ВЕСТНИК Российского университета

ВЕСТНИК
Российского
университета
дружбы народов
НАУЧНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
Основан в 1993 г.
Серия
ФИЛОСОФИЯ
2014, № 1
Серия издается с 1997 г.
Российский университет дружбы народов
С О Д Е Р ЖА Н ИЕ
От редакции ...........................................................................................................
5
ГУМАНИТАРНЫЕ НАУКИ И ПОЗНАНИЕ:
ФИЛОСОФИЯ, ЛИТЕРАТУРА И ЯЗЫК
Степанянц М.Т. Экологическая цивилизация: утопия или будущее мира? ..............
6
Нижников С.А. Символ как средство познания сознания в творчестве М.К. Мамар-
дашвили .....................................................................................................................................
15
Канаева Н.А. Образ истины в традиционной индийской философии .......................
24
Защитина Г.В. Посредники коммуникации: когнитивный и прагма-стилистиче-
ский аспект тропов в современном массмедиальном дискурсе ..................................
32
Зорин А.В. Линии развития тибетоязычных изданий сборника «Сунгдуй», впервые
напечатанного в монастыре Тактэн, основанном Таранатхой ....................................
40
ФИЛОСОФИЯ И ЛИТЕРАТУРА:
АСПЕКТЫ ВЗАИМОВЛИЯНИЯ
Рашковский Е.Б. Философские смыслы в лирической поэзии: к постановке вопроса ..
53
Гревцова Е.С. Философское содержание творчества А.П. Чехова ...........................
59
64
Муссауи Е.В., Ковыршина Н.Б. Отражение философских тем в арабской литературе ...
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ ОСНОВАНИЯ ДИАЛОГА
РАЗЛИЧНЫХ ЯЗЫКОВЫХ КУЛЬТУР
Пахомов С.В. Сотериологический потенциал Высшего Бога и проблема зависимо-
сти и освобождения индивидуальных существ в индуистском тантризме .................
Скороходова Т.Г. Я-сам как другой: мыслитель Бенгальского Ренессанса в диалоге
с Западом ......................................................................................................................
Десницкая Е.А. Отрицание семантической связи в индийской классической культуре ...............................................................................................................................
69
78
87
ПРОБЛЕМЫ ПЕРЕВОДА
ВОСТОЧНЫХ ФИЛОСОФСКИХ ТЕКСТОВ
Смирнов А.В. Счастье как само-осуществление у Ас-Сухраварди и Ибн ‘Араби ....
94
Псху Р.В. Историко-философский метод интерпретации концепции Брахмана
в ранней вишишта-адвайта-веданте .............................................................................
Титлин Л.И. Понятие пудгалы в буддийской школе пудгалавада: проблема интерпретации и эволюция концепта ....................................................................................
Мазепова Е.В. Концептуальная оппозиция «свой/чужой» в персидском лингвокультурном пространстве .............................................................................................
Лапицкая О.А. Историография работ по Ал-Кушайри ..............................................
101
105
112
120
НАУЧНЫЕ СООБЩЕНИЯ
Жданов В.В. Миропорядок и справедливость в контексте предфилософских кате-
горий древнеегипетской мысли первого переходного периода и среднего царства ...
Кулагин И.В. Диалог цивилизаций в Иране: Мохаммад Хатами ...............................
Псху Р.В. Экспликация одного известного, но непопулярного факта .......................
126
132
137
НАШИ АВТОРЫ .....................................................................................................
143
© Российский университет дружбы народов, Издательство, 2014
© «Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов», 2014
BULLETIN
of Peoples’ Friendship
University
of Russia
SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
Founded in 1993
Series
PHILOSOPHY
2014, N 1
Series founded in 1997
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
CONTENTS
Editorial note .................................................................................................
5
HUMANITIES AND KNOWLEDGE:
PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE
Stepanyants M.T. Ecological civilization: utopia or the future world? ..........................
Nizhnikov S.A. Symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K.
Mamardashvili ...............................................................................................................
Kanaeva N.A. Image of truth in traditional indian philosophy ........................................
Zashchitina G.V. Communication mediators: the cognitive and pragma-stylistic aspect of
tropes in modern mass media discourse ...........................................................................
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first
printed in the rtag brtan monastery founded by Tāranātha ...............................................
6
15
24
32
40
PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOLOGY:
ASPECTS OF INTERACTION
Rashkovsky E.B. Concerning the philosophical background of lyrical poetry: some preliminary notes ................................................................................................................
Grevtsova E.S. Philosophic content of Anton Chekhov’s work .....................................
Mussawi E., Kovyrshina N. Philosophic ideas in the arabic literature ...........................
53
59
64
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPRETATION
OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGE CULTURES
Pakhomov S.V. Soteriological capacity of the godhead and а problem of individuals’ de-
pendence and release according to hindu tantrism ............................................................
Skorokhodova T.G. Oneself as Another: the Bengal Renaissance thinker in a dialogue
with the West .................................................................................................................
Desnitskaya E.A. The denial of semantic relation in Indian classical culture ..................
69
78
87
PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION
OF ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS
Smirnov A.V. Happiness as self-realization: two islamic approaches ...............................
94
Pskhu R.V. Historic-philosophical method as a way of interpreting a concept of Brahman
in the early vishishta-advaita school ................................................................................
101
Titlin L.I. The concept of pugdala in the buddhist school of pudgalavāda: the problem of
interpretation and the evolution of the conception ............................................................
Mazepova O.V. The self/other conceptual binary in the persian lingua-cultural area .......
Lapitskaya O.A. Historiography of al-qushayri’s heritage ..............................................
105
112
120
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
Zhdanov V.V. World-order and justice in the context of ancient egyptian pre-philosophical
categories of the first intermediate period and the middle kingdom ..................................
Pskhu R.V. Explication of one known but not popular fact .............................................
126
132
137
On Our Authors .......................................................................................................
143
Kulagin I.V. Dialogue of civilizations in Iran: Mohammad Khatami ...............................
© Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Publishing House, 2014
© «Bulletin of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia», 2014
ОТ РЕДАКЦИИ
В предлагаемом вниманию читателей номера «Вестника» представлены научные статьи на основе пленарных докладов и научных сообщений известных
и пока мало известных ученых из ведущих университетов России и академических
институтов, с которыми они выступали на конференции «Гуманитарные науки
и познание: философия, литература и язык», проведенной в 2013 г. в рамках Четвертой международной конференции «Сагадеевские чтения». Материалы данного
номера объединены единством замысла: показать важность и актуальность междисциплинарных исследований в гуманитарных науках, а также особенности
трансляции знания в рамках перевода философских текстов, созданных в одной
культуре для восприятия в другой культуре. Общая характеристика представленных статей и материалов может быть определена как углубление и предметное
уточнение понятия междисциплинарного подхода в рамках гуманитарных наук,
позволяющее поставить вопрос о достоверности и адекватности переводов философских текстов на другие языки, т.е. речь идет о рассмотрении способов понимания и интерпретации различных языковых культур, философских оснований перевода и ряда других проблем. Особое внимание при этом уделяется взаимосвязи
литературы и философии в различных культурах (Е.Б. Рашковский, Е.С. Гревцова,
Е. Муссави и Н.Б. Ковыршина). Безусловно, ряд авторов ставят вопрос в целом
о цивилизационном подходе как общем контексте, характеризующем особенности
понимания и интерпретации в рамках проблемы «Свой-Иной» (М.Т. Степанянц,
И.В. Кулагин).
Представляется важным, что ряд актуальных проблем гуманитарных наук
рассматриваются как философские проблемы, например, символ как средство
познания (С.А. Нижников), образ истинны в традиционной индийской философии
(Н.А. Канаева), миропорядок и справедливость в контексте предфилософской
древнеегипетской мысли (В.В. Жданов). Представленные статьи в рубрике «Проблемы перевода восточных философских текстов» с особой остротой ставят вопрос о взаимосвязи философии, лингвистики и о проблемах языковых культур.
Особо хотелось бы отметить, что это статьи в первую очередь философов или,
точнее, историков философии, имеющих опыт перевода оригинальных источников. Редакция вместе с авторами этой рубрики и рубрики «Философские основания
диалога различных языковых культур» предлагают поразмышлять о связи философского дискурса с коммуникативным контекстом, т.е. речь идет об анализе оригинальных текстов в рамках определенных коммуникативных ситуаций и о проблемах внутри самого философского текста, который можно рассматривать как
важный инструмент осмысления взаимосвязи между различными проблемными
полями философского и религиозного дискурса (А.В. Смирнов, Е.В. Мазепова,
Р.В. Псху, Л.И. Титлин, О.А. Лапицкая, С.В. Пахомов, Т.Г. Скороходова, Е.А. Десницкая).
5
HUMANITIES AND KNOWLEDGE:
PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE
AND LANGUAGE
ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION:
UTOPIA OR THE FUTURE WORLD?*
M.T. Stepanyants
Main researcher
Institute of Philosophy Russian Academy of Sciences
Volhonka str., 14/1-5, Moscow, Russia, 119992
The construction of the ecological civilization is a task which could be solved by the contribution
on behalf of the peoples representing different cultures. Plurality of axiological orientation makes culture
multidimensional, dialogical, allows the latter to transform itself, moving to the periphery that was yesterday
dominant in the culture and putting forward that what responds to the needs and demands of the new
times. Any utopia, as inversion of an existing society transformed by the author's imagination, not only foretells but also diagnoses the need for the correction of a social order. It opens up new possibilities, offers
options for changes. The construction of ecological civilization could be compared with the scheme of growing the ‘Rose of the World’ dreamed by Daniel Andreev.
Key words: Culture, nature, ecological crisis, violence, Faustian spirit, non-violence, utopia, dialogue.
There is an exiting and thought promoting metaphor used by Russian poet and
thinker of the middle of the XX century Daniel Andreev (1906—1959) in his best
known book The Rose of the World («Roza Mira»). For Daniel Andreev, the Rose of
the World is a flower each petal of which is an image of the great world religions and
cultures. The Rose of the World it is a project of unification of the humanity based on
the merge of the cultures. However, in his view, the traditional doctrines and cultural
essentials should be critically rethought. They are to be reformed so that to put the
end to disrespect towards nature which is to be converted into the Garden. A special place
in the Rose of the World should be given to a reverence for nature; the temples of stihialej (elements of nature) will hold in it the central place. The construction of ecological
civilization is similar to the scheme of growing the ‘Rose of the World’ since the two
projects could be brought in the life only by collective efforts.
It is not realistic (nor admissible) to aspire the uniformity in understanding the
meaning of human existence and the norms of human behaviour. Yet, it is imperative
to exert efforts to work out common approaches to the issues which determine the
fate of mankind. This urgency results from the actuality: the humanity is truly going
on through the processes of globalization and hence there is a certain category of pheno* The paper was submitted to the Second Conference of World Cultural Forum (Taihu, China) —
Strengthen International Cooperation to Build an Ecological Civilization (Hangzhou, China,
18th—19th May, 2013) which the author was not able to attend.
6
Stepanyants M.T. Ecological civilization: utopia or the future world?
mena that requires worldwide participation. There are two kinds of problems: local and
universal which are the problems of humanity as a whole. Poverty, wars, new technologies, ecology have turned into global challenges. They demand for their solutions collective efforts, which can be undertaken only if certain values are commonly accepted.
The construction of the ecological civilization is a task which could be solved only by
the contribution on behalf of the peoples representing different cultures.
The variety of attitudes toward nature is endless. We trace the evolution of the
attitudes through the different stages of human history. Roughly there have been four
main phases (Daniel Andreev). At the first phase, associated with polytheism, human
beings were not conscious of Nature as something distinct from them and did not contrast themselves with it.
At the second phase people practically ignored Nature or even were hostile to it.
The monotheistic teachings made them to believe that only humans could grow spiritually while Nature, on the other hand, is “stagnant and static; it is amoral and irrational; it is under the power of the demonic”.
The third phase is connected with age of scientific supremacy. It is characterized
by a strictly utilitarian view of Nature when the latter is to be looked at as an object of
rational (scientific) research and its resources are to be exploited for human use.
The people had to enter the age of the metropolis in order to experience a longing
for Nature. People in large cities, separated from Nature as never before by great distances and missing its warm embrace, have begun returning to it. They carried the
seeds of a new, more mature relationship with Nature. This turn had been prompted
and even forced by the challenges caused by ecological crisis and a danger of the
global catastrophe. That is the fourth phase during which we are living.
One should keep in mind that the variety of attitudes to Nature is entrenched in ontological foundations of culture as such. It is quite obvious when we compare anthropocentric understanding of human nature and its provisions in this world along with
Faustian spirit of the European Renaissance and Enlightenment (the prerequisites for
which existed already in classical Greek and Roman thought) which prevail in Western
culture with the approach typical for traditional cultures (Asian, African, etc.) strongly
committed to antropocosmism.
The key-notion of traditional Chinese ontology was codified as early as in the
I-ching (Book of Changes), which had a paradigmatic impact on the whole Chinese
culture. As it is well known, the basic structure of the I-ching system is formed by the
eight trigrams (pa-kua), combinations of three lines. According to Chen I-Chuan
(1033—1107), one of the renowned commentators of the Book of Changes, “in ancient
times, the sages instituted the system of the Changes in order to follow the principle
of nature and destiny … (Each hexagram) embraced the three powers (Heaven, Earth,
and Man)…” [1. P. 269].
The unity of human being with Nature (Universe) was in particularly emphasized
in Taoism. Its adherents consider the human being to be ideal if he or she manages to
make the true nature predominate over the false. “The sage-man learns of Heaven and
follows nature. He should not be tied by convention nor enticed by the sophism of
man. He looks to Heaven as father and Earth as mother” [2. P. 58].
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
At the Beijing Forum in 2007 the keynote speech (by Lang Ye) was on “The
Eco-consciousness in Chinese Traditional Culture”. It was claimed in it that Chinese
traditional culture contains intense eco-consciousness. Chinese ancient thinkers believed
that human and everything are integrity, belonging to a big life world. So human beings
are of the same breed with creatures. They are equal. Human has no rights to consider
himself as the dominator of the world. We shouldn’t “sacrifice the nature of creatures
to fit the nature of us”, while we should love every creature in the world, make them
live and develop according to their own nature, that is “fit each nature”.
What Confucius advocates as the “benevolence” is not only to love your family
and people, but also to spread your love to every creature of the world. Since humans
and all other creatures are integrity, all belong to the world. Mencius said: “To love your
family, then love the people, and then love the creatures.” Zai Zhang said: “People are my
compatriots, things as well.” Yi Cheng said: “People, sky and earth are integrity.” Such
sayings are countless. All have the same meaning: human and creatures are of the
same kind, are equal, and should build up harmonious relationship.
Related to the consciousness of eco- ethnics and eco- philosophy, there is also
eco-aesthetics consciousness in the traditional culture. Chinese ancient artists mostly
stressed to embody the liveliness of the creatures. Gai Wang of Qing Dynasty said in his
The secret to Drawing Fish: “To draw fish is to draw its liveliness, just like it is swimming.” Chinese artists never draw dead fish or dead birds. The flowers, birds, insects,
and fish under the pen of Chinese artists are all vivid, filled with liveliness. The image
world of flowers, birds, insects and fish, drawn by Chinese artists is a world of life,
containing human and everything, and so embodies Chinese eco-consciousness.
Lang Ye comes to the conclusion that “The core idea of eco-ethnics and ecophilosophy is to transcend the western traditional “human-centered ism”; to build up a
new concept of “eco-integrity ism” which advocates all creatures in the ecosphere.
There will be equally true to acknowledge a strong eco-consciousness in traditional Indian culture. The first thing that ‘baffles’ a Western person reared in the spirit
of the Enlightenment is the seeming non-detachment of human beings in the Indian
tradition from the world of all other living creatures. This statement could be justified
only partly, because the sacred texts attribute to a human being an exclusive right to
conduct rituals and make sacrifices, thereby recognizing the particular bond between
the human and Divine. The fundamental difference between human beings and animals lies in the former’s capacity to follow dharma, or the “moral law”.
According to the conventional idea predominating in India the world was created
in order to realize the moral law of dharma. Cosmogonist processes are not related to the
arbitrary rule of gods, no to natural mechanical causes, but rather to moral principles —
or to be more precise, to the moral state of the creatures inhabiting the cosmos. According
to the epic cosmology of the Indians, the “decline” of the dharma at the end of the each
cosmic cycle leads to pralaya, a period of “cosmic night” during which the world disintegrates while souls reap the fruits of their past actions.
One should not draw hasty conclusions from the above, and assign the exclusive
role of nature’s ‘king’ to human beings alone. There are many Hindu, Buddhist, and
Jain texts recognizing the involvement of not only human beings but also of animals
in the maintenance of dharma. It is quite significant that though one of the most wide8
Stepanyants M.T. Ecological civilization: utopia or the future world?
spread synonyms for the word “man” in ancient Hindu texts is manusya, a derivative
from the verb ‘to think’, some of the texts point out that access to knowledge is not an
exclusively human ability: “True, humans are knowledgeable, but they are not the only ones; for even birds and beats all have knowledge of some sort” [3. P. 260].
The metaphysical basis for eco-consciousness is deeply rooted in one of the central
philosophical concepts of Indian culture, religion and philosophy — samsara (in Sanskrit — “passing [through a sequence of states]”) which means a rebirth, reincarnation, and transmigration of souls. Samsara in combination with the idea of karma is
often referred to as the law of moral causation: rebirth is a moral retribution for karma:
good deeds cause a favorable rebirth, bad is bad. Each of inhabiting space creatures
reborn during 8400 thousands (mahakalp) equal to 432 000 million human years, and
at the end of this period, automatically reaches Nirvana. Then the cycle resumes.
Recognition of karma and samsara as the natural mechanism of ‘evolution’ of
all living things entails a number of problems. Among the first one is value relativity
of any individual existence: for through infinite time of rebirth each will have chance
to be a rich and a poor, a parent and a child, an executioner and a victim, a teacher
and a student, a good and an evil person, a man and a woman, an animal and a God.
Atman by transiting from one existence to another one, only changes its ‘shell’—
‘body’. Atman itself is not subject to samsara. The Upanishads distinguish three
possible kinds of rebirth: “the way of the gods”, leading to Heaven where there is no
returning to the Earth; “the way of our ancestors”, leading to the Moon, where did the
soul, turning into rain, falls to the ground, humidifying plants; a person or an animal
eats plants, its seeds penetrates into the human’s seed bringing by this way a new life
(cf. cycles of substances in nature). The third way is mainly ‘reserved’ for insects
(these include lice, fleas, flies, worms, worms, etc.) or to everything which holds exclusively negative karmic impulses. They are condemned to be reborn in the same position as for the launch of transmigration you must have at least a minimum of Dharma.
Buddhism, unlike Hinduism considers heaven and hell, not as a ‘transit point’
between the old and the new birth, but rather as a place where this rebirth actually
takes place. In Buddhism six ‘directions’ of reincarnation are recognized out of which
four are bad. These are Hell, Kingdom of animals, dwelling of hungry ghosts and
asuras. As to the two good ‘directions’ they are the human world and the Heavens.
It is these believe in rebirth which makes quite possible reincarnation of a human
soul in a ‘body’ of other creatures that has driven another very important concept of Indian culture — ahimsa. Ahimsa (in Sanskrit — non-harming) means to avoid killing
and injuring by action, word or thought to all beings. It is the fundamental, the first
virtue of all Indian moral systems, the first stage in ethical training. One of the most
famous references to ahimsa is contained in the Chandogya Upanishad (III. 17.4)
where it is one of the five virtues (along with pursuits, generosity, honesty and truthfulness). However, the initiative of making ahimsa the first and most important virtue
belongs to those who opposed Brahmanism, that is to Buddhism and Jainism in which
sacrifice of animals was considered to be improper, incompatible with the principle of
ahimsa.
