Константин Сонин Российская экономическая школа Политическая экономика Откуда берутся и почему так устойчивы плохие институты? Почему демократические государства проводят плохую экономическую политику? Зачем (и кому) нужно регулирование? Почему политики не выполняют своих экономических обещаний? Чем плохо неравенство? Почему веймарская республика просуществовала столь недолго? Может ли быть неэффективная децентрализация? Курс политической экономики посвящен ответу на эти и другие вопросы. Книги: Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1998) The Grabbing Hand, Harvard Univ. Press. Barzel, Y. (2002) A Theory of the State, Camb. Univ. Press Дополнительно: North, D. (1981) Structure and Сhange in Economic History, Norton. Roland, G. (2000) Economics and Transition: Politics, Markets, and Firms, MIT Press. 1. Введение: экономика и политика 2. Политики и фирмы Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1994) Politicians and Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 995-1025. Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2003) The Curley Effect, Quarterly Journal of Economics, to appear. 3. Неравенство и перераспределение Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) Inefficient Redistribution American Political Science Review, 95: 649-61 Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) A Theory of Political Transitions, American Economic Review. Glaeser, E., Sheinkman, J., Shleifer, A. (2002) The Injustice of Inequality, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming. Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? American Economic Review, 83, 409-14. Polishchuk, L., Savvateev, A. (2001) Spontaneous (Non) Emergence of Property Rights, mimeo. 1 Sonin, K. (2003) Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming. 4. Политэкономия регулирования Djankov, S. et al (2002) Regulation of Entry, mimeo. Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2003) The Rise of Regulatory State, Journal of Economic Literature, to appear. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Corruption, Quartely Journal of Economics 108, 599-612. 5. Происхождение институтов Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001) The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development, American Economic Review, forthcoming. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., (2000) Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 11671199. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, mimeo. Barzel, Y. (2002) A Theory of the State, Camb. Univ. Press, главы 1-2. Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2001) Legal Origins, Quarterly Journal of Economics, to appear. Engerman, R., Sokoloff, K. (2001) La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999: “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-279. 6. Конституции и избирательные системы Alesina, A., Aghion, P. (2002) Endogenous Political Institutions, mimeo. Myerson, R. (2000) Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster, mimeo. Person, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (1997) Separation of Power and Political Accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 4, 1163-1202.. 7. Экономика и политика федерализма Enikolopov, R., Zhuravskaya, E. (2003) Influence of Political Institutions on the Effect of Decentralization, mimeo. Inman, R., Rubinfeld, D. (1997) Rethinking Federalism, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 43-64. Lambert, A., Sonin, K., Zhuravskaya, E. (2003) Capture of Law: Economics and Politics of Russian Bankruptcy, mimeo. Sonin, K. (2003) Provincial Protectionism, mimeo. Qian, Y., Roland, G. (1998) Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review, 1143-1162. Weingast, B. (1995) The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, v. 64, 131. 2 Zhuravskaya, E., (2000) Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics 76 (3), 337-368. 8. Политическая экономия реформ Shleifer, A., Treisman, D. (2000) Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia. Roland, G. (2000) Economics and Transition: Politics, Markets, and Firms, MIT Press. Hellman, J. (1998) Winners Take All: the Politics of Partial Reform, World Politics 50, 203234. 9. Долгосрочная политика Acemoglu, D. (2003) Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics, mimeo. Schwarz, M., Sonin, K. (2003) War and Peace, mimeo. Полтерович, В. (2000) Институциональные ловушки, препринт РЭШ. 3