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
For the Buddhists and the Jains ahimsa is the first requirement in the morally behavioral training. Under the influence of Jainism and Buddhism ahimsa became the most
important virtue in Hindu epics. Thus, according to the Mahabharata, as the traces of all
animals dissolve into the elephant trail, all other deeds of Dharma dissolve in ahimsa;
a human being, who practices it, becomes immortal and by protecting all living beings,
follows the highest way of self-perfection (XII. 237.18—20). In the lists of virtues in
Dharmašastra ahimsa often hold the first place, followed by truthfulness, honesty,
cleanliness, generosity, restraint and patience (Manu Smriti X. 63).
In the reformed form the ideal of ahimsa has received recognition in Indian in
the age of the national liberation struggle. Mahatma Gandhi’s own life was an example of an untiring, bold and decisive experiment with ahimsa.
Gandhi’s experiments were basically different from those which are known in
Hindu, Buddhist or Jain traditions. They are not limited only to the internal world of
man. They are conducted in the broad social context. Thus, Gandhi’s proposed campaign
of civil disobedience came to be known as Satyagraha which means “insistence on
truth.” Those who participated in Satyagraha were called upon to achieve his/her aims
without causing physical or material harm to an ‘opponent’. In case of punishment,
he/she must accept it without a murmur, with utmost humility. Obviously, it is extremely difficult to conduct oneself in this manner. That is why it is necessary to prepare very seriously for participation in Satyagraha by bringing up consciousness of
strength, calmness and firm resolution.
Gandhi suggested Swaraj, a non-violent political structure. He meant by that the
structure which was to be decentralized. He dreamed independent India to be turned
into a confederation of free and voluntarily interacting villages, each of them being a
state unto itself, having full powers. The village will undertake to provide the inhabitants food, clothing, the organization of law and justice, education. The society,
which consists of a free confederation of village republics will, in Gandhi’s words,
“not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom — i.e. not a hierarchical
structure based on force — but it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the
individual. The whole becomes one life composed of individuals never aggressive in their
arrogance, but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they
are integral units” [4].
For Gandhi liberation of the Indian people from colonial oppression was not the
final objective of struggle. In freedom he saw only the first step towards building a nonviolent civilization. Gandhi explained his views on civilization in detail in his paper
Indian Opinion as far back as 1908, while he was in South Africa. This ‘dialogue’ of the
editor (Gandhi) with the reader was later published as a separate brochure called Hind
Swaraj or Indian Home Rule.
By civilization Gandhi understood that mode of conduct which points out to the
path of duty. In his view, contemporary Western civilization does not correspond to
this understanding and is therefore the “incarnation of evil”. “The chief symbol” of
Western civilization is the machine which “represents a great sin” [5. P. 94]. Gandhi
was opposed to the big machine because in machine-production he saw the destruction
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Stepanyants M.T. Ecological civilization: utopia or the future world?
of cottage industries and the traditional Indian way of life. “It is machine that has impoverished India. It is due to Manchester that Indian handicraft has all but disappeared” [5. P. 93]. Gandhi compared machine production with a snake-hole which
may contain from one to a hundred snakes: “cities destroying villages, slavery of the
workers, horrible exploitation of female labor, unemployment, sexual laxity, lack of
faith in God, and mechanical means of transport which harm the health of the people”
[5. P. 96]. Violence permeates Western civilization in all its spheres — in economics, in
politics, in mutual relations between people, in international relations. “The greatest
sin” of the civilization was imperialism [5. P. 96].
Gandhi was repulsed by the machine-dominated West because of the destruction
of man’s links with nature. True civilization, in Gandhi’s view, must be based on the
principles of conscious and voluntary self-restraint. In the economic field, this means
relying on the villages and cottage industries. It was no accident that Gandhi chose
the spinning wheel as the symbol of the national freedom movement. He looked upon
the spinning wheel as an instrument of national regeneration. The spinning wheel could
revive handicrafts and free the Indian people from dependence on colonial imports of
cloth, ensure mass employment, and in this way remove unemployment in the country.
Gandhi’s world outlook fully reflected the attitudes of European opponents of
machine-civilization, so well expressed by Nikolai Berdyaev: “Technology radically
changes man’s relationship to space and time. It is inimical to all organic bodies. In the
technological period of civilization man stops living among animals and plants. He
plunges into a new cold-metallic atmosphere, in which there is no more animal warmth,
no blood. The rule of technology leads to the weakening of emotionality in human
life. ... Technology kills all that is organic in life...” [6. P. 219].
Of course, N. Berdyaev was not the only Russian whose thoughts were in harmony
with the views of Gandhi. It was Leo Tolstoy whose ideas on non-violence were at
the most corresponding to those of Mahatma. Gandhi repeatedly acknowledged Tolstoy’s
name among three personalities who had made the greatest impact on his own thoughts
and ideas (the two others were Henry David Thoreau and John Ruskin). In Gandhi’s own
words, during the first years of his life in South Africa he made an ‘intensive’ study
of such of Tolstoy’s works as The Gospels in Brief and What to Do? But it was The
Kingdom of God is Within You which made the strongest impression on him [7. P. 212,
373]. In October 1909 Mahatma wrote his first letter to the Russian writer in which he
drew the attention of Tolstoy to “passive resistance” in Transvaal and asked his opinion about it. In his last letter to Tolstoy in August 1910 Gandhi informed him about
founding of the Tolstoy Farm in South Africa “for the needs of the non-resisters and
their families” and promised “to make every effort to live up to the ideas which you
(Tolstoy — M.S.) have so fearlessly placed before the world” [8. P. 348]. In the same
letter Gandhi explained that the farm was named in Tolstoy’s honor as a stimulus to
further efforts to achieve the same ideals “which the writer had put forward before the
world” [8. P. 347].
The two great men were in tune in their non-violent attitude to nature in general
and to the animals, in particular. Gandhi wrote that if animals could talk, their story
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on our crimes against them would shake the world. It is just what Tolstoy made by
writing his story about man’s cruelty to a horse in his famous story Strider. Those
people who knew Tolstoy said that it seemed as if he understood what animals were
thinking about.
Each culture encloses in itself the golden rule of ethics: “Treat others as you wish
to be treated”. In the beginning of the XX century, marked by the greatest violence towards the humans and the nature, Tolstoy and Gandhi added to that rule: “Treat as
you wish to be treated the other human beings and the animals”. Ecological crisis
which we face nowadays tells us to expand the impact of the above mentioned rule on
the whole nature by making the golden rule of ecology.
The views of the proponents of non-violent civilization might appear to the majority of people to be utopia. In fact, Gandhi soberly assessed the prospects for realizing
his design of a non-violent civilization. Two years before his death, he wrote: “I may be
taunted with the retort that this is all Utopian and, therefore, not worth a single thought.
If Euclid’s point, though incapable of being drawn by any human agency, has an imperishable value, my picture has its own for the mankind to live” [9. P. 112].
Utopian have been considered the views of those who belong to that trend of
thought which is called ‘Russian Cosmism’. It is based on holistic worldview that implies a certain teleological evolution of the universe. It is characterized by a sense of universal unity and co-dependence. Russian cosmists are in search of the place of humans
in space. They try to perceive the relationship of space and terrestrial processes. They
recognize man as the microcosm and the universe as the macrocosm, and insist that
there is the need to balance human activity with the integrity of this world. Cosmists
ideas have been shared by some scientists like the founder of cosmonautics Konstantin
Tsiolkovsky (1857—1935), Vladimir Vernadsky (1863—1945), who worked on the
concept of noosphere, biophysicist Alexander Chizhevsky (1897—1964), world known
paleontologist Ivan Efremov (1908—1972); philosophers like Nikolay Fedorov (1829—
1903), Alexander Syhov-Kobilin (1817—1903), Peter Uspensky, religious thinkers,
artists, poets, writers, etc.
Some philosophers find the consonance of the main principles of the philosophy
of cosmism with many fundamental ideas of modern scientific picture of the world
and their positive potential for the development of a new metaphysics as the philosophical foundation of the new development stage of science. The adherents of cosmism
see the relevance of their ideas in solving challenges, such as the problem unification
of humanity in the face of the ecological crisis. They consider cosmism to be the original
fruit of Russian intelligence, rooted in unique Russian archetype of “universal unity”
(vseedinstvo). There are at the same time many critics of the above mentioned trend
of thought which is evaluated as occult, non-scientific, too vague, etc.
Every culture has its own utopias because people can not live without dreaming
or hoping about an ideal society. There are different kinds of utopia: political, social, economic, religious, technologic, etc.
The most widely-known utopias are socio-political like Plato's Republic and
Thomas More’s Utopia. As to ecologic utopias they deal with new ways in which so12
Stepanyants M.T. Ecological civilization: utopia or the future world?
ciety should relate to nature. Among the Western authors of ecological utopias one
may call the writings of Thomas More, Henry David Thoreau, Peter Kropotkin, William Morris, Ebenezer Howard, B. F. Skinner, Aldous Huxley, Ernest Callenbach,
and Murray Bookchin, etc. [10] Much less are known to the Eastern ecologic utopias
like Chinese The Peach Blossom Spring — a prose written by Tao Yuanming, also
known as Tao Qian (365—427), a poet of the Six Dynasties period (c. 220—589 CE).
The narrative goes that a fisherman who sailed upstream a river, came across a beautiful blossoming peach grove and lush green fields covered with blossom petals. Entranced by the beauty, he continued upstream. When he reached the end of the river, he
stumbled onto a small grotto. He squeezed through the passage and discovered an
ethereal utopia, where the people led an ideal existence in harmony with nature. He
saw a vast expanse of fertile lands, clear ponds, mulberry trees, bamboo groves, and
the like with a community of people of all ages and houses in neat rows. The people
explained that their ancestors escaped to this place during the civil unrest of the Qin
Dynasty and since that time had no contact with anyone from the outside. Thus, the
community was secluded and unaffected by the troubles of the outside world. Eventually, the Chinese term Peach Blossom Spring came to be synonymous for the concept of utopia.
What role could be played by utopias in the construction of non-violent civilization?
In responding to this question I fully agree with Marius de Geus, from the University
of Leiden in the Netherlands, which was expressed in his book named Ecological Utopias: Envisioning the sustainable society (International Books, Utrecht, The Netherlands. 1999): utopian thought provides insightful social critique and imaginative vision.
Any utopia, as inversion of an existing society transformed by the author's imagination, not only foretells but also diagnoses the need for the correction of a social
order. It opens up new possibilities, offers options for changes. Utopia is not an antagonist to history per se, but a protest against its inescapability. The utopist could be
compared with an artist who creates a picture of the future by using not so much the
abilities of his/her reason as by imagination, intuition.
Any culture contains both an orientation towards harmony between man and nature, and an orientation to rule over natural forces, an orientation towards intrusion
into them. It would be erroneous to bring the crops to any single alternative axiological orientation. The “share” of each orientation varies in different cultures and in different historical periods of the same culture. One should not forget about the existence
in western culture the orientation which approves values of love and non-violence. Suffice is to recall the views of Francis of Assisi, of the Christian mystics, of Thomas
Aquinas, P. Abelard, P. Teilhard de Chardin, A. Schweitzer. Just as it is mistaken to reduce oriental cultures to “symphonic unity of man and nature” (A. Schopenhauer),
forgetting the parallel existence in those same cultures focus on violence in social relations.
Plurality of axiological orientation makes culture multidimensional, dialogical,
allows the latter to transform itself, moving to the periphery that was yesterday dominant
in the culture and putting forward that what responds to the needs and demands of the
new times. Let us use these plurality by believing in our great capacities as the human
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beings: “We Are Born to Make a Fairy Tale Come True!” These are the lines from a very
popular poster (painted by Valentin Viktorov). The lines appear to be tailor-made for the
dawn of the Space Age; yet they were written in early 1920s, they come from the
Aviation March, the official marching song of the Soviet Air Force. The dream to conquer space and vastness is becoming true with the fast development of the Space age
started by the first human space flight in Apri 1961.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Selection from Remarks on Certain Trigrams // A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.
Trans. and compiled by Wing-Tsit Chan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1963.
[2] The Tao. The Great Luminant. Essays from Huai Nan Tzu. Trans. By Evan Morgan. London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1933.
[3] Cited from Chakrabarti, A. Rationality in Indian Philosophy // A Companion to World Philosophies. Ed. by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe. Oxford: Blackwell. 1999.
[4] Gandhi, M.K. Independence // “Harijan”, 28 July 1946.
[5] Gandhi, M.K. Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. Ahmedabad. 1938.
[6] Berdyaev, N. The Spiritual State of the Contemporary World. Paper read in May 1931 at the
Congress of Leaders of World Christian Federation // “Novy Mir” (Russian), No. 1, 1990.
[7] The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Delhi. 1970. Vol. I.
[8] Literary Heritage (in Russian). Vols. 37-8.
[9] Gandhi, M.K. Two American Friends // “Harijan”, 16 November, 1947.
[10] de Geus e Geus, M. Ecological Utopias: Envisioning the sustainable society. International
Books, Utrecht, The Netherlands. 1999.
ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЯ:
УТОПИЯ ИЛИ БУДУЩЕЕ МИРА?
М.Т. Степанянц
Сектор восточных философий
Институт философии РАН
ул. Волхонка, 14/1-5, Москва, Россия, 119992
Построение экологической цивилизации — задача, осуществление которой если и возможно,
то лишь при участии народов разных культур. Многообразие аксиологических ориентаций делает
культуру многомерной, диалогичной, способной к трансформации, отодвигая на периферию то, что
только вчера было в ней доминирующим, и выдвигая на передний план то, что отвечает потребностям и требованиям нового времени. Утопия — это по-существу инверсия существующего общества,
порожденная авторским воображением. Она ставит своего рода диагноз болезненному состоянию
общества и дает свой «рецепт» его «излечения» посредством внесения поправок или принципиальных изменений. Утопия тем самым открывает новые горизонты развития. Построение экологической
цивилизации можно сравнивать с проектом выращивания «Розы мира», о которой мечтал Даниил
Андреев.
Ключевые слова: культура, природа, экологический кризис, фаустовский дух, ненасилие,
утопия, диалог.
14
SYMBOL AS A MEANS OF COGNITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
IN THE WORKS BY M. K. MAMARDASHVILI
S.A. Nizhnikov
History of Philosophy Chair
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Miklukho-Maklay str., 10a, Moscow, Russia, 117198
The article reveals the specificity of understanding the symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K. Mamardashvili. It demonstrates the difference between his interpretation and the
analogues existing in neo-Kantianism and Russian Silver Age metaphysics (P.A. Florensky, A.F. Losev, etc).
The symbol of consciousness is seen as an “empty shape”, a transcendental issue, through which transcendence generating man as a spiritual and moral being becomes possible Mamardashvili’s criticism of the naturalized theory of ideas (“Platonism”) is analyzed. The idea itself is seen as a symbol of consciousness, a unit
of its description. The entire history of philosophy is considered from the same point of view.
Key words: consciousness, metaphysics, Platonism, philosophizing, spiritual cognition, symbol, transcending, transcendental, theory of ideas.
Merab Konstantinovich Mamardashvili (1930—1990) is often referred to as the
“democratic aristocrat” and the “Russian Socrates of Georgian descent” [1. P. 24].
V.P. Vizgin mentions in his memoirs that he was famous for his “conversation-like
speech”, and he was an “artist in philosophy”. Along with Socrates, he could be called
the “incarnation of philosophy”, or even better, “philosophizing”, for he “philosophized
out loud”. To Mamardashvili, philosophy was an “art of thought serving the art of existence”; therefore, he regarded its discourse full of scientific terms as secondary in relation to its humanistic goals. Returning to the ancient Greeks and medieval concepts, he
was bringing it closer to wisdom: he was a philosopher of a personality, not that of ideas
(Hegel), a phenomenologist, not a follower of Husserl. Like Heidegger, he saw phenomenology as an “accompanying point of any sort of philosophy”. He has always
been himself in his inimitable discourse; “my experience is not typical”, he said about
himself. We would like to call him a philosopher of consciousness who was developing
a new theory of the symbol, which has not yet been studied despite a number of publications. Mamardashvili was also a critic of the Hegelian-Marxist interpretation of historic progress and the policy devoid of personality and morality. Today, the fact that
the works by M.K. Mamardashvili are a contribution to world philosophy, comparable
to the achievements of well-known Western philosophers of the 20th century is indisputable.
According to Mamardashvili, symbolism has a very special meaning different
from the generally accepted Cassirer’s and Jung’s interpretations. It is also different from
what was described by P. Florensky and other “symbolist” representatives of the Silver
Age in Russia, including A.F. Losev. Mamardashvili interprets symbolism as a property
of consciousness, through which conscious, spiritual, and moral life is possible. It is not
a mere property (which can be found in traditional symbolism), it is a structure, or a matrix that produces meanings. In this case, the thinker means not the content of symbolism,
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or merely its role in culture, but the symbol from the point of view of functioning of
the human consciousness, its special regime and its condition, “Symbols are tools of
our conscious life. They are the things of our consciousness, not analogies, comparisons, or metaphors” [2. P. 38]. Mamardashvili, unlike his predecessors from the Silver
Age, implements an abstract or formal analysis of the symbol. He is interested not in
its specific content, but in its form, within which, the “content of consciousness” is constituted and structured” [6. P. 73].
In his work Symbol and Consciousness, Mamardashvili solves the “original metaphysical problem: interpreting the symbol in the context of consciousness”. To approach it, first of all, he reveals the difference between the notion of a sign (“something that stands for nothing”) and that of a symbol (“symbols are understandings”)
[6. P. 73, 83, 86]. What is the importance of the symbol for cognition? Consciousness
cannot be comprehended directly, since it is always at least one step above or deeper
than its own content is. The content of consciousness will never reach the limits of
consciousness — the shape. If we assumed it, we would have to accept the possible
expansion of self-consciousness to the limits of consciousness, thus switching from
Mamardashvili’s cognitive methodology to the metaphysics of consciousness and the
relevant religious symbols to describe this state, or their ontological recognition. In yoga,
it is referred to as Samādhi; in Buddhism, it is called Nirvana. Such descriptions can
be found in the spiritual and religious traditions mentioned above and in some other ones.
However, they do not satisfy the scientific method as they cannot be verified. At the same
time, they cannot be rejected, either, for they are not merely present in the tradition,
but also ennoble man spiritually and morally. Mamardashvili sets the task of comprehending spiritual knowledge by excluding faith in the symbolic and ontological reality
of the things literally described by these symbolic pictures of this world and the spirit.
At the same time, he criticizes all the reductionist concepts of understanding of consciousness which deduct or derive it from any other things.
The fact is that consciousness cannot be cognized directly the way we cognize
everything else, including our own self, with the help of consciousness. In order to
cognize consciousness, we need to objectify it, turn it into a thing opposed to us, but this
is impossible, because it would take another consciousness, a different one, to make
a comparison, and so on, and so forth, to infinity. Plato implies it in the idea of the “third
eye”, or an additional idea needed to realize the relationship between the first idea and
the thing. Aristotle, in his critique of Plato, does not consider the idea as a symbol of
consciousness, but naturalizes it, then mercilessly criticizing this naturalized representation. An idea can be either limited or limitless: any thing existent is perceived and comprehended in its context. An idea is just the light, which is differentiated into colors
later on. In this aspect, all the criticism of Plato’s theory of ideas misses the point: it
preliminarily objectifies the idea, and then criticizes the objectified image.
M.K. Mamardashvili demonstrates an entirely original vision of history of philosophy, metaphysics, and, in particular, Plato’s theory of ideas. In his opinion, an idea is “not
something used for describing or depicting”, but something “constructive”, or “generating”. In this aspect, an idea “is not a thing... [it] is not present somewhere in a special
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Nizhnikov S.A. Symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K. Mamardashvili
world, in addition to things. It is real in a different sense than the real things are” [4.
P. 162]. Mamardashvili points out that the “topos”, the place of the idea, is not located
somewhere in the space and time. One can say it is a spiritual symbol. This concept is not
a metaphysical and cosmological one, but a regulatory and transcendental one (let us
recall Kant).
In this connection, Mamardashvili writes:
“...The very idea of the existence of a certain ideal world derived from the idea
of ideas was first introduced on the basis of the Aristotelian doctrine, though it may
seem rather strange. Aristotle is the first to have a reason for such consideration because
he found a place for ideas. He drove the ideas out of the world... Aristotle sort of localized
Plato’s ideas, that is, he did not refute the theory of ideas, but quite an opposite thing
happened, and it had an impact on the subsequent history of philosophy” [4. P. 164].
However, in history of culture, “secondary symbolism” won: the idea was objectified, and the “philosopher’s cultural shadow” turned out to be “more important than
the philosopher himself” [4. P. 168]. This is how the phenomenon referred to as Platonism appeared.
Purified by Kantian critique, Mamardashvili supposes that ideas should be regarded
not in a transcendent (i.e., traditional metaphysical and theological), yet in a transcendental (or, as he called it, intelligible) way, but implementing transcendence at the
same time. In his opinion, Plato’s theory of ideas is the “first theory of consciousness
ever observed in history of philosophy”. From this point of view, the idea is a transcendence, a “point through which we emerge from the world”, a “moment that seems to be
out of time” [4. P. 165, 168]. We would say that an idea is a spiritual symbol. By naturalizing it, making it rough and external, we completely distort and destroy its understanding.
An idea symbolizes the infinite horizon of the essence of a thing. It is an absolute limit beyond and over which nothing exists and nothing can be said. Therefore,
an idea cannot be considered to be similar to anything else, because it is the source of
any principle of similarity. Hence, it cannot be perceived by its own self: one cannot
see one’s own eyes, by means of which, however, one can see everything. In this regard,
Aristotle probably criticized the Megarian school more than Plato himself, but in the
text, Aristotle does not seem to separate these two different teachings. All of his criticism is based on the space and time coordinates of the world of sense that he tries to
spread to the speculative world, thereby doubling the world. It turns out that Aristotle
initially vulgarizes the theory of ideas, reducing it to the level of empirical reality, and
then criticizes it because the speculative cannot be directly applied to the sensual:
contradictions are inevitable. Aristotle is not so much trying to figure out what Plato was
actually going to say, or what truth he attempted to express by introducing the concept
of an idea; instead, he vehemently criticizes the obvious contradictions that were noticed
and understood by Plato himself, and criticized by him in Parmenides dialogue. Was
Aristotle searching for the truth or trying by all means to contrast himself to his former
teacher to make room for his own independent thinking in order to find some other
foundations and develop a different way to avoid the problems Plato was facing? Perhaps
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both reasons are true, and it would be difficult to distinguish between them. Still, according to Mamardashvili, “Aristotle was a more average genius”, a “less tragic one”,
compared to Plato [4. P. 161].
Consciousness is a concept as ultimate as God or death (it is true of all spiritual concepts in a certain sense). They cannot be objectified to be understood, because the
process of objectification destroys the thing to be learned. Let us consider the concept
of death as an example. We do not know and cannot know what it is. Epicurus is
known for making this statement, seeking to neutralize the fear of death. In order to
cognize it according to the usual cognitive procedures, one should simply kill oneself
and watch it to understand the experience of death. But it is impossible by definition,
for death is the elimination of consciousness. That is exactly what Kirillov in Demons
by Dostoevsky wanted to realize; this is why he needed to kill himself to make sure
that there was no God. Actually, suicide is an absurd attempt to comprehend the incomprehensible: consciousness. In fact, we basically cannot understand what death is.
But, nevertheless, it is the thing most known to everyone: many people have already
died. However, we will never be able to comprehend whether the dead are really
dead; therefore, the theory of immortality of the soul is ineradicable. We cannot have
a glimpse beyond the experience of consciousness. We can only artificially construct it,
i.e. reinvent it. Concepts of the afterlife are assumptions every person (or every tradition)
creates in a certain manner, but “death” is nothing but a symbol of consciousness itself.
“Eternal life” is a symbol of consciousness, a shape, and the specific description of
this eternity is the secondary (informative) symbolism, that is, speculations. After all, we
have no mirror to look at our consciousness from the outside, and only circumstantial
descriptions through “secondary symbolism” are possible.
In this context, cognition of consciousness is an attempt to awaken from sleep,
“turn the eyes of the soul” from the shadows to the light, trying to turn to consciousness
itself, its immediate symbolism, from endlessly shuffling the endless deck of cards —
the symbols of what we are not supposed to know. This is where the critical pathos of
Kant inherited by Mamardashvili emerges. We are surrounded by things in themselves;
we ourselves and our consciousness represent a thing in itself, something inconceivable,
though it is the thing closest to us. We take our images for our own self, and therefore
we are profoundly mistaken. We perceive secondary symbolism as the primary one,
and the illusion of perception for ontology.
In culture, spiritual knowledge is focused on special “symbolic structures”, for example, a symbol of unconditional love or pure faith, etc. Mamardashvili emphasizes
that “faith as a real psychological state of any human being is impossible. It is as impossible as unselfish love. Nevertheless, we live in a field connected with these symbols
which generate human conditions within us…” Both philosophy and religion make part
of such “symbolic structures”, or “special forms” [7. P. 100] which allow us gaining
the experience that we would not be able to keep in mind or understand without them,
“God is a symbol of a certain power that acts in the world in spite of our foolishness”
[2. P. 38]. Touching upon the symbolism of the Gospel, in particular, the expression saying, “he that gives his soul away shall lose it, and he that is afraid to lose it shall lose it”,
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Nizhnikov S.A. Symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K. Mamardashvili
he writes, “The importance of this kind of symbols for the only possible mode the
events of our conscious life can happen and do happen in is obvious” [3. P. 19].
Besides, Mamardashvili understands history of philosophy in a completely different way, through the theory of symbolism of consciousness. Starting his lectures
on ancient philosophy, he noted that he would try to “tell the history of philosophy as
a history of people’s single attempt to philosophize, though extended in time” [4. P. 9].
Meanwhile, he only uses the “empirical” history of philosophy (who said, when, where,
and what was said) as the materials, an “introduction to philosophy, an attempt to grasp
its specificity and the things acts of philosophizing consist of”. He is not interested in
“dead knowledge”. The challenge consists in revitalizing the mental states concealed
behind the texts. To him, a philosophical text is not an element of bookish knowledge, but a certain design of condensed meaning. The task is to take this meaning out
of its “package”. In this case, philosophy turns to philosophizing, as Heidegger mentions. History of philosophy is not a study of philosophical empiricism, but trying to
take part in the act of thinking recorded in the text. At this point, Mamardashvili’s
point coincides with that of Heidegger, but it is not limited to that view, as he develops
it further. The essence of this “further” development is that Mamardashvili regards
history of philosophy and philosophizing as unfolding the potentials of consciousness that
are constructive in relation to man: acts of philosophizing are a condition of life or
conscious beings, they are their way of life. Therefore, history of philosophy is “recorded
events of acts of self-creation of a certain creature that is not born by nature”, and this
creature is called “man” [4. P. 11]. In this respect, man descends from philosophizing
which involves specific acts of consciousness, like in religion and art, yet philosophy
has its specificity: it tends to interpret them. According to Mamardashvili, philosophy
seems to overtake, catch up with the reflection of consciousness that generated it
along with man, myth (religion), and art. Therefore, philosophy is transformed into
theory of consciousness, a science of consciousness — an attempt to understand the
specificity of its operation.
In this regard, Mamardashvili demonstrates a distinction between the reflective
content of philosophy and the historical form it is expressed in. Traditional “empirical”
history studies exactly metamorphoses of these historical forms of philosophizing;
consequently, it is interested in this object (subject) content which is always living
and constructive towards man. From this perspective, he draws a paradoxical conclusion,
“there is no history of philosophy at all” [4. P. 11], if we approach it the same way we
approach history in general. He means not history of philosophy but history of philosophy, which involves only acts of philosophizing, not their empirical, textual, or other
framing. We can truly understand any philosophy that has taken its place in history of
philosophy only when we go through the same act of philosophizing that could have
happened two and a half thousand years ago for the first time. Still, in the realm of the
spirit, space and time are powerless. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Socrates, and Kant are
our contemporaries in this regard: their thought is placed in eternity, and if we, too,
have reached that level, it means that we have met them, reconstructed the same acts
of thought, and created a piece of personality within ourselves. Consequently, in re19
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ality, there is no history understood as history of external philosophy, or its texts.
That is, they certainly exist, but they cannot have anything in common with the acts
of philosophizing registered in them.
In this context, Mamardashvili’s statement that philosophy cannot be taught, for
teaching it is pointless, becomes clear. The challenge is not providing a student with
the “heavy heap” of the information stating when certain prominent persons lived, what
they said, and in what way someone’s points differ from someone else’s words. The audience should be awakened to philosophize, make something happen within their
minds due to thinking, or generate some meanings in order to “live their lives in a conscious and worthy way”. This is why the lectures by Mamardashvili are so strikingly
different from the traditional lectures by university professors of philosophy, who seek
to show off their erudition or their knowledge of some minor details from the lives of
philosophers and the development of their ideas. Mamardashvili’s lectures cannot be
merely listened to: you have to do something about yourself at a certain point. Listening
to his texts or reading them requires some feedback; he involves the audience ready to
think along with him into a “whirlpool” of philosophizing (Heidegger). In this sense,
his style of philosophizing is really Socratic, it is true maieutics.
Speaking of man, Mamardashvili emphasizes the fact that we have to deal with
existence, which depends upon the willingness and effort to be as existence does, but,
at the same time, this existence does not depend on our efforts at all: we can make efforts
to cause an act of philosophizing, but we cannot deterministically generate it artificially, entirely through our own efforts. But it can only happen if we comply with all
the procedures of thinking in accordance with the laws. Like any creative process,
philosophizing is spontaneous.
Therefore, philosophy is not a picture of the world, or ideological preaching, as
Heidegger puts it. “Pictures of the world” can certainly be found in philosophy, but
they are not essential. Developing a perspective of things in existence is generally a prerogative of science. The “subject” of philosophy is existence, not in a naturalistic, cosmological (Engels’, or “ontological” sense, as it is popularly called: we speak of the essence)
sense, but in constructive and creative terms concerning the thinker himself.
According to Mamardashvili, a philosophical text is interesting not due to the
views it reflects, but as a trace of a “person making oneself”, “texts are related to us by
effort, not by the content of the views they contain”, so they have “eternal modernity”
[4. P. 12, 13]. Philosophical texts should be treated in the same way we treat myths. The
essence of the latter is not giving us any concepts, true or false ones. Myth is a “manshaping machine”. Philosophy is a different type of “man-shaping machine”. This is not
mythology of the concept, but mythology of mind. The essence of Mamardashvili’s
approach is in the fact that he is not interested in metaphysics of concept (myth) or
metaphysics of mind (the traditional “Platonic” idea of philosophy). He is less interested
in the content of these concepts of the world (their falsity or truth) than in what they
produce in man and how they transform him, what happens to consciousness, and
how man arises as a personality, a responsible moral being.
To sum up, Mamardashvili also identifies two types of philosophizing. The first
one is the “symbolic” one, i.e. using the language of symbols. Understanding this phi20
Nizhnikov S.A. Symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K. Mamardashvili
losophy is reduced to interpreting the symbols it uses; to do that, one should be within
this symbolic system. A philosophizing man and a man eager to understand him have
to share the same “symbolic space”, and be bound by the “same glue made of symbols” [5. P. 14]. If the stock of symbols is not identical, understanding will be impossible. This philosophizing is aimed at sharing a certain spiritual state, and becomes
similar to a sermon.
On the contrary, the second type of philosophizing does not tend to express its
own or universal concepts through certain symbolism, moreover, it regards it as an
inevitable distortion of the truth to be interpreted. This type of philosophizing (based
upon the phenomenological tradition, and even before that, upon Kant and transcendental philosophy) seeks to exclude all the symbolic points: it does not practice interpreting “secondary symbolism”, instead, it is oriented towards “pure consciousness”
every sentient being a priori has. The task of understanding such philosophizing is not
getting into someone else’ soul, intuition in the banal sense of the word, “psychoanalysis”, or deciphering symbolic speech, yet “overcoming the difficulties of one’s own
feeble-mindedness”, since the problem is cognizing the “analytical expression of an understandable and clear thought” [4. P. 14]. This is what implies the “scientific nature”
of Kant’s method, as understood by Heidegger and Mamardashvili.
This kind of philosophy treats the symbolic pictures of the world as a certain
kind of allegories, that is, specifically as the symbolic ones. In this case, the symbols
themselves are not important (the truth is not to be found in them), while the function
they perform is. For example, the postulate of existence of God can be treated in this
manner. Kant refers it to the sphere of practical faith. Mamardashvili shares this
point, explaining that such postulates are initially meant to organize our lives, not to
describe the objective or any other world. The same point applies to the postulate of
the immortality of the soul: it is not a physical object; therefore, no definition from
the physical world can be applied to it. Mamardashvili illustrates this idea, “But, nevertheless, Kant would say, I assume that the soul is immortal, that is, my assumption is
based on the way I determine my moral responsibility” [4. P. 86—87]. The concepts of
God, the soul, etc. are defined by Mamardashvili as the metaphysical ones, that is, not
subject to the verification test. In his opinion, they are related to being, not to existence (there are objects perceived by the senses). The concepts he attributes to being are
characterized by the fact that they do not describe the world and its structures, or the
presence of certain items within it, yet they characterize the being of the one who expresses such thoughts. Such symbols or metaphysical concepts as “empty shapes” are
required for generating a certain man, the second, spiritual birth, not for describing
reality.
Let us return to Heidegger again in this regard: he defines metaphysics, the core
of philosophy, apophatically: he no longer treats it as a science in the traditional way of
understanding a science, a description of the world, or ideological preaching [8. P. 81,
82]. Metaphysical thinking is “thinking in extreme terms embracing the whole and including existence” [8. P. 89]. Within this thinking, this-being (Da-sein) is revealed.
Furthermore, Heidegger constructs his Da-sein existential metaphysics. In contrast, Mamardashvili avoids any metaphysical constructions, while remaining entirely on the basis of understanding the metaphysical concepts as the regulatory ones instead of the
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
constitutive ones, in a practical rather than an ontological way — that is, he stays
within the limits of philosophizing determined by Kant and Husserl in this regard.
Meanwhile, Mamardashvili explains, “the word ‘transcendental’ includes the core
word ‘transcendence’”, though “philosophical reasoning excludes transcendent things”.
Apparently, he means that, in transcendental philosophy, transcendence is practiced,
yet there is no transcendent object. Transcendence is implemented “not for a thing, but
for a shape, a symbol”. The transcendent has only symbolic value here, i.e. it is not affirmed that something denoted by the symbol exists. But if there is a focus on such
symbol, if there is transcendence, it means that “something arises at this side of this
focus; this arising entity is being” [5. P. 209]. Some kind of objectless transcendence
appears — the transcendence without any subject. The entity that seems to be the object
in “symbolic”, “transcendent” philosophy (philosophy of the transcendent) is regarded as
a symbol in transcendental philosophy; this symbol is devoid of specific content, and
referred to as an “empty shape”. It is a certain symbol without a thing to be symbolized,
a demythologised symbol deprived of any notion. It apparently differs from a sign only
by its constitutive power in relation to man.
Distinguishing between these two types of philosophizing by means of terminology,
Mamardashvili defines the first one as means for describing the “transcendent world,
whereas the second one is defined as emerging from the “transcendental consciousness”.
The first type is inclined to interpreting symbols as objective existence, and can be
reduced to religion understood in a vulgar way, and the idealist (“Platonism”) or naturalistic (materialism) metaphysics. The second type prohibits speaking about spiritual
realities as objects: transcendental philosophy “refers to an object that does not exist,
which is not defined in any possible way...” [5. P. 286]. However, this “referring” transcendence generates what is called human in man — the spiritual, the moral, the social,
and the legal — and gives rise to man as Homo sapiens.
Translated by T. Ivanova
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Vizgin V.P. All of Us Loved Him So Much… // Merab Konstantinovich Mamardashvili. —
Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009. — Pp. 17—32 (Визгин В.П. Мы все его так любили… // Мераб
Константинович Мамардашвили. — М.: РОССПЭН, 2009. — С. 17—32.)
[2] Mamardashvili M. Being a Philosopher Is a Destiny // The Way I Understand Philosophy… —
Moscow: Progress, 1990. — P. 27—40. (Мамардашвили М. Быть философом — это
судьба // Как я понимаю философию… — М.: Прогресс, 1990. — С. 27—40.)
[3] Mamardashvili M. The Way I Understand Philosophy… // Ibid. — P. 14—26. (Мамардашвили М. Как я понимаю философию // Там же. — С. 14—26.)
[4] Mamardashvili M.K. Lectures on Ancient Philosophy. — Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya, M. Mamardashvili Foundation, 2009. (Мамардашвили М.К. Лекции по античной философии. —
М.: Прогресс-Традиция, Фонд М. Мамардашвили, 2009.)
[5] Mamardashvili M.K. Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy. — Moscow: ProgressTraditsiya, Merab Mamardashvili Foundation, 2010. (Мамардашвили М.К. Очерк современной европейской философии. — М.: Прогресс-Традиция, Фонд Мераба Мамардашвили, 2010.)
22
Nizhnikov S.A. Symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in the works by M.K. Mamardashvili
[6] Mamardashvili M.K., Piatigorsky A.M. Symbol and Consciousness (Metaphysical Discourse
on Consciousness, Symbolism, and Language). — Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya, Merab
Mamardashvili Foundation, 2009. (Мамардашвили М.К., Пятигорский А.М. Символ
и сознание (Метафизические рассуждения о сознании, символике и языке). — М.:
Прогресс-Традиция, Фонд Мераба Мамардашвили, 2009.)
[7] Mamardashvili M. Phenomenology: An Attendant Element of Any Philosophy // The Way I Understand Philosophy… — Moscow, 1990. — Pp. 100—106. (Мамардашвили М. Феноменология — сопутствующий момент всякой философии // Как я понимаю философию… —
М., 1990. — С. 100—106.)
[8] Heidegger M. What Is Metaphysics? // The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. — Moscow,
2007. — Pp. 80—171. (Хайдеггер М. Что такое метафизика? // Основные понятия метафизики. — М., 2007. — C. 80—171.)
СИМВОЛ КАК СРЕДСТВО ПОЗНАНИЯ СОЗНАНИЯ
В ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ М.К. МАМАРДАШВИЛИ
С.А. Нижников
Кафедра истории философии
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 10а, Москва, Россия, 117198
Вскрывается специфика понимания символа как средства познания сознания в творчестве
М.К. Мамардашвили. Отмечается отличие его трактовки от существующих аналогов в неокантианстве и русской метафизике Серебряного века (П.А. Флоренский, А.Ф. Лосев и др.). Символ сознания
рассматривается как «пустая форма», трансценденталия, благодаря которой оказывается возможным
трансцендирование, порождение человека как духовно-нравственного существа. Анализируется критика со стороны Мамардашвили натурализированной теории идей («платонизма»). Сама идея рассматривается как символ сознания, единица его описания. С этой же точки зрения рассматривается
вся история философии.
Ключевые слова: сознание, метафизика, платонизм, философствование, духовное познание,
символ, трансцендирование, трансцендентальный, теория идей.
IMAGE OF TRUTH
IN TRADITIONAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
N.A. Kanaeva
Cathedra of the History of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
National Research University “Higher School of Economics”
Maliy Tryehsvyatitelsky Pereulok, 8/2, Moscow, Russia, 101000
Truth is one of the key values in Western culture, and in the History of Western Philosophy it had
different images. The position of truth in the History of Indian Philosophy was similar. But sometimes
in India it is very difficult to retrace the way from the word ‘truth’ to the philosophical category. In this article
are traced main lines of discussions about the truth and principal senses of Indian terms (satya, jñāna,
Dharma, prāmāхya). Buddhists were the firsts who introduced the concept of truth, originally in a form of
the Four noble truths doctrine then as Mahayana concept of the two truths (conventional and absolute). In Indian tradition, as well as in Western philosophy, truth was considered differently in existential, moral, ontological, soteriological, epistemological and logical perspectives. Indians also distinguished between inferential and semantic concepts of truth. From Western point of view their aspiration to build a theory of the
World, which will explain the existence of its different natural and supernatural levels, which are cognizable
by rational and super-rational means, brought Indians to paradoxical, contradictory results. Typical example
of such contradictory theory of truth can be found in Jaina relative truth doctrine about impermanent and pluralistic reality (syādvāda or anekāntavāda).
Key words: cognitive practice, epistemological truth, Indian epistemology, logical truth, requirements
for truth, satya, stratification of being, truth in Indian philosophy.
In Western culture truth is considered to be the ideal of cognition and as one of its
basic values. In the History of Western Philosophy truth as well as other cultural values
appeared in different images. In Antiquity it was viewed like Good, being (Plato, Aristotle), like ideal of inquiry and the way of its attainment or proving [1. C. 323] (in modern
epistemology), like meanings of propositions (in Logic), the logical ontology (in ‘semantic conception of truth’ of A. Tarski) or even superfluous property of the propositions
(in deflationary conception of truth by A. Ayer). Among current theories of truth one
can choose between the correspondence theory, conventional and coherence theories
of truth. Historically philosophers discussed the ideas of absolute truth and relative one,
an empirical and theoretical truth, and now more frequently we are even hearing that
notion ‘truth’ is not really a productive concept and so there is no need in this notion at
all. This list of the truth’s images transformations in the history of Western Philosophy
is a vindication of its innate pluralism in comprehension and it compels us to perceive
the truth pluralism as philosophical norm [2. C. 50].
Truth in India was also very significant category, but along of original character
of Indian thought the word ‘truth’ had its own way for transforming to the philosophical category. Sometimes it is very difficult to retrace this transformation for the reason
that truth in Paхуitas (1) discussions had divers names and sometimes wasn’t named
explicitly at all. But it is necessary to identify the meaning of the Indian philosophers’
discussions as the discussions about truth, because this meaning provides understand24
Kanaeva N.A. Image of truth in traditional indian philosophy
ing of the level Indian theoretical thought as very high and it helps to see the peculiarity
of Indian philosophy. Such reasons became the foundations for the choice of our topic
of study. I am planning to show the beginnings of truth question in Indian philosophy
and how Indian thinkers began to use term ‘truth’ as the philosophical category. I’ll try
to fetch out main lines of discussions about truth and principal senses of the term
which are comparable with Western ones. Basic method of my research will be semantic
analysis of the pre-philosophical and philosophical texts in Sanskrit where are present
different conceptions associated with the terms indicating truth.
Most correlative with term for ‘truth’ in Sanskrit is word ‘satya’. It was derived
from ‘sat’ — ‘being’, ‘existing’. ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘venerable’, ‘reality’, ‘a sage’ and so on
[3. P. 1134] and inherited from ‘sat’ some meanings: ‘truth’, ‘reality’, ‘entity’. They use
‘satya’ also as adjectival words: ‘true’, ‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘genuine’, ‘truthful’, ‘successful’,
‘pure’, ‘virtuous’, ‘good’, ‘valid’ an so on [3. P. 1135]. Word satya was employed in
vedic literature from the Ancient time. иgveda teems with derivatives from satya,
Upanisads and epic poems ‘Mahābhārata’ and ‘Rāmāyaхa’ include set of names and
epithets for heroes which are secondary from ‘satya’ like Satyavatī (mother of
Vyāsa), satyā (epithets of Durgā and Sitā), in purāхas (2) highest sky in the world
structure, Brahma loka, was named Satya-loka (Sky of truth) and they told about
Satya-yuga (Golden age of truth and purity).
Thanks to Buddhists word ‘satya’ became the philosophical category. They were
the first who suggested their concepts of truth. Brahmans had no need in satyacategory, because they had dharma-category. Dharma was universal category and it was
signify the universal law, World order, religion, moral prescriptions, status rules, principles of law, various kinds of systematical teachings, Good etc. Dharma-universalia has
its roots in Vedic religion (3) and for this reason it acquired religious, sacral character.
So meanings ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ were attributed to word ‘Dharma’. So it was impossible
for Brahmins to ask any questions about validity of Dharma and they had no need in its
rational justification. Vedic religion is a belief not only in the pantheon of thousands
gods but in the Vedic language, Sanskrit, as in force of World’s creation. Belief in
Dharma as the embodied eternal word of Vedas (śabda) was one of the conditions for
using the ‘dharma’ as ‘truth’. It would be tautology for Brahmins to talk about truthfulness of Dharma in their sacred contexts.
Brahmanical Dharma was struck by śramaхas and Buddhists were among them.
Buddhists brought up the issue of truthfulness of Brahmanical Dharma as well as the
issue of the validity of the instruments for its acknowledgment, which were enumerated
in Brāhmaхas and Upaniщads. It was historical irony that śramaхas for the disavowal
of Brahmanism employed the same theory of dialectics (theory of public debates or —
in modern terms — theory of argumentation) which was originally elaborated in Brahmanical schools. In Brāhmaхas and Upaniщads dialectics appeared under the name
vākovākya (the art to ask questions) [4. P. 6], and in smзti-literature it was named
ānvīkщikī (consideration, clarification, research, analysis) [5. P. 792]. Ānvīkщikī didn’t
employ dialectics for the solution of metaphysical problems and justification of those solutions before the birth of the philosophical reflection of World and human life in V AD.
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Brahmins applied ānvīkщikī to discussions about special issues of theology, eristic, principles of law and medicine in their professional schools. This Brahmanical tool Śramaхas began to use against them for disestablishment of Brahmanical pre-philosophical
ideology and so they demonstrated themselves as match opponents for Brahmins.
Why are we talking about Buddhists as the beginners of truth conceptualization?
Buddhists were the firsts who identified their own (not Brahmanical) Dharma with satya
and proposed two theories of truth at once. The first one we find already in earliest
Buddha’s sermons about Four noble truths, the second one is two truths theory. It was
created by early Buddhists schools while later scholars subscribed it to Siddhartha
Gautama himself (4). According to L. de la Vallée Poussin in Chinese schools of
Buddhism were elaborated theories in which the correlations of two and four truths
was set down [6. P. 159—187].
The Doctrine of Four noble truths not only articulates sense of each ‘truths’ but also
explains how to reach their realization. The first Buddha’s sermon (according to
‘Dhamma-cakka-ppavatana-sutta’) stated that the first truth (about suffering) must
be understood completely, the second one (about thirst) must be helpful for refusing
from thirst, the third one (about nirvāхa) must be attained and the fourth one (about
way) ought to be put into the practice. In ‘Sa#yuttanikāya’ (LVI. 30) and ‘Visuddhimagga’ (XVI. 84) process of realization of the four truths recieved some different features, but it was described in the first sermon too. Two ways of the Truths’ realization
(sacca-$āхa) were told in those texts: understanding (anubodha-$āхa) and penetration
(paсivedha-$āхa). Understanding is mundane (lokiya) knowledge and it aids to drop
suffering; penetration is super-mundane (lokuttara) knowledge and it refers to cessation
of suffering and realization of all four truths at the same moment.
The doctrine of Four noble truths have four senses in one: an existential (because
they all are serving to human existence), moral (because they are imperatives for a good
behavior), ontological (because they distinguished levels of being — lower, with suffering, and higher, without suffering) and soteriological one (for they all show the way
to the salvation). Those senses were also the points of bifurcation in Buddhists Philosophy: each of them was the beginning for new conceptions of truth which entered
in the whole Indian tradition of Philosophical thought.
Doctrine of two truths became the logical corollary from the primary stratification
of being in the tenet of Four truths. It is also acquired epistemological sense. In epistemological frame term ‘truth’ is equivalent to term ‘knowledge’ (in Pali — $āхa, in Sanskrit — j$āna). In doctrine of two truths Buddhists distinguished ontological and
epistemological senses. Existence of two levels of reality they fixed in special terms:
higher being (paramārtha-sat) and lower being (vyavahārika-sat), and they validated
them by designation of two correlative kinds of truths: higher truth (paramārtha-satya)
and lower one (vyavahārika-satya).
Being heavy at odds with validity of supernatural reality Buddhists provoked variety conceptions about the structure and knowability of that reality. Later this Buddhist
stratification of reality in two levels was adopted in Vedānta (5). In ‘Abhidharmakośa’
by Vasubandhu quite different conceptions of reality by Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas
26
Kanaeva N.A. Image of truth in traditional indian philosophy
and Vaibhāщikās are presented. In realistic Sarvāstivādins ontology higher reality was
explained as ultimate truth “consists of irreducible spatial units” (paramāхu), which exist
the only moment (kщaхa), and of “irreducible temporal units (e.g., point-instant consciousnesses) of the five basic categories”; lower reality was explained as the conventional
truth “consists of reducible spatial wholes or temporal continua” [7]. Sautrāntikas
placed in higher reality the essences of some moments (dharmas) of consciousness flow
(dravyasat) and other dharmas, which they named unreal (praj$āptisat), they regarded
as lower reality [8. C. 625]. Their conception of two realities developed by Yogacārins
Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara in conception of particularia (svalakщaхa) and
universalia (sāmānya-lakщaхa) [9. C. 182]. And when Yogacārins came in with development of epistemology and logic of their own, they introduced in Buddhist ontology
de facto the third, ideal reality: the world of thought, “where there is no Matter at all,
there are only Ideas” [10. P. 509].
One may read background for Buddhist conception of two truths in such Brahmanical texts like ‘Muхуakopaniщada’ and others in which two kinds of knowledge,
higher and lower (parā caivāparā), mentioned. But in ‘Muхуakopaniщada’ (III. 2.4-6)
and in other texts the old, Vedic knowledge is opposed to the new post-Vedic knowledge
(Atman comprehension, which ascetics-зщi achieve by yoga and saпnyāsa). From this
fact another reason and another goal for the conception of two truths follow. World
pictures in four Vedas and in Upaniщadas were different, but Brahmins couldn’t say
that first of them was a delusion. Two truths conception let to legitimized the contradictions between them and in this way it preserves the idea of the continuity of sacred
tradition. This is why Buddhist theory of two truths cannot be considered just as a result of evolution of Brahmanical ideas.
Teaching of epistemological truth as a result of different cognitive practices in
Indian philosophical tradition is much elaborated. It also includes a part which tells
about logical truth, because Logic didn’t become in India a special science. Epistemological truth was considered in the frame of doctrines of sources or instruments of valid cognition (pramāхavāda). In such theories truth always go as cognition (pramā,
j$āna) and it was opposed to not-truth (apramā, aj$āna). Even Buddhists in their
pramāхavāda prefer agnominate it j$āna, not satya. This preference seemed to be determined by traditionalism of Indian intellectual life and by the fact that in the beginning of this tradition Brahmins (who were its creators) didn’t employ ‘satya’ as philosophical term. One of the main epistemological problems for Indian paхуitas was the
problem of the ability of instruments of knowledge to give valid knowledge (prāmāхya)
[11. P. 133] while for a philosopher of Western tradition the meaning of this problem
is a question about existence of epistemological truth. Among ten pramāхas which
named by different schools, most allowed were perception (pratyakщa), inference
(anumāna) and testimony which often was treated as eternal word or sound (śabda) (6).
Logical truth was investigated in two relatively independent theories and Indian logicians asked two questions connected with such truth: 1) about the inference of truthful
propositions in the frame of theory of inference (anumānavāda), and 2) about meanings
of the words in the frame of theory of meanings (apohavāda). Named theories allow
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us to talk about the fact that Indians distinguished among inferential truth and truth as
semantic concept. The answers for the first question were definitions of invariable
concomitance (vyāpti, anyathānupapatti) of Major (sādhya) and Middle (hetu) terms
in inference (anumāna). Anumānavāda allowed of resolution the justification problem
for inferential knowledge. Apohavāda explained truth-conditions for sentences which
are made up of words and phrases. As a result of this division of reality into two levels
in Indian tradition, empirical and logical truths, which are produced with the help of reason, received lower status of the conventional truth. In Western Philosophy the same
kinds of truth have been seen as the higher ones for a much long time.
The receiving of perception as valid source of knowledge sets before epistemologists the problem of the criteria of perceptual truth. Indian realists, who admitted the
existence of universalia and a soul as subject of cognition, had got the royal road for
its resolving. So realists of six orthodox darśanas argued sense organs (indriya) and its
objects (viщaya) contacted and just at the precise moment the soul received knowledge
of the universalia which was verbalized. Buddhists nominalists didn’t recognize reality
any objects, any universalia, any soul, that’s why their cognitive situation was more
difficult. But it was more convenient to the things in reality. And they have found an
exit from the situation when they have seen truth-criteria for perceptual judgments in
its empirical effectiveness. “Knowledge is right when it makes us reach the object,”
wrote Dharmottara in his “Nyāyabinduсīkā” [12. P. 6]. Judgment “This shell is yellow”
will be true only in the case when shell is really yellow but it is not only seemed yellow
for the reason of eyes disease.
Very significant factors influenced deeply on Indian conceptions of epistemological
and logical truths were the comprehension of cognition aims not as the truths about
first elements of the World (as in Ancient Greece), but as the truths of human entity, and
that truths did not considered as fruitless for practical activities. In India epistemology
was elaborated as discipline useful for practice, admittedly, practice was understood
in a special sense: not as material production of one’s own life but first of all as its spiritual production. And main aim of life they saw in finding the way out of circle of rebirth and death, the way of release (mokщa). Material production of goods was not interesting issue for Indian thinkers. Epistemology was taken in the sense of teaching
about most important means (sādhana) for mokщa — knowledge. Such practical (inherently soteriological) orientation of pramāхavāda determined requirements for any
truths as ideals of knowledge. Those requirements weren’t written but implicitly were
in the scholars reasoning and they may be reconstructed and uttered in the words. The reconstructed requirements are: 1) clarity and obviousness (nirхaya, niścaya, adhyavasāya)
those propositions which pretend to be truthful; 2) they must have the practical value;
3) they must be verifiable by practice. Seeing higher truth isn’t verifiable by practice
in physical World (because it is transcendent) they formulated rule 4) truthful knowledge must be gained in accordance with special rules, which are fixed in authoritative
texts. And at last rule 5) truthful knowledge must open the whole picture of reality,
not a piece of it. It is clear that perceptual and inferential truths didn’t satisfy last rule.
For this reason they never were higher truths in India though they were such ones in
28
Kanaeva N.A. Image of truth in traditional indian philosophy
Western philosophy. Higher truth for Indian scholars was unspeakable truth which
became a result of insight into transcendent reality by means of super-abilities like
numinous perception of yogin (yogīpratyakщa) and meditative practices (for Buddhists),
omniscience (kevalaj$āna), telepathy (manaюparyāya), clairvoyance (avadhi) (for Jainas) and mystic love for God (bhakti) (for Vedantists).
Aspiration to built theory of World which would explain the existence of its different levels, natural and supernatural, cognizable by rational and super-rational methods, brought from Western point of view paradoxical, contradictory results, but
from the point of view of Indian tradition they were not the paradox. Such example of
the contradictory epistemology we find in Jainism. Jainas didn’t accept the two realities conception from Buddhists, but conception of two truths they accepted. They opposed the ontological doctrine of plural, manifold reality (anekāntavāda) to Buddhists
two realities and also they opposed two theories, “connected with anekāntavāda like
wings are connected with bird” [13. P. 177], to epistemological conceptions of other
darśanas. They were the doctrine about points of view (nayavāda) and method of conditioned predication (syādvāda) or sevenfold paralogism (saptabhaпgī). Named theories showed their consanguinity with the methods of public debates from which they
grow and they agreed in a rude fashion with postdate conception of instruments of cognition (pramāхavāda), which Jainas included in their philosophy later. According them,
diversity of reality doesn’t mean, its stratification and insulation of such level which is
materially incommensurable with human cognitive abilities. It doesn’t mean also that
various kinds of knowledge are materially incommensurable. But for Jainas it means that
it is possible to articulate the propositions about reality which are true in some or other
aspect (by form-rūpa or by substance-dravya or by place-kśetra or by time-kāla) that
is they are relatively true. Question ‘What to do with relative truths?’ wasn’t a problem for Jainas. They didn’t feel embarrassment about truths’ relativity. For them it is
normal because reality is changing permanently and we can’t obtain permanent truth
about it. Indeed, their conceptions nayavāda and syādvāda prescribe to form a lot of
propositions about the same object (7), and all they are relative truths. Why so? Because Jainas had no need in positive knowledge about physical things for material practice but they used their methods for the demonstration of relative character of all theses
advanced by their opponents. Nobody intended to formulate 700 or 4900 propositions
about one predicate during the debate with opponents. However possible quantity of such
propositions shows very well relativity and falsity of opponent doctrines, so epistemological methods must to help non-Jainas to accept Jīna Mahāvīra’s darśana which
value is not in its truthfulness but in its effectiveness and this effectiveness is founded
upon belief.
Even those few observations and generalizations about Indian conceptions of
truth which were presented here by the author show as high level theoretical thought
in India as grand differences just in foundations of theoretical reasoning of Indian and
of Western philosophers. Such dissimilarities convince of the need to go on study of the
foundations for authentic comprehension of Indian Philosophy.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) Specialists in Sanskrit learning.
(2) The beginning of such pseudo-historical texts specialists refer to III—V AD, though they
admit information codified in puraхas is more earlier, because they mentioned in Vedas already (for example, in ‘Atharvaveda’, XI. 7. 24).
(3) In иgveda there are as the word ‘Dharma’, as a lot of derivatives from it, for example: Indra was
named dharmakзta — ‘creator of universal order’ (see: http://www.sanskritweb.net/rigveda/
rv08.pdf).
(4) According to Nāgārjuna’ s ‘Mūlamadhyamakakārikās’, 24.10. Texts from Buddhist canon
teem with such citation as L. de la Vallée Poussin found, see: Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de
Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Publité par L. de la Vallée
Poussin. Fasc. I—VII. SPb., 1903—1913. (Bibliotheca Buddhica. IV).
(5) Vedantists discourse on two kinds of truth one may see in ‘Maхуukyakārikā’ by Gauуapāda
and ‘Brahmasūtrabhāщya’ by Śaпkara.
(6) The last one is directly connected with vedic conception of Eternal Word of Veda.
(7) In accordance with syādvāda we must formulate 7 modal propositions about some predicate
of an object, then according with nayavāda we must see each of them from 7 points of view; and
if we’ll follow “Nayakarхikā” (19) by Vinayavijaya, each of 7 points of view has 100 subspecies, then we may formulate 4900 propositions about one predicate of single object.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Kasavin I.T. Truth // Encylopedia Epistemologii i Philosophii nauki. (Encylopedia of Philosophy
and Epistemology of sciences). Moscow. 2009. S. 323—329.
[2] Fedotova V.G. Klassicheskoye i neklassicheskoye v socialnom poznanii // Obschestvennye
nauki i sovremennost. (Classic and non-classic in social knowledge // Social sciences and
modernity). 1992. N 4.
[3] Monier-Williams M. Sanskзit-English Dictionary. New ed. With collabor. of E. Leumann,
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C. Cappeller and other. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Prvt. Ltd., 1976; 1 ed.
1899.
[4] Solomon E.A. Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion. 2vols. Vol. I. Ahmedabad.
1976.
[5] Solomon E.A. Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion. 2 vols. Vol. II. Ahmedabad. 1978.
[6] Vallée Poussin, de la L. Documents d’Abhidharma — les Deux, les Qatre. Les Trois
Vérités. Extraits de la Vibhāщa et du Kośa de Sa#ghabhadra // Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques. Bruxel, 1936—1937. T. 5.
[7] Thakchoe S. The Theory of Two Truths in India // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2011/entries/twotruths-india/>.
[8] Lysenko V.G. Svalakщaхa-sāmānya-lakщaхa // Philosophiya Buddhisma: Encylopedia. (Philosophy of Buddhism: Encyclopedia). Moscow. 2011.
[9] Stcherbatsky F.I. Teoriya poznaniya i logika po ucheniyu pozdneishyh buddistov (Epistemology
and Logic in accordance with teaching of latest Buddhists) / Ed. A.V. Paribok. SanktPetersburg. 1995. Pt. 2.
[10] Stcherbatsky Th. Buddhist Logic. In 2 vols. New York, 1984. Vol. I.
[11] Mohanty J. N. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian
Philosophical Thinking. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1992.
[12] Stcherbatsky Th. Buddhist Logic. In 2 vols. New York, 1984. Vol. II.
[13] Padmarajiah I.J. Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvāda // Encyclopaedia of Jainism. In
30 Vols. New Delhi. 2001. Vol. 1.
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Kanaeva N.A. Image of truth in traditional indian philosophy
ОБРАЗ ИСТИНЫ
В ТРАДИЦИОННОЙ ИНДИЙСКОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ
Н.А. Канаева
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет философии
Национальный исследовательский университет
«Высшая школа экономики»
Малый Трехсвятительский переулок, 8/2, Москва, Россия, 101000
Будучи одной из ключевых ценностей западной культуры, истина исторически являлась в западной философии в разных образах. В истории индийской философии истина также рассматривалась как ценность, но не всегда путь превращения слова «истина» в философскую категорию там
можно проследить. В статье выделены основные направления дискуссий и главные смыслы индийских терминов (satya, j$āna, Dharma, prāmāхya), обозначавших истину. Первыми предложили свои
концепции истины буддисты, сначала — как учение о четырех благородных истинах, затем — как
учение о двух истинах (высшей и низшей). В индийской традиции, также как в западной философии, истина исследовалась в разных образах: как экзистенциальная, моральная, онтологическая,
сотериологическая, эпистемологическая и логическая. Индийцы различали также выводную истину
и истину как семантический концепт. Стремление построить теоретическое учение о мире, которое
объясняло бы существование разных его уровней, природного и сверхприродного, познаваемых
рациональными и сверхрациональными способами, привело, с западной точки зрения, к парадоксальным, противоречивым результатам. Пример такой противоречивой эпистемологии можно
найти в джайнизме.
Ключевые слова: индийская эпистемология, истина в индийской философии, когнитивная
практика, логическая истина, сатья, стратификация бытия, требования к истине, эпистемологическая истина.
COMMUNICATION MEDIATORS:
THE COGNITIVE AND PRAGMASTYLISTIC ASPECT
OF TROPES IN MODERN MASS MEDIA DISCOURSE
G.V. Zashchitina
Department of the English language
Correspondence faculty
Moscow State Linguistic University
Ostozhenka str., 38, Moscow, Russia, 119034
The paper focuses on the communicative aspect, stylistics and pragmatics of lexical tropes in mass
media discourse, primarily in the press. The cognitive aspect of tropes in modern non-literary discourse
is discussed to show that they are not merely expressive means of the language but complex cognitive
structures which can either affirm our schematic knowledge or bring substantial changes to it. By having
an insight into some aspects of cognitive metaphor theory we look upon the cases when new or alternative
knowledge structures function as source domains and discuss the way in which individual authors, using
both conventional and unconventional conceptual metaphors can change the role that mass media audience
take in interpreting texts thus giving mass media tropes a chance to influence and mold social practice.
Key words: metaphor, cognitive metaphor, tropes, communication, mass media discourse, mass communication, stylistics, pragmatics.
It is a deep-rooted, widespread belief that nowadays mass media can no longer
be treated as merely a tool providing communities with news coverage, forecasts and
random analysts’ opinions but as a powerful means of communication since the primal
aim and motto of modern mass media discourse is to get across to tremendously large
and quickly growing groups of addressees across the globe bringing them all kind of
knowledge, norms and values. It will not be an exaggeration to claim that nowadays it
is the informative media that monopolized the right to mold public opinion and is often
held responsible for setting a tyranny of “objective coverage” of the news and “fairness”
of journalistic opinion.
Given that, we agree with Jacob L. May that as to content, the newscasters are
supposed to strive to represent all opinions in an equitable manner, and to use language
that could be prejudicial against any group. On paper it is taken for granted that the
official news and other programs should maintain a neutral stance toward all opinions
found in a democratic society and the majority should not be allowed to impose its
views against the minority’s wishes [11. P. 298]. But in fact the “objectivity” criterion
of mass media discourse has been repeatedly given a series of severe blows, thus
quite frequently the media coverage of all events from G20 summits to showbiz gossip
alike are often served up as neutral, objective while reflecting the interest of certain
segments of communities as well as subjective interests of the individuals including
journalists and reporters as the latter may have their own pragmatic aims they want to
achieve getting across to their distant interlocutors.
Traditionally, presenting and interpreting the objective reality in mass media discourse is carried out along two lines: explicitly, through facts presentation, discussion
and argument as well as through direct evaluation, and implicitly, through such language means as tropes which are often evasive, indirect and manifold but easily re32
Zashchitina G.V. Communication mediators: the cognitive and pragma-stylistic aspect of tropes...
cognizable and decodable by the target audience. The fact that mass media discourse
is more and more viewed as a mediator in communication between the state and the
public only proves the claim that it is steadily acquiring the features that rate it as
more phatic, more aggressive, more incentive, urging to action. The dual nature of mass
media discourse (as being at the same time opposing and supporting the ruling power)
brings about other issues such as the growing awareness of the fact that by exercising its
influence on the addressee the addresser eventually gets them both involved in communication conflicts imposing patterns of stereotyped reasoning and behavior [1. P. 114].
So as mass media discourse is shifting towards the emotional, the phatic, attempting
to win over larger audiences, it finds itself in constant need of effective language means
which could also be two-faceted, enticing, evaluative, but easily decodable and what
is equally important — serving the aim of being both a means of communication and
achieving social and political goals. Such language means as lexical tropes skillfully
employed by mass media seem to be a valuable asset in achieving at least two pragmatic goals: firstly, to make a certain media discourse more effective, eye-catching,
and consequently more competitive as compared to other types of communication;
secondly, to impose (explicitly or implicitly) an ideology that can be often aimed at
changing the schemata of the reader. Thus we tend to agree with Jeffries who points
out that in non-literary texts (to which we can definitely allocate mass media texts in their
written, electronic or oral form) the imposed propaganda can alter the schemas of the
addressees (that is the portion of background knowledge that contains generic information about different types of extralinguistic facts and phenomena) in the key that
these texts reinforce those ideologies, rather than challenge them [7. P. 11].
In regard to such general truth such as that of ideology being an unavoidable fact
of all types of discourse it is worth studying how mass media texts can bring it home
to the target audience. Besides it is of interest what language means are more favoured
by the media which in its turn allows one to have an insight into how and why individual
authors may choose from the regular resources of the language in representing a view
of the world [7. P. 17]. In this paper we focus on stylistic means of the language, namely
tropes, which are believed to be among the best language tools raising the effectiveness of communication between media and public.
A question may arise though why so much attention is given to tropes when it
comes to their role in reinforcing public world view when used in mass media texts
and whether we exaggerate their contribution to the communicative strategies of individual authors. But there are apparently some grounds we will try to analyze, yet
briefly, further in the paper, which allow one to assume that it is the tropes we should
examine carefully when trying to answer such questions as, for instance: “Why is
media discourse has that competitive edge in controlling and molding the minds of the
public and to what extent?”
Mass media discourse is traditionally believed to be in the possession of three
main functions that is to inform, to instruct/influence and to entertain the addressee.
But numerous studies of the last decades seem to suggest that the first, the most essential function of the three tends to be somewhat outshadowed by its once less prominent ones. Nowadays mass media happens to be involved in a tough competition of
getting it all when it comes to the general public attention and loyalty. Thus tropes which
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are characterized by a great degree of expressiveness are known to catch the reader/
listener’s eye and if they help the bulk of information that we, addressees, pay attention to, to stand out conspicuously in the text, it cannot be completely erased from our
memory. The fact is the addressee is very selective when it comes to choosing facts
and arguments he receives in communication, most assuredly focusing on those which
concern him personally or match his own life experience or — in terms of linguistics —
his schematic knowledge. Thus we see that presenting news and comments is based
on some skillfully designed communicative patterns or strategies on which certain
ideologies are superimposed.
Besides it should be also pointed out that emotive tropes, when used skillfully,
can also play a pivotal role in fostering what is widely known as “mass mind” or
“mass opinion” as the target addressee does not go in for a deep analysis of the received
information, reacting impulsively, becoming more and more receptive to subconscious,
encoded signals. We agree with John Zaller who, talking about the phenomenon of mass
political behavior, supports that mass media (and definitely its communicative strategies) is very instrumental in forming or changing the public opinion as media coverage may consist of ostensibly objective news reports, partisan argumentation, televised
news conferences, or even paid advertisements, but what matters for the formation of
mass opinion is the relative balance and overall amount of media attention to a certain
issue [16. P. 1]. And it is up to the media discourse to make the right choice out of the
scope of metaphors, metonymies, periphrases and other tropes — emotively charged,
evaluative means — while trying to preserve the above mentioned balance.
Mass media metaphors have always been and still are an ample source of scientific research and debate, but what should be stressed that other tropes and their role
in non-literary texts was apparently underrated, as seems to be always all about metaphors only when it comes to stylistic aspect of non-literary discourse. We support the
idea that much of what was said about metaphor functioning in mass media texts and its
cognitive nature can be fairly attributed to other tropes whose communicative and evaluative potential should be studied alongside that of the stylistic device of metaphor.
In regard to the fact that metaphor is no longer (particularly in non-literary texts)
is understood merely as a rhetorical device, but more frequently as a means of exerting
a certain degree of influence on the interlocutor, much attention is paid to its cognitive
structure. As Lesley Jeffries and Dan McIntyre claim a traditional rhetorical approach
to metaphor is limited to providing descriptive categories for different types of metaphor.
Thus the rhetorical approach offers no insight into the cognitive basis of metaphors
(and into the cognitive basis of other figures or tropes, as we may assume), nor into
the means by which people process and make sense of them [8. P. 139]. Consequently
the necessity to study tropes or figures of speech from the cognitive (metaphor) theory
is perhaps the only possible way of trying to find a clue to how make the communication between the public and mass media more cooperative.
It has been some time already since Lakoff and Johnson, and later Faiclough,
Semino and many more worked out the cognitive metaphor theory with Fauconnier
and Turner contributing to it with their theory of blending mental spaces, and quite a few
conceptual metaphors from both literary and non-literary discourses have been brought
to light and analyzed, yet there is still an unflagging interest in the cognitive potential
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Zashchitina G.V. Communication mediators: the cognitive and pragma-stylistic aspect of tropes...
of the trope in question that allows it to shape ideology or to lead to what is called
“schema affirmation”. At present a number of researches argue whether it is possible
to speak about objectivity referring to metaphors, metonymies and the like and whether
it is possible to say that conceptual metaphors are as subjective as they are objective.
Goatly, citing Lakoff’s words concerning philosophic issues of objectivity and subjectivity in conceptual metaphors points that there cannot be apparent objectivity as we
have no immediate access to reality and our entire mental process is mediated by metaphoric structures, but at the same time there is no sign of subjectivity prevailing as we
make our metaphors on the basis of our bodily experience which is universal in character and thus we all speak a somewhat common metaphoric language [4. P. 276].
It is worth mentioning that conceptual metaphors, based on the mapping of the
source domain x on to the target domain y, such as in much discussed one ARGUMENT/
POLITICS IS WAR, are quite typical of mass media discourse. Thus according to
Lesley Jeffries and Dan McIntyre this cognitive structure implying aggressive behavior
in all that concerns politics and adjacent spheres is deeply entrenched in Western and
possibly in other societies and implications of using that type of conceptual metaphor
are significant. What they further assume is that the conventional metaphorical ways
of talking about particular activities suggest that people tend to think about them in particular ways [8. P. 140]. In other words by using some conceptual metaphors repeatedly
describing certain segments of things and phenomena mass media discourse does not
only mirrors the way we conceptualize the reality, but may deliberately or not broaden
our schematic knowledge, thus turning to what is currently called “novel conceptual
metaphors” which can reveal the way an individual author conceptualizes things.
Despite the fact that the language of mass media sticks to the standardized forms
of expression which in the case of tropes is a marked slant towards the use of traditional, language tropes, which are based on conventional concepts and reactions, the
world around us demand from the users to broaden the already established borders
with new source domains being mapped on to the regular target ones. Such is the case
of the target domain WAR on to which such conventional source domains as politics
and sports are mapped as in the examples below:
1) Away from the battlefield of a hugely divided Congress, President Obama probably
thought he was on safe ground praising his political allies at a fundraising event in California [12].
2) At the end of the last month’s league final a corner of both dressing rooms resembled a battlefield dressing station. Tommy Walsh had a cut beneath his eye. Paul Murphy had a bad gash across his finger. Down the corridor, Lar Corbett wheezed with the pain
of a broken rib [13].
The given examples are both easily decodable by the majority of the addressees
irrespectively of their identity, besides to blend such referents as political struggle as well
as a boxing fight on the ring will not require much mental work on the individual reader’s
part. Nor will it be too demanding of the reader to decode the following one, such as:
3) The weather has been very strange in some parts of the world recently. Freak
snowstorms have swept much of the Midwest US, although this cold snap has had at least
one benefit — very few tornados have been recorded so far this year. Springtime is normally a battlefield of colliding warm and cold air masses that can erupt into violent super-
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cell thunderstorms, which unleash powerful tornados over Tornado Alley on the plains
of the US [15].
By referring a fierce political debate, the physical state of the boxers, bruised and
bleeding after the fight, and the unstable springtime weather to one and the same concept
only supports the arguments that we verbalize reality as we see it. But media discourse
does not seem to be fully contented with these traditional models. We have observed
that the target domain WAR is stretched towards some new sources. Let us have a look
at the following example in which the journalist presents such matter as children restaurant menus in terms of war:
4) ‘Unhealthy’ menus for children turning restaurants into battlefields for parents.
There is no shortage of culprits when it comes to the nation’s alarming childhood
obesity problem with everything from packed lunches to computer games held responsible.
Now health campaigners have accused family restaurants of serving unimaginative,
high-calorie and largely unwholesome fare on their children’s menus, turning eating
out into “a battlefield” for parents. Burger King was judged to be the worst offender,
“devoid” of any healthy option with not as much as a lettuce leaf on top of its chicken
and beef burgers [14].
If we try to analyze the metaphor ‘menus for children are battlefields’ in terms of
domains we may come to a difficulty as it evidently requires a mental effort on the
addressee’s part to bring together the concepts behind unhealthy restaurant’s fare and
worried parents’ behavior. Even if we try to apply the theory of blended spaces to the
case we are sure to see that it might not give us enough clues to understand the pragmatic
aim of the author in likening high-caloried food to parent’s worries. Yet if we take into consideration the grounds of the blending theory and that is a belief that meaning
construction in tropes such as metaphor is not always dependent on the so-called preexisting knowledge domains but more likely on temporary knowledge structures created
during online processing we can try to pick out elements from two in-put spaces
RESTAURANT FOOD and PARENTS, such as “unhealthy”, “harmful”, “destructive”,
“alarming”, “fattening” on the one hand and “requiring urgent action”, “a need to combat
side-effects”, “belligerence”, “immediate reaction /attack” on the other. This may allow
one to see the restaurant fare as a menace to growing children and consequently parents’
behavior in this case can be likened to that of the soldiers who are instantly ready to
confront an enemy.
But what also may attract our attention is the fact that the metaphor in Example 4
is different from the previous ones, mainly due to the fact that, strictly speaking, it is
not a conventional, conceptual one. We tend to agree with Goatly and call such metaphor
“alternative”, as they markedly represent conventional things in a little bit unconventional
way. In other words the metaphor “restaurant food is a battlefield to parents” in Goatly’s
terms should be classified as “live”, or “active”, as opposed to the conventional, “inactive” ones. We also support his view of alternative metaphors as of means that within
a language allow multiple perspectives or constructions of social practices. All metaphors seem to be cognitive filters, but alternative ones are more likely to filter “differ36
Zashchitina G.V. Communication mediators: the cognitive and pragma-stylistic aspect of tropes...
ent particles of truth”. And if we want to assess the communicative value of alternative
metaphors we should bear in mind that by applying language in new and alternative
ways or structuring the concepts differently, alternative or novel conceptual metaphors
(as well as other tropes constructed in a similar way) “have the potential for challenging the commonsense categories of knowledge” [4. P. 25].
However there can be one more question to give an answer to, and that is why
the individual authors are so eager to resort to alternative metaphors as they run the risk
forcing their readers into more mental effort by creating puzzling or disturbing metaphors
that are not ingrained into their conception of particular segments of reality. To be honest,
we cannot but notice that the author of this “food metaphor” wants to be safeguarded
from a possible misunderstanding, thus the metaphor in the headline is further reinforced
in the lead by contributory lexical means, explaining the nature of the problem and
being used for the second time the figuratively used noun ‘battlefield’ appears in inverted
commas as to stress that the author is metaphorically speaking.
In regard to the above said we believe it is necessary to highlight that by creating
novel conceptual metaphors, attributing conventional target domains on to the rather
unusual source domains, the media discourse forces us to look at things around us in a
new key. As far as we can judge “aggressive” metaphors are beginning to win over
the journalists’ minds, influence their creativity, as they try to promote and impose
their own, often subjective, view of the world. Goatly calls such metaphors ‘mechanisms
of regimes of truth, as they create the reality rather than describe it’ [4. P. 80].
The reasons for such a marked slant towards metaphoric creativity in media discourse can be both of linguistic and extralinguistic nature. As for the latter, we can often witness how sometimes harsh reality forces us to see things in a new light. Researches assume that Western cultures are very responsive to political, economic and
social changes. News about unceasing military conflicts, credit crunches and austerity
measures inevitably forces one to see the reality as being entirely hostile and menacing, and the language as a social barometer immediately reacts to these worries by
creating speech metaphors such as based on the patterns SPRING WEATHER IS WAR
or EATING OUT IS WAR which as we see take a little time to rub well into the language system and eventually get integrated into our schematic knowledge. With the
time “military” conceptual metaphors tend to persuade us that fighting or attacking is a
normal activity no matter what subject we take. Thus we agree with Kovecses who
points out that metaphoric concept can be realized not only linguistically but also in
social practice [9. P. 20]. Let us have a look at one more example illustrating that
thought:
5) So I telephone Gilles, who heroically comes and ploughs, which enables me to devote the entire summer to having nightmares about weeds and Colorado beetle. And then
everything ripens on the same day, so that by September, the whole vegetable patch is like
the Somme: an eerie battlefield of blackened tomatoes, exploded cucumbers, ruined melons and burnt-out courgettes [2].
As the example shows the central conceptual metaphor GARDENING IS WAR
is very eye catchy and not very conventional. One should also pay attention to the
supporting elements that reinforce its expressiveness and the resulting humorous effect,
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
such as the stylistic simile ‘the whole vegetable patch is like the Somme’, and the contributory epithets of the same semantic field like ‘blackened’, ‘exploded’, ‘ruined, ‘burntout’ that help the reader to visualize the garden catastrophe which is, in author’s view,
similar to what we can see at the theater of war. Another object of interest can be the
stylistic simile “like the Somme” which introduces the idea of war with the author likening one of the bloodiest battles of the First World War to growing vegetables. It is as
if the author suggested, let us say, politics (which is traditionally perceived as a ruthless and aggressive business) and gardening may function along similar lines. A direct
reference to yet notable, but possibly unfamiliar for some, fact of world history may
also suggest that such novel metaphors may be devised in a hope of it being appreciated
by a more sophisticated public. The humorous effect that the whole utterance is supposed to produce only proves that media discourse should also entertain.
To sum it up, as the above analyzed examples show conceptual tropes, namely
metaphors can no longer be limited to the conventionally accepted structures and patterns as they are effective tools of enriching our perception and interpretation of objective reality. Both conventional and alternative language structures when used in
mass media discourse allow one to see the way mass opinion can be manipulated both
explicitly and implicitly. Thus tropes can be viewed as cognitive containers which
control and guide communication as well as influencing a relevant behaviour of all
participants sometimes without them realizing that. They are perfect mediators in
communication as they are often used due to the power of persuasion that they acquire in non-literary discourse. Media tropes can easily unite the reality, individual
experience and symbols as they are those mechanisms that construct our outlook of
the world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Avraamov D.S. Professional journalistic ethics. — M., 2003. (Авраамов Д.С. Профессиональная этика журналиста. — М., 2003.)
[2] C’est la Folie: Lessons Of the Last Spring Lamb, The Telegraph, August 22, 2013. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/9237059/Cest-la-folie-lessons-of-the-last-spring-lamb.html
(Accessed: August 22, 2013).
[3] Carpignano, P. Chatter in the Age of Electronic Reproduction: Talk Television and the “Public
Mind”, 1990. (http://www.jstor.org/stable/466239).
[4] Goatly, A. Washing the Brain. Metaphor and Hidden Ideology. John Benjamins B.V., 2007.
[5] Hazagerov G.G. Rhetoric vs. Stylistics: Semiotic and Institutional Aspect. // Journal of Sociology,
№ 2, 2008. (http://www.khazagerov.com/pragmatica/69-rhetoric-vs-stylistics.html). (Хазагеров Г.Г. Риторика vs. стилистика: семиотический и институциональный аспект //
Журнал социологии. — 2008. — № 2. (http://www.khazagerov.com/pragmatica/69-rhetoricvs-stylistics.html).)
[6] Hoeken, H., Swanepoel P., Saal E., Jansen C. Using Message Form to Stimulate Conversations:
The Case of Tropes, 2009. (http://www.careljansen.nl/Publications/hoeken_swanepoel_saal_
janse.pdf).
[7] Jeffries, L. Critical Stylistics: The Power of English (Perspectives on the English Language).
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
[8] Jeffries, L., McIntyre D. Stylistics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. — P. 137 — 147.
[9] Kovecses, Z. Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2002.
38
Zashchitina G.V. Communication mediators: the cognitive and pragma-stylistic aspect of tropes...
[10] Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. Metaphors We Live by. London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1980.
[11] Mey, J.L. Pragmatics. An Introduction. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. — P. 297 — 299.
[12] ‘Sexist’ Obama Attacked Over Compliment to Attorney-General, The Times, April 5, 2013,
Available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3731798.ece). (Accessed: May 14, 2013).
[13] Tyrrell Tough As Teak, The Sunday Times, June 9, 2013. Available at:
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ireland/article1271306. (Accessed: June 20,
2013).
[14] ‘Unhealthy’ Menus For Children Turning Restaurants Into Battlefields For Parents, The
Times, July17 2013. Available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/health/child-health/ article3818058.ece (Accessed: July 23 2013).
[15] Weather Eye: Freak Conditions, The Times, May 11, 2013. Available at:
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/weather/article3761724.ece (Accessed: June 1, 2013).
[16] Zaller, J.R. The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press, 2003. —
P. 1—4.
[17] Zheltuhina M.P. Mass Media Language: Informing or Influencing? // Methods of Modern
Communication. Issue 1. Moscow State Linguistic University, 2003. — P. 111—115. (Желтухина М.Р. Язык СМИ: Информирование или воздействие? // Методы современной
коммуникации. Вып. 1 / Под ред. В.Н. Переверзева. — М., 2003. — С. 111—115.
ПОСРЕДНИКИ КОММУНИКАЦИИ:
КОГНИТИВНЫЙ И ПРАГМА=СТИЛИСТИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ
ТРОПОВ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ МАССМЕДИАЛЬНОМ ДИСКУРСЕ
Г.В. Защитина
Кафедра английского языка
Факультет заочного обучения
Московский государственный лингвистический университет
ул. Остоженка, 38, Москва, Россия, 119034
Статья посвящена изучению коммуникативного, стилистического и прагматического аспекта
тропов, реализуемого массмедиальным дискурсом, в частности, прессой. Рассмотрение когнитивного
аспекта тропов, актуализируемых в нехудожественном дискурсе, имеет целью показать, что лексические стилистические приемы не следует рассматривать лишь как преимущественно экспрессивнообразные средства, а как комплексные когнитивные структуры, способные апеллировать к существующим фоновым знаниям адресата, а также существенно расширять их объем и границы. Интерес
к некоторым аспектам когнитивной теории метафоры обусловил рассмотрение случаев реализации
и функционирования структур, содержащих новую, альтернативную концептуализацию знаний о мире, выступающую в роли области источника, а также позволил затронуть вопрос о том, как, оперируя
конвенциональными и неконвенциональными концептуальными метафорами, авторы могут регулировать ту роль, которая отводится получателю масс медиального продукта, позволяя тропам в массмедиальных текстах воздействовать на социальную практику.
Ключевые слова: метафора, когнитивная метафора, тропы, коммуникация, язык СМИ, массовая коммуникация, стилистика, прагматика.
39
LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIBETAN EDITIONS
OF GZUNGS BSDUS COLLECTION FIRST PRINTED
IN THE RTAG BRTAN MONASTERY FOUNDED BY TĀRANĀTHA
A.V. Zorin
The Department of Manuscripts and Documents
the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Dvortsovaya emb., 18, St Petersburg, Russia, 191186
The paper is devoted to the collection of canonical, apocryphic and post-canonical texts known under
the brief title Gzungs bsdus which was first printed at the Rtag brtan monastery founded by the famous
figure of Tibetan Buddhism Tāranātha in 1619 as a monastic center of Jonangpa school later converted
to Dge lugs pa and renamed to Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling after Jonangpa was crushed by the government
of the Fifth Dalai Lama in the mid of the 17th century. The paper is based on an unique collection of various
editions of Gzungs bsdus kept at the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The author discovered some editions which had never been introduced to the academic work, including
the possibly oldest one printed in Mongolia and most close to the original edition (non-available) and two
early Beijing editions, one of which is also close to the Rtag brtan edition while the other one was probably
made right before the first official edition made in 1674 in Beijing for Kangxi, the Manchu Emperor of
China. Some other sources, primarily later Tibetan editions of Gzungs bsdus available at the TBRC e-library,
were also used. On the basis of comparison of all the editions found, from the earliest ones to the last Lhasa
edition made in 1947, the author could present the first rather valid, from textological point of view, picture of
development of this colelction of texts with two major lines clearly ascertained — the Original Tibetan one
and the Imperial Beijing one.
Key words: Tibetan Buddhist literature, Buddhist Canon, Gzungs bsdus, Tāranātha, Rtag brtan Monastery, Tubetan Buddhism in Beijing, book printing, textology.
(1) The subject of my paper is the well-known Gzungs bsdus, or Gzungs ’dus,
collection of minor canonical, apocryphic and post-canonical Buddhist texts which is
generally attributed to the famous Tibetan Buddhist teacher and thinker Tāranātha
(1575—1634). It was Tāranātha who founded the Rtag brtan dam pa’i chos kyi gling
monastery near Shigatse, which was the major center of the Jo nang pa school of Tibetan
Buddhism from its foundation in 1615 [20. P. 2330] right up to its convertion to Dge
lugs pa by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1650, which followed with its renaming to Dga’ ldan
phun tshogs gling, in 1658. This attribution does not mean though that Tāranātha
himself was the editor and publisher of the entire collection, rather he only compiled
the core of the collection that was later enlarged with some other texts, apparently after
he passed away.
The size of the initial corpus is not totally certain. It cannot be excluded that it
was limited to the greater part of the first section of the collection entitled Gzungs mdo.
This term translates the Sanskrit Dhāraṇī-sūtra meaning the subgenre of Sūtra literature
that contains powerful dhāraṇī prayers. Apart from the texts of this kind, such as
Sarvatathāgatoṣṇīṣavijayā-nāma-dhāraṇī-kalpasahitā (De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad
kyi gtsug tor rnam par rgyal ba zhes bya ba’i gzungs rtog pa dang bcas pa), etc., and
a number of dhāraṇī prayers given without any narrative frame, the Gzungs mdo section
40
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
contains some other important texts considered to have magical powers, including its
very first text, the famous Ārya-mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti (’Phags pa ’jam dpal gyi mtshan
yang dag par brjod pa). The texts or groups of related texts of the collection are enumerated with Tibetan letters, from Ka to A, then Ki, Ku, Ke, Ko, etc., usually up to Pho.
The end of the part edited by Tāranātha himself is clearly found after the pt. Co as
thereafter a colophon is given — This Dhāraṇī-sūtra [Section] was edited by Great
Vajradhāra Tāranātha, hence totally correct (2), or a slightly different version used
in a certain branch of the development of the collection, This Dhāraṇī-sūtra [Section]
was copied from the edition by Great Vajradhāra Tāranātha (3). Several more texts were
added to this section later, possibly together with the second section entitled Mdo phran,
Minor Sūtras, containing a number of important texts such as Ārya-vajracchedikā-nāmaprajñāpāramitā-mahāyāna-sūtra (’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje
gcod pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo) or Ārya-sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchānāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (’Phags pa klu’i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa zhes bya ba
theg pa chen po’i mdo.) There are also a number of other texts, mostly apocrypha, belonging to Gter ma literature and closely associated with the figure of Padmasambhava
(8th century).
The second section has no special colophon naming Tāranātha as its compiler,
though some texts of this section as well as the majority of texts from the first section
are completed with the verdicts zhus dag, “edited”, or dag, “correct”, and auspicious
formulae, but it is not clear if we should consider them all as Tāranātha’s own words.
Moreover, according to the Dkar chag of the late 18th century edition made in Labrang
Monastery of Amdo, although there were many dhāraṇī collections compiled by many
wise men who appeared here in the Land of Snow during the early and later periods
[of the Dharma dissemination] [we] re-edited the edition of Gzungs bsdus made in the
Rtag brtan phun tshogs gling monastery that [consisted of] Dhāraṇī-sūtras and Minor
Sūtras [Sections] checked by Great Noble Tāranātha to which some treasury texts, etc.,
that had become famous in Tibet, were added (4). If we can trust the publishers of this
edition, made a century and a half after the death of Tāranātha, the core of the collection
compiled by him did include also the second section — but without any Gter ma texts.
In any case, I think the quotations presented are eloquent enough to correct the idea
expressed in some Beijing editions that Tāranātha ordered the printing of Gzungs
bsdus (5), since the final formation of the collection, not to say its printing, obviously
took place after his death.
What follows the rather long introductory part of this paper is aimed at showing
how the first edition of the Gzungs bsdus collection, based upon the initital corpus
compiled by Tāranātha, developed over time in a widespread territory including Central
and Eastern Tibet, China, Mongolia, Buryatia and Ladakh. This paper will be limited
by editions in Tibetan, the Mongolian translations of Gzungs bsdus deserving special
research.
My privilege of working at the Tibetan library kept at the Institute of Oriental
Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences, one so rich in many respects, is the
only reason why my study could go further than that of my predecessors, the German
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
scholars M. Taube and R.O. Meisezahl, who tried to discover the key to understanding
how the editions of Gzungs bsdus available to them were related to each other. Their
papers on the subject were published 45 years ago together, in the same volume of the
journal Zentralasiatische Studien. M. Taube scrutinized four editions of Gzungs bsdus
kept in various Eastern German libraries and museums and tried to reconstruct their
‘genealogical tree’, for which purpose he used also data on some other Tibetan and
Mongolian editions kept in Paris, catalogued and described by M. Lalou and L. Ligeti
respectively. This attempt resulted in rather a chaotic scheme [27. S. 64] showing clearly
the defects of mechanic textological comparison (6).
In his paper, R.O. Meisezahl scrutinized more editions of Gzungs bsdus than were
available to M. Taube. He divided them into two groups such as
1) those belonging to the Rtag brtan redaction, namely three editions that are not
dated but contain the name of Rtag brtan monastery and do not have anything Chinese
in their outlook, hence their combination into one group, and
2) those belonging to the Beijing redaction, namely four editions, from 1691, 1729
(two different ones), and 1731, acc. to their colophons [25. S. 82—124].
We should notice though, just as R.O. Meisezahl did, that the latter edition, made
in 1731, also mentions Rtag brtan monastery in its colophon, hence it seems slightly
inappropriate that it was not included into the first group. R.O. Meisezahl noticed also
another important fact, that the colophon of the second edition made in 1729 repeats
the colophon of the former edition made in 1674, and so he had to remark that only
after this edition could be discovered could the whole picture of development of Gzungs
bsdus be clarified [25. S. 124].
V. Uspensky, who worked at the IOM Tibetan library for several years, was first
to find the 1674 edition there and describe it briefly, in 1996 [28. P. 176]. A more detailed
information on this edition illustrated with a fragment of a folio from one of its three
block print copies kept at the IOM RAS, the one being probably the biggest Tibetan
block print worldwide (size — 89,5 × 34,7 cm), was published later, in 2011, in his monograph on Tibetan Buddhism in Beijing [30. P. 269—270]. This important discovery,
however, proved sufficient in answering only a few questions.
In 2007, I initiated a long project aimed at the thorough processing and cataloguing
of the IOM Tibetan library. My colleague, Dr Svetlana Sabrukova, who joined me a
year later, and I started with the editions of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon and separate
texts from it. In 2009, all the editions of Gzungs bsdus found at the library were initially
brought together and described (7). They were also given new library numbers. As is
clear now these numbers do not reflect the right chronological order of the editions and,
as often happens, one of the less inspiring editions, numbered Tib.177-3 [16], turned
out to be a major key for their proper ordering. This is a block print of clearly nonChinese appearance with the colophon stating that it was produced in accordance with
the edition made in Rtag brtan monastery, in the great northern land of Mongolia by
the order of the Descendent of Heavenly Appointed Genghis Khan, Pā thur hung tha’i ci
named Siddhi (8). Initially, it was very tempting to identify this person with the founder
of the Zunghar Khanate Erdenebaatar Khong Tayiji, who ruled during 1634—1653,
42
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
since this edition seemed to reflect the original edition (OE) of Gzungs bsdus. The problem is that Erdenebaatar Khong Tayiji did not belong or claimed to belong to the line
of direct descendants of Genghis Khan. Moreover, Siddhi is not attested as his personal
name. Thanks to generous help by V. Uspensky a more appropriate “candidate” was
found, namely the younger brother of the first Bogd Gegen of Mongolia, Zanabazar
(1635—1723), Sidisiri, who had first the title of Khong Tayiji but was given the title
of Jasak by the Manchu Emperor, in 1686, and then, in 1691, that of Beile. If this identification is true the block print must have been produced before 1686 and, surely, could be
made rather long before this year, back to late 1650s.
It is also worth mentioning that, according to the colophon, the edition was printed
at this Great Central Camp Exalted With Many Auspicious Signs (the name?) near the
great residence of Dpal Ri bo dge rgyas gling [monastery] (9). This name inevitably reminds us about the Ri bo dge rgyas dga’ ldan bshad sgrub gling monastery founded by
Zanabazar in 1654 and later ruined by the Junghars, in late 1680s. The monastery and
the camp around it (Urga) were afterwards re-established at a different place where the
capital of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, is now located. Since Zanabazar was considered to be
a reincarnation of Tāranātha it is tempting to draw a link between him and the first Mongolian edition of Gzungs bsdus thus supporting our identification.
According to the colophon the edition contains 135 texts in pts. Ka - Pho but they
are in fact supplied with four additional parts that have no numbering letters but are
put in the volume right after pt. Co which is the end of the original Gzungs mdo Section
compiled by Tāranātha (10). These parts are named briefly Tāre (The Hymn in 21 Homages), Dkon mchog (The Recollection of Jewels), Tshigs su bcad pa (One, Two, Four
Gāthās) and Dam bcas (two dhāraṇīs related to Maitreya and Mañjuśrī; this part is
expanded with three additional texts in later editions). The colophon does not mention
the year when the edition was printed, but the list of the texts included, the shortest
one of all those found, prove that this edition must have been made very close to the
time when the original edition was produced and appears to be its closest copy (11).
There remains the question though as to whether the OE included the abovementioned four additional parts or if there was a slightly enlarged later version with them.
The IOM RAS has a Chinese block print, Tib.171 [8], that has exactly the same
texts arranged in the same order as the Mongolian edition except for the abovementioned four pts. that are added to the end of the collection as the continuation of the
final part Pho and in a different internal order — Bo, Bu, Be, Bi resp., with The Hymn
in 21 Homages completing the volume. Unfortunately, the first and fourth (last?) ff.
of the Dkar chag are missing so it is hard to ascertain when exactly this copy of the OE
was produced. Although, as will be shown later, an early Tibetan edition could have
been reproduced in Bejing even in the 18th century, I find it more likely that it is in
fact the first Chinese edition, made before 1674, since I can find no other traces of this
edition in any catalogues of Tibetan libraries worldwide or descriptions of editions in
Mongolian translation, and so it must be a rare block print which is more likely to be
found among texts produced at the earlier period. On the other hand, it is important to
43
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
stress that the general outer features of this volume resemble very much those of the
edition made in Beijing in 1674, which is a result of serious textological work aimed
at making an enlarged version of Gzungs bsdus for imperial use, so I cannot believe
Tib.171 could have been produced by the end of the 17th century after this official
edition was printed. These considerations will remain hypothetical though until a copy
of this edition supplied with the Dkar chag can be found in some Tibetan library in Mongolia, China or elsewhere.
Apart from these two editions following closely the OE, I was lucky enough to
discover at the IOM Tibetan library OE’s slightly enlarged version, the volume numbered
Tib.177-2 [15]. The paper of the volume is clearly not Chinese and there are no Chinese
marginalia so I think we should believe its colophon stating that it was produced in Dpal
Rtag brtan dam pa’i chos kyi gling [15, Dkar chag, F. 2a1-2] — just like the colophon
of the well-known Chinese edition made in 1731 (Tib.177 at the IOM RAS [14])
which turns out to be nothing else but a very close copy of the edition represented
with Tib.177-2 (12). Thus, it simply repeats the old name of the monastery that had been
renamed to Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling about 75 years before this Chinese print was
made. The indigenous enlarged version then must have been prepared at least before
1658, and probably even earlier, before the conversion of the monastery to Dge lugs pa.
This edition absorbs the three of four additional parts mentioned above by giving
them stable positions inside the structure fixed in the colophon, though only one of
these positions was carried on by the later editions, namely Tāre placed as the pt. Ja
(the second one with this number), while the fourth additional part, Tshigs su bcad pa,
is not mentioned in its colophon although it is printed with the numbering letter Gi. In
Tib.177-2 it is found in the very end of the volume, right before the Dkar chag while
the Chinese copy fixes its position in the very beginning of the second volume (some
editions are divided into two volumes) before pt. Ju. The other two of the four additional pts. and three more pts. were put in the end of the entire collection and marked
with numbering letters Bi—Mi.
The next step in the development of the collection is found in the block print
H.3680 kept in Stockholm and fully described by H. Eimer [21; 22]. Its colophon uses,
for the first time, the Dge lugs pa name of the monastery, so it is surely later than
Tib.177-2, although in some respects regarding the additional texts H.3680 does not follow Tib.177-2 (13). Otherwise, H.3680 is nothing but a replica of Tib.177-2, repeating
even its number of ff. for each part and the way the texts are arranged there. It shares
also the above-cited second version of the colophon to the Gzungs mdo section first
attested in Tib.177-2 and then repeated in all later Tibetan editions of Gzungs bsdus,
while all the Chinese editions except for the one made in 1731 follow the OE in this respect. At the same time, these Chinese editions are closer to H.3680 than to Tib.177-2
in respect of a few differences between them, some of which have been mentioned.
So I think it is very probable that they were generally based on H.3680, maybe with a
limited use of some copy of the OE, rather on the first Chinese edition hypothetically
discovered in the IOM Tib.171.
44
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
It seems that H.3680 was not the final version of Gzungs bsdus made in the Rtag
brtan / Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling monastery. From the paper by H. Eimer, we learn
about Gzungs bsdus made there around 1694 and consisting of 865 ff. [22. S. 168—
169], the number significantly exceeding that of H.3680's 813 ff. I think there existed
an enlarged version of H.3680, since the above-cited Labrang ed. made in 1785 is said
to be a copy of Rtag brtan / Dga’ ldan phun tshogs edition but it contains several additional texts and consists of 864 ff., almost the same number as in the edition made
around 1694.
Moreover, my analysis of the contents of Gzungs bsdus printed in Lhasa, probably,
in late 19th century (14) which is, according to its colophon, a copy of the Rtag brtan /
Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling edition and of a Ladakh copy of the edition made in Bkra
shis lhun po monastery [6], which itself is in fact a copy of the Rtag brtan / Dga’ ldan
phun tshogs gling edition, shows that several additional texts were inserted. For this
reason, I think there could be one or two (if some minor differences between the Lhasa
and Bkra shis lhun po / Ladakh editions reflect two stages of textual development)
later revisions of the Rtag brtan / Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling edition. The Lhasa edition
was later seriously enlarged and printed in 1947. This edition [3] represents the final
stage of the development of Gzungs bsdus that had started more than three centuries
before as a collection of texts compiled by Tāranātha whose role, eloquently enough,
was finally eliminated, since the colophon to the initial Gzungs mdo section mentioning his name was not reproduced here — maybe, for the first time though, in order to
prove it, I need to check all the other Tibetan editions that were printed in various Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. For instance, there was an edition made in Derge in the
first third of the 18th century, but I could only check its Dkar chag compiled by the
famous Tshul khrims rin chen (1694—1774), a major figure in publishing the Derge
edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon [5]. Although this edition obviously reflects
some general local as well as personal religious interests of the Derge clergymen, the
Dkar chag shows definitely that it was based upon the Rtag brtan / Dga’ ldan phun
tshogs gling edition, the version found in Stockholm H.3680. I should note that it may be
a matter of a special academic importance to study the Gzungs ’dus section of the
Derge edition of Bka’ ’gyur, the first part of the Buddhist Canon [19. P. 142—180],
in comparison with Gzungs bsdus as the independent collection of texts discussed in
this paper.
What has been said so far concerns mainly the most developed and variegated
branch of development of Gzungs bsdus that can be roughly called the original Tibetan
line. Let us turn now to the revised Beijing line that consists of five editions, basically
identical and different only in few minor aspects. Four of them have been properly
introduced by M. Taube, R.O. Meisezahl, and V. Uspensky, but the entire picture
could not be complete without another one which I had the fortune to find at the IOM
Tibetan library — the volume numbered Tib.176 [13].
Its structure and repertoire are almost identical with the edition made in 1674, numbered Tib.170 [7] at the IOM collection, save for just two exceptions, since
1) Tib.176 does not have the internal colophon ’Gyur byang included into the pt.
Pho completing the volume of Tib.170, and
45
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
2) both editions put in the end three mantras, those of Avalokiteśvara (the famous
six-syllabled one), Vajrasattva (the 100-syllabled one) and Pratītya-samutpāda, so that
in Tib.176 they complete the volume while in Tib.170 they precede ’Gyur byang, although Tib.176 has them 3, 1 and 1 times printed resp. while Tib.170 repeats them 98, 7
and 7 times resp.
These two features of difference are found also in three well-known later Beijing
editions. Thus, the edition made in 1691 for Kangxi Emperor, Tib.178 at the IOM [17],
and then copied with some insignificant changes in 1729 at the time of rule of Yongzheng
Emperor, Tib.175 [12], clearly follows Tib.176 while the edition made in 1729 specifically for Yongzheng Emperor, Tib.173 [10], follows Tib.170. The latter edition,
made in 1729, was used by one of the Buryat monasteries to produce its almost exact
replica in the 19th century, this edition being numbered Tib.174 in the IOM collection
[11]. There is also a manuscript copy of the same edition, numbered Tib.178-2 [18],
which was most probably made in Buryatia in the 19th century or early 20th century.
The importance of these Buryat editions is not in any textological value but in showing
that Gzungs bsdus was well-known to the Buddhists of the Russian Empire.
Unfortunately, Tib.176 lacks the Dkar chag and again, as with Tib.171, I cannot say
for sure when it was produced. Its general outlook is very similar to that of Tib.170
and Tib.171, and three of them (Tib.170, Tib.171, Tib.176) are not divided into two
parts like the editions made from the late 17th century through the first third of the
18th century. That I have no evidences for the existence of such an edition in other
collections may be a sign of its rarity, though I do hope it can be found, together with
the Dkar chag, in some less explored Asian collections. Finally, if Tib.176 was produced after Tib.170 we shall have to explain why ’Gyur byang written for the official
imperial version of Gzungs bsdus was omitted. Given all these facts, I am almost sure
that Tib.176 had to be prepared before Tib.170, hence by 1674, perhaps as a draft
version (15).
I understand very well that all the data presented above should better be tested
against the tables of texts I compiled for each edition and concordances I compiled
for all groups of editions, but it would be impossible to include them in this short
publication. I hope that the tables showing the two major lines of textual development
of Gzungs bsdus in the course of time given below can facilitate the reader’s apprehension.
To conclude I would like to say that this paper has not touched at all upon some
important issues, such as the actual genesis of the Gzungs bsdus collection which is to
be found probably in earlier collections of minor canonical texts such as those described in papers by P. Harrison [23, 1996] and R.O. Meisezahl [25. S. 68—82], or
the possible connection of the Rtag brtan Gzungs bsdus with other collections of texts
of this kind including the 'correct' Dge lugs pa version printed in Beijing in the 18th century. Nor have I dealt with its place in the history of the formation of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon although, as was said before, it was surely known and used by Tshul khrims
rin chen, one of the main editors of the Derge redaction of the Canon. These issues will
hopefully be studied in the near future.
46
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
The initial corpus compiled by Tāranātha, by 1634
THE ORIGINAL EDITION (OE) — not found so far; must have been made
between 1634 and 1653 at the Jonang Monastery Dpal rtag brtan
dam pa’i chos kyi gling nges don dga’ ba’i tshal gyi chos grwa chen po;
maybe there was also its slightly enlarged version, not found either
Tib.1773 — a copy made in Mongo
lia by the order of some Siddhi Baatar
Khong Tayiji (Zanabazar’s younger
brother?, if so then by 1686)
Tib.171 — a copy of OE, may be the first Bei
jing ed. made before 1674?
Tib.1772 — The second enlarged version made
at the Rtag brtan Monastery, hence before 1658
Tib.177 — a copy made in Beijing in
1731
?
H.3680 (Stockholm)— a slightly revised version
made at the Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling Monas
tery, the former Rtag brtan Monastery hence af
ter 1658
?
Enlarged Beijing eds. made around 1674?,
in 1674, 1691, and two in 1729; check Fig. 2
+ Dresden Ms, a ms copy
Derge ed. — made in 1730s?; check the col.
(1738) by Tshul khrims rin chen (1697—1774)
preserved in his Gsung ’bum [W10347 (TBRC)]
A slightly enlarged ed. — made at the Dga’ ldan
phun tshogs gling Monastery, around 1694?
Tib.172 — the Labrang Monastery ed., made
in 1785
One or two slightly enlarged eds. made after
early 1780s?
В9906 — the Lhasa
ed. made first in late
19th century?, then
repeated in 1913; the
latter one is available
as a replica made in
Waranasi in 1994 —
W1KG5988 (TBRC)
Bkra shis lhun po ed.,
no data available
W1KG12113
(TBRC) — the
second(?) enlarged
Lhasa ed., made
in 1947
W4CZ1062 (TBRC): the edition made at the Ri rdzong mgon pa mo
nastery in Ladakh
Fig. 1. The original Tibetan line
47
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
THE ORIGINAL EDITION (OE), check fig. 1
H.3680 (Stockholm) — the enlarged version of the OE, check fig. 1
Tib.176 — the first original Beijing edition, enlarged, probably made around 1674
Tib.170 — the Beijing edition made in 1674
by Lha rje Sangs rgyas rgyal mtshan for
Kangxi Emperor of Qing
Tib.178 — the Beijing edition made in 1691 for
Kangxi Emperor of Qing
Tib.173 — the Beijing edition made in 1729
for Yongzheng Emperor of Qing
Tib.175 — the Beijing edition made in 1729 for
Yongzheng Emperor of Qing, a copy of the Beijing
edition made in 1691
The 19th century Buryat replicas:
a. block prints — Tib.174, Tib.1742
b. ms — Tib.1782
Fig. 2. The Imperial Beijing line
FOOTNOTES
(1) The study was supported with a grant for young scholars from the Government of St Petersburg,
the Committee for Science and Higher Education, 2013. I would like to thank Dr. Simon Wickham-Smith for his English proofreading and Prof. V. Uspensky for his generous help and valuable remarks.
(2) Gzungs mdo ’di ni rdo rje ’chang chen po rje btsun tā ra nā thas zhus dag gnang nas shin tu dag
pa yod do [16, Pt. Co, F. 3a5; etc.].
(3) Gzungs mdo ’di ni rdo rje ’chang chen po rje btsun tā ra nā thas zhus dag gnang ba’i dpe las
bris ba’o [15, Pt. Co, F. 4a2-3; etc.].
(4) De yang gangs can gyi ljongs ’dir snga phyir byon pa’i mkhas pa du mas bsgrigs pa’i gzungs
bsdus mang du mchis na’ang | ’dir rje btsun chen po t’a ra n’a thas zhus dag mdzad pa’i mdo
phran dang gzungs phran rnams kyi steng du | bod na grags che ba’i gter ma sogs ’ga’ zhig
bsnan nas | rtag brtan phun tshogs gling du brkos pa’i gzungs bsdus par ma phyi mor byas te
par gsar bskrun la bzhugs pa… [9, Pt. Dkar chag, F. 2a5-2b3; etc.].
48
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
(5) Gangs can rtag brtan du tā ra na tas par du bzhengs pa [7, Pt. Dkar chag, F. 1b6; etc.].
(6) In the former USSR, such kind of methodology had been criticized by Acad. D. Likhachev in his
opus magnum on textology [24] and consequently refuted.
(7) Except for one volume belonging to the famous collection of G. Tsybikov brought by him from
Lhasa in 1902; this collection is kept as an unit and will be processed as such in 2014.
(8) Byang phyogs chen po hor gyi sa yi char| | gnam bskos ching gis rigs las mi yi dbang| |…
siddhi’i mtshan can pā thur hung tha’i ci [16, Pt. Dkar chag, F. 1a3].
(9) Dpal ri bo dge rgyas gling gi gnas gzhi chen po’i nye ’dabs| |dge mtshan du mas mngon par
mtho ba’i dkyil sgar chen po ’dir… [16, Pt. Dkar chag, F. 1a5-6].
(10) The number of texts is often put right after the list of texts in Dkar chag but never corresponds
with the actual number of texts included since there are always some minor texts not mentioned
there. In Bibliography both the number of texts acc. to Dkar chag lists and actual number of them
(including mantras if they are separated clearly from other texts) are given for the editions
kept at the IOM RAS and H.3680, while two editions available at TBRC (Lhasa 1947 and Ladakh editions) claim to be checked again for calculating the correct actual number of texts.
Moreover, concerning the editions processed so far, I have to confess that in some cases I was
not quite sure which minor fragments shall be considered as independent texts, hence the actual
number can be corrected after a more profound study of the entire collection. The list of texts
in Bibliography is also supplied with some other data that can prove helpful for identifying
doublets of the editions in other libraries and museums, but I did not include there the printed
area size of block prints since I do not find this information really important for this purpose.
The entire description of each volume is to be issued in the first part of the catalogue of the IOM
Tibetan collection which is currently being prepared.
It would have been impossible to present here the titles of all texts, they can be found in several papers and catalogues, e.g. the paper by R.O. Meisezahl which is supplied with an appendix containing a concordance table [25]; the identification of texts can be found in the description of the Mongolian Gzungs bsdus by V. Uspensky [29. P. 147—170].
(11) V. Uspensky who was kind enough to check this volume found its paleographic features resembling later Urga editions of Tibetan texts, dating from 19th century, though some other features can testify the possibility of earlier dating (especially, style of handwritten Mongolian
equivalents of the titles found on the first folio of each section). To my mind, though, it would
be rather strange if the earliest edition of Gzungs bsdus that was never reproduced anywhere else
since the late 17th century could be printed in Urga at that time although such a possibility can
not be excluded either. Theoretically, a copy of the OE could be used for this purpose and so
Tib.177-3 can be its later reproduction — in the same way as Tib.174 is a later Buryat copy
of Tib.173.
(12) It only adds a short additional colophon telling us that it was produced on the 9th year of rule
of Yongzheng Emperor, i.e. 1731 [14, Pt. Mi, F. 7a7-8].
(13) E.g. H.3680 does not have at all the pt. Mi introduced there and does not give any numbering
letter to the pt. Dkon mchog (Be in Tib.177-2), simply putting it between pts. Ti and Tu, corresponding to the place this pt. occupies in the much later Labrang edition.
(14) It was ordered by G. Tsybikov in Lhasa during his expedition to Central Tibet in 1899—1902,
the current number of this volume at the IOM RAS is B-9906. It contains no data on the year
of publication, unlike its later copy made in 1913 and supplied with an additional colophon
where the year of printing is mentioned [4].
(15) Although this paper is not intended to cover editions of Gzungs bsdus in Mongolian translations I found it important to check, with the generous help of my colleague Alla Sizova, who
works with the IOM collection of Mongolian texts, the contents of the manuscript edition K.6
produced in Beijing in 1673, that was first introduced by A.G. Sazykin in a brief paper [26] not
supplied with the list of texts found in this version of Mongolian Gzungs bsdus. This turned
49
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
out to be an early version of the revised Beijing edition of Gzungs bsdus, enlarged with some
additional texts found in Tib.170 such as a group of auspicious verses added to pt. Ji and
briefly entitled Spyod ’jug, Thog mtha’ ’bar, Bde ba can, Zhing mchog, Gsang ’dus smon lam.
Others, however, are not found here, including the hymn to Avalokiteśvara from the Ma ṇi bka’
’bum apocrypha attributed traditionally to the famous Tibetan King Srong btsan sgam po (7th
century). Another peculiar feature of K.6 is found in the beginning of the final pt. Pho that
starts, in all Tibetan editions, with three short hymnic texts such as De bzhin gshegs pa lnga’i
bkra shis, De bzhin gshegs pa’i mdzad pa bcu’i bkra shis and Sangs rgyas dpa’ bo bdun gyi bkra
shis but K.6 omits the first text and interchanges the other two. Taking into consideration the fact
that none of Tibetan editions except for the latest ones mention the first text, i.e. De bzhin
gshegs pa lnga’i bkra shis, in their Dkar chags, I have a feeling that the editors of K.6 tried
to follow, in some respects, the list of texts actually given in the original Dkar chag. This is
strengthened by another example - a very short versified text called Shloka brgya lobs pa that
is mentioned as completing the pt. Kho in all the Tibetan Dkar chags, though it always begins
pt. Sha, is nonetheless put, in K.6, in its rightful place - in the end of pt. Kho. Anyway, it is very
important to stress that before 1674 there were some draft versions of the imperial Gzungs
bsdus, and both Tib.171 and Tib.176 could really have been produced before this year.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Sources
[1] B-9906 (No. 76 of Tsybikov’s collection, IOM): Lhasa, late 19th century?; 1 title in the col. —
Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu, number of texts — 159 (col.), 214 (actual number) + concluding
verses; 2 vol., pts. Ka — Pho, separate pagination for each pt., [409] + [408] ff. + Dkar chag, 5 ff.
[2] H.3680: Stockholm, Etnografiska Museet — 1 nearly complete copy (pt. Khe is missing);
Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling monastery, after 1658?; 2 titles in the col. — Glegs bam yid bzhin
nor bu and Byin rlabs gzi ’od ’phro ba’i gsung rab rin chen gter, number of texts —135 (col.),
164 (actual number) + concluding verses; 1 vol., pts. Ka — Pho, separate pagination for each pt.,
[808?] ff. + Dkar chag, 5 ff.
[3] TBRC, W1KG12113: Lhasa, 1947; title (on the cover) — Mdo sngags gsung rab rgya mtsho’i
snying po mtshan gzungs mang bsdus, number of texts — 159 (col.); 2 vols., 310 and 311 ff. +
Dkar chag, 9 ff.
[4] TBRC, W1KG5988: Lhasa, 1913, reproduced in Waranasi, 1994; a copy of B-9906.
[5] TBRC, W10347: Tshul khrims rin chen. Bka’ nye bar mkho ba rnams gcig tu bsdebs pa’i glegs
bam ’dod dgu ’jo ba’i bum bzang // Tshul khrims rin chen. Gsung ’bum, vol. A, pt. 6.
[6] TBRC, W4CZ1062: Ri dzong dgon pa (Ladakh) — a copy of a Bkra shis lhun po ed.; 1 title
in the col. — Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu, number of texts — 170 (col.); 1 vol., pts. Ka — Mi,
separate pagination for each pt., [about 760] ff. + Dkar chag, 5? ff. (f. 5, the last one?, is
missing).
[7] Tib.170: the IOM — 2 complete and 1 imcomplete (f. 1—113 are missing) copies; Beijing,
1674; 2 titles in the col. — Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu and Byin rlabs gzi ’od ’phro ba’i gsung
rab rin chen gter, number of texts — 165 (col.), 188 (actual number) + concluding verses,
mantras and ’Gyur byang; 1 vol., pts. Ka — Pho, 591 ff. + Dkar chag in Tibetan, 5 ff., and in
Mongolian, 7 ff.
[8] Tib.171: the IOM — 1 complete copy; Beijing, before 1674?; 2 titles in the col. (probably,
the col. is incomplete) — Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu and Byin rlabs gzi ’od ’phro ba’i gsung
rab rin chen gter, number of texts — 165 (col.), 164 (actual number) + concluding verses; 1 vol.,
pts. Ka — Pho, 394 ff. (395 acc. to the original pagination but numbers 302 and 303 are given
to one f.) + Dkar chag, 4 ff.
50
Zorin A.V. Lines of development of the tibetan editions of gzungs bsdus collection first printed...
[9] Tib.172: the IOM — 1 complete and 1 incomplete (vol. 1 is missing) copies; Labrang, 1785;
1 title in the col. — Gzungs bsdus kyi glegs bam, number of texts — 167 (col.), 182 (actual
number) + concluding verses; 2 vols., pts. Ka — Thu and The — Wo, separate pagination for
each pt., [418] and [446] ff.
[10] Tib.173: the IOM — 4 complete and 1 incomplete (vol. 1 is missing) copies; Beijing, 1729 (2) —
follows Tib.170; 2 vol., pts. Ka — Ji, Ju — Pho, 380 ff. (1—190 and 190—380, number 190
is dubbed) + Dkar chag, 4 ff.
[11] Tib.174: the IOM — 10 complete and 1 incomplete (vol. 2 is missing) copies; Buryatia, the
19th century? — a copy of Tib.173.
[12] Tib.175: the IOM — 18 complete copies; Beijing, 1729 (1) — follows Tib.178; 2 vol., pts.
Ka — Ju, Ju — Pho, 197 and 188 ff. + Dkar chag, 5 ff.
[13] Tib.176: the IOM — 1 almost complete copy; Beijing, before 1674?; 2 titles in the col. —
Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu and Byin rlabs gzi ’od ’phro ba’i gsung rab rin chen gter, number
of texts — 165 (col., probably), 188 (actual number) + concluding verses and mantras; 1 vol.,
pts. Ka — Pho, 388 ff.
[14] Tib.177: the IOM — 1 complete and 1 incomplete (vol. 1 is missing) copies; Beijing, 1731 —
a copy of Tib.177-2.
[15] Tib.177-2: the IOM — 1 complete and 1 incomplete (vol. 1 is missing) copies; Rtag brtan
monastery, before 1658; 2 titles in the col. — Glegs bam yid bzhin nor bu and Byin rlabs gzi ’od
’phro ba’i gsung rab rin chen gter, number of texts — 135 (col., probably), 171 (actual number) + concluding verses; 2 vols., pts. Ka — Ji, Ju — Mi, Gi, separate pagination for each pt.,
[409] and [410] ff. + Dkar chag, 5 ff. + [Par byang], 2 ff.
[16] Tib.177-3: the IOM — 1 complete copy; Mongolia, before 1653; 2 titles in the col. — Bsam
’phel yid bzhin dbang gi rgyal and Byin rlabs gter gyur pa’i gsung rab rin chen glegs bam
mchog, number of texts — 135 (col.), 164 (actual number) + concluding verses; 1 vol., pts.
Ka — Pho, separate pagination for each pt., [536] ff.
[17] Tib.178: the IOM — 2 complete and 2 incomplete (1 — many ff. are missing, 2 — vol. 2 is
missing) copies; Beijing, 1729 (1) — follows Tib.176; number of texts — 165 (col., probably),
167 (cover title), 188 (actual number) + concluding verses and mantras; 2 vol., pts. Ka — Ju,
Je — Pho, 211 and 199 ff. + Dkar chag, 4 ff.
[18] Tib.178-2: the IOM — a ms copy of Tib.173; Buryatia, the 19th century?; 2 vol., pts. Ka — Ji,
Ju — Pho, 389 and 380 ff. + Dkar chag, 6 ff.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
2. Catalogues, papers, reference books
A complete catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist canons (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur) / Ed.
by Hakuju Ui, Munetada Suzuki, Yenshô Kanakura, Tôkan Tada. Sendai: Tôhoku Imperial
University, 1934.
Dung dkar tshig mdzod chen mo, 2002: Mkhas dbang dung dkar blo bzang ’phrin las mchog
gis mdzad pa’i bod rig pa’i tshig mdzod chen mo shes bya rab gsal. Beijing: Krung go’i bod
rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2002.
Eimer H. Tibetica Stockholmiensia. Handliste der tibetischen Texte der Sven-Hedin-Stiftung
und des Ethnographischen Museums zu Stockholm“ // Zentralasiatische Studien 6, 1972.
S. 603—682; 7, 1973. S. 301—351; 8, 1974. S. 179—240; 9, 1975. S. 37—86; 10, 1976.
S. 625—674; 11, 1977. S. 507—554; 12, 1978. S. 315—358.
Eimer H. Die Ausgabe des Gzungs ’dus aus Dga’ ldan phun tshogs gling // Jaina-itihāsaratna. Festschrift für Gustav Roth zum 90. Geburtstag. Marburg: Indica et Tibetica Verlag,
2006. S. 163—177.
Harrison P. Preliminary Notes on a gZungs ’dus Manuscript from Tabo // Suhṛllekhāḥ. Festgabe
für Helmut Eimer. Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1996. P. 49—68.
Likhachev D.S. Tekstologiya (na materiale russkoy literatury X—XVII vv. Moscow-Leningrad,
1962.
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
[25] Meisezahl R.O. Über zwei mDo-maṅ Redaktionen und ihre Editionen in Tibet und China //
Zentralasiatische Studien 2. Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1968.
S. 67—150.
[26] Sazykin A. A Mongolian Manuscript ‘Sungdui’ // Manuscripta Orientalia. Vol. 5, No 3, September 1999. P. 62—69.
[27] Taube M. Zur Textgeschichte einiger gZuṅs-bsdus-Ausgaben // Zentralasiatische Studien 2.
Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1968. S. 55—66.
[28] Uspensky V. Old Tibetan and Mongolian Collections in the Libraries of St. Petersburg //
Asian Research Trends, 1996, No. 6. P. 173—184.
[29] Uspensky V. Catalogue of the Mongolian Manuscripts and Xylographs in the St. Petersburg
State University Library. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia
and Africa, 1999.
[30] Uspensky V. Tibetskiy buddizm v Pekine. St Petersburg, 2011.
ЛИНИИ РАЗВИТИЯ ТИБЕТОЯЗЫЧНЫХ ИЗДАНИЙ
СБОРНИКА «СУНГДУЙ», ВПЕРВЫЕ НАПЕЧАТАННОГО
В МОНАСТЫРЕ ТАКТЭН, ОСНОВАННОМ ТАРАНАТХОЙ
А.В. Зорин
Отдел рукописей и документов
Институт восточных рукописей РАН
Дворцовая наб., 18, Санкт-Петербург, Россия, 191186
Статья посвящена сборнику канонических, апокрифических и постканонических буддийских
текстов, известному под кратким наименованием «Сунгдуй» и впервые напечатанному в монастыре
тибетской школы чжонанг Тактэн, который был основан знаменитым деятелем тибетского буддизма
Таранатхой в 1619 г. и который, после разгрома школы чжонанг правительством Пятого Далай-ламы
в середине XVII в., перешел в ведение школы гэлук и получил новое название Гадэн-пунцок-линг.
Статья основана на уникальном собрании различных изданий «Сунгдуя», хранящихся в Институте
восточных рукописей РАН. Автором впервые были выявлены несколько изданий, до сего момента
неизвестных мировой науке, в том числе, по-видимому, старейшее из известных изданий, наиболее
близкое исходному (напечатано в Монголии), а также два наиболее ранних пекинских издания, одно
из которых близко оригинальному изданию монастыря Тактэн, а второе, вероятно, непосредственно
предшествовало появлению первого официального издания 1674 г., созданного в Пекине для маньчжурского императора Китая Канси. К работе были привлечены также некоторые другие источники,
которых нет в коллекции ИВР РАН, прежде всего более поздние тибетские издания «Сунгдуя», доступные в электронной библиотеке тибетских текстов TBRC. На основании сравнения всех изданий,
начиная с самых ранних и заканчивая последним лхасским 1947 г., автору впервые удалось представить достаточно надежную текстологически картину развития памятника, в которой отчетливо
выделяются две основные линии: «оригинальная тибетская» и «императорская пекинская».
Ключевые слова: тибетская буддийская литература, буддийский канон, «Сунгдуй», Таранатха,
монастырь Тактэн, тибетский буддизм в Пекине, книгопечатание, текстология.
52
PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOLOGY:
ASPECTS OF INTERACTION
CONCERNING THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
OF LYRICAL POETRY: SOME PRELIMINARY NOTES
E.B. Rashkovsky
All-Russian State Library for Foreign Literature
Nikoloyamskaya str., 1, Moscow, Russia, 109189
The phenomenon of lyric poetry is described as a special, internally necessary form of self-realization
of person in culture and, moreover, as a special form of self-realization of culture as it is. At the heart of this
phenomenon there are the principles of spontaneous self-discovery of human personality in a rhythmic
speech flow and at the same time — spontaneous integration of personality into trends and meanings of
language and culture. Both of these principles assume, first, expansion of a search field of human memory
and associations, and, secondly, a search field of communication between people. Thus, the lyric poetry appears to be a necessary, though semi-hidden, ingredient of sociality and civil relations, accustoming us
to involuntary self-knowledge and aspiration to find contacts with the other person and, therefore, to wisdom and tolerance.
Key words: philosophy, lyric poetry, creativity, culture, language, existential, sudden, spontaneous
integration, interlocutor, reference.
As it seems me, such kind of formulation of our coming discourse could involve us
not only in the matter of understanding of the nature of lyrical poetry itself, but, moreover, in the matter of understanding of human cognition as well as human creativity.
Once upon a time British scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi had defined
human creativity, especially in its crucial moments, as certain “spontaneous integration”, or spontaneous association and mutual correlation of different and seemingly
unlike verbal and imaginative streams in the same human experience [6].
This generalization of creative scientific practices may be also used for our following interpretation of the poetical, or better to say, lyrical phenomenon.
Surely, we could define the lyric poetry as well as the poetical sphere itself as a final
realization of spontaneous tacit knowledge (once more, Polanyi’s notion) being willynilly cherished by the poet, as usual, through years and years. This final and sometimes unexpected realization means almost sudden reciprocal discovery of the stream
of speech in human existence as well as (vice versa) an almost sudden discovery of
human existence in the stream of speech. This spontaneous transformation of “tacit
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
knowledge” into the meaningful and beautiful stream of speech and, moreover, stream
of language (1), was acutely marked in the early poetry of Boris Pasternak:
И сады, и пруды, и ограды,
И кипящее белыми воплями
Мирозданье — лишь страсти разряды,
Человеческим сердцем накопленной.
(“Gardens, ponds, fences, // And the Universe itself, full of bubbling white
screams, — // All these things are only discharges of passion // Accumulated by human heart”) (2) ...
If we have to speak not only about the wide phenomenon of creativity, but about
more specific area of creativity in poetical field, it is necessary to underline the primacy
of language in the matter of poetry. It is worthy to remember that the very notion of poetry used in the present day language is rooted in the Greek ποιησις, meaning not only
sublime poetical work, but also the almost prosaic working processes. Thus, the notion
of ποιησις could also mean a kind of language practices.
Passions and images cherished in the depth of our consciousness, semi-consciousness or subconscious (3) are being transformed in sometimes momentary acts of
poetical creation into something organized and animated by the structures and meanings,
sometimes paradoxical, of our common language. And thanks the language, thanks
the inner work of our thought and consciousness these deep processes receive more or
less understandable and rational expression.
Non-linear, instant, non-commonplace character of poetical associations proves
unique character of human experience as well as existence. Thanks completed and finally
trimmed poetical text the poet’s Bergsonian durée becomes almost common cultural
as well as mental heritage.
Lyrical poetry responds the peculiar human need for transforming of our intimate
pains and conflicts into some conditional meaning, order and beauty. But, as we know
thanks the works of outstanding philosophers of science (K.R. Popper, T.S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos e.a.), the more responses we get the more questions we have to put. And — sometimes — the more wide audience we have to address [5].
Thus, it is a high time to precede to the problem of audience as well as of the addressee of the lyrical poetry.
***
As it seems, it’s important to note: human uniqueness is by no means closed in itself,
but necessary needing somebody other, needing for some kind of interlocutor or addressee, maybe not only known, but also unknown, though demanded (4). Sometimes this
interlocutor could be denoted not only as “you” or “Thou”, but also as “he” or “she”
(the latter kind of silent interlocutor was displayed in Lermontov’s masterpiece “The
Dream” — «В полдневный жар, в долине Дагестана...»). But such kind of substitute
is not so important.
Even the Lord Himself from the time of the Psalmists is being perceived as necessary Interlocutor of the lyrical ποιησις through ages and ages. And the range of such
54
Rashkovsky E.B. Concerning the philosophical background of lyrical poetry: some preliminary notes
poetry is very wide: from loud enthusiastic praises up to the semi-whisper of confession.
Let us once more remember the early poetry of Boris Pasternak. I mean his untitled
octave written in 1915:
Не как люди, не еженедельно,
Не всегда, в столетье раза два
Я молил Тебя: членораздельно
Повтори творящие слова.
И тебе ж невыносимы смеси
Откровений и людских неволь.
Как же хочешь Ты, чтоб был я весел,
С кем бы стал Ты есть земную соль?
(“Not as all the people, as they use to do weekly, // But seldom, maybe only
twice a century, // I prayed Thee: please, // Repeat Thy creating words in articulated way.
All these blends of revelations and purely human compulsion // Are also, I should
say, unbearable for Thee. // Thus, how do Thou want me to be marry? // Whom doth
Thou need for sharing the salt of the Earth?”).
I would like also to quote another paradoxical example of almost whispering as
well as confessional poetic prayer written by another great master of Slavic poetical area:
the Pole Leopold Staff (1878—1957). This quatrain was written by Staff in the end of
his life:
Stojąc sam na milczenia progu,
Tracę na zawsze twoje imię,
Druga osobo dialogu,
Wiecznej mgławicy pseudonimie.
(“Standing alone on the threshold of silence, // I’m losing Thy Name forever, //
Oh, Thou, the second Person of the dialogue // And the pseudonym of eternal nebula”).
As it seems, the very fact of our persistent need for interlocutor is the reason why
Benedetto Croce denoted lyrical poetry as “the quintessence of humanity” [3. P. 349].
***
This kind of penetrative dialogue and penetrative communication may also be
described as a manifest “spontaneous integration” of our existential as well as esthetical
and linguistic experience in the rhythmical stream of speech. This correlative integration
deals not only with the necessary human need for gathering of the Universe in our
mind, but also the need of inner collecting of ourselves. Through our poetic experience
(not only in making, but also in listening or reading poetry we are trying to find the
intimate connections or correlations among the Universe and ourselves, among the
Macrocosm and our tiny and fragmentary Microcosms). If to remember Eckermann’s
record of Goethe’s conversation on January 27, 1824, the old poet’s words were as
following.
According to Goethe, his poetical experience, especially in the end of his life,
helped him to collect the Life, including the life of his own, as the kind of his intimate
chronological order (“als Annalen”) [4. P. 101].
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
In many respects this statement reminds Plato’s idea concerning remembering /
recollection (αναμνησις) as the necessary premise of the gathering of the Universe in
ourselves and, vice versa, of the inner gathering ourselves in the Universe (Phoedrus,
249b-d). Special features of this remembering / recollection are very peculiar things
being out of the ranks of our present discourse. But as for myself, I should once more
underline a specific and spontaneous character of lyrical poetry, its necessary role in the
process of organization of our αναμνησις.
This accent on the fact of spontaneous, immediate poetical illumination partly
leads us out of the borders of classic Athenian philosophical heritage (nevertheless,
not out of the border of classic Athenian drama). Poetical phenomenon of immediate
correlation of things as well as immediate gathering of fragmentary and semi-distracted
human existence partly drawing us near some trends of the ancient Oriental thinking,
including Israel, India, China. Quite the same could be said concerning the tradition
of Christian Patristics as well as the tradition of Christian mysticism (Jacob Boehme,
Vladimir Solovyev e.a.).
Thus, the very culture of poetical meditation with its accent on immediate correlation of things, symbols, feelings and thoughts helps us to get more deep understanding
of many trends in modern as well as in post-modern European, American and Slavic
philosophical and scientific thinking [5]. If to remember Gaston Bachelard — “La
poésie est une métaphysique instannée” [1. H. 224]: The poetry is a kind of momentary metaphysics.
This paradoxical definition of poetry given by French philosopher brings us closely to understanding of lyrical poetry as a certain display of animated, though conditionally verbalized, Wisdom. This kind of Wisdom is erecting and supporting human
being from early, infantile stages of life and — sometimes — up to the ultimate
hours: in hora mortis nostrae.
Thus, sometimes poetical experience could be one of the preconditions of human
steadfastness and surviving in the crucial circumstances of human life. I have managed to listen or to read many written or oral witnesses of different survivors of Nazi
or Bolshevik concentration camps (including Austrians, Poles, Russians) concerning
poetry, certainly without books, only thanks memory, as a substantial supporting factor
in their almost hopeless camp situation.
Thus, different kinds of poetical experience, either making remembering / recollection (αναμνησις!) of poetry could be understood not only as a mere “reflection” of the
Universe, but also as its human re-construction (5). And, moreover, the human Universe’s furthermost development.
As a brilliant example of such poetical correlative recollection I would like to remember one relatively short Emily Dickinson’s poem “There came a Wind like
a Bugle...” (1883):
There came a Wind like a Bugle —
It quivered through the Grass
And a Green Chill upon the Heat
So ominous did pass
We barred the Windows and the Doors
56
Rashkovsky E.B. Concerning the philosophical background of lyrical poetry: some preliminary notes
As from an Emerald Ghost —
The Doom’s electric Moccasin
That very instant passed —
On the strange Mob of panting Trees
And Fences fled away
And Rivers where the Houses ran
Those looked that lived — that Day —
The Bell within the steeple wild
The flying tidings told —
How much can come
And much can go,
And yet abide the World!
To resume this paper as well as to remember some ideas and notions introduced
by Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Poetical Phenomenon seems me to be an
integral part of the Human One. Poetical experience of human person (the poet himself
or readers of his poetry: this distinction almost does not matter) seems me to be necessary school of the art of instant and sometimes integrative correlation of things, minds,
and hearts.
August 13, 2013
FOOTNOTES
(1) This transformation of “common words” of our common language into the beautiful and
rhythmically organized stream of speech is one of the main problems of Aristotelian “Poetics”.
(2) This is the quotation from Pasternak’s poem “The Definition of Creativity” (1919?). Probably,
this quatrain may be the root of L.S. Vygotsky’s teaching of creative act as a “discharge” of so
heavy and sometimes long internal stress which could be the precondition of the creative escape from the state of stress.
(3) Certainly, the world of our subconscious is not only poignant Freudian “It”. Rooted in the depth
of our psycho-somatic structure rhythmical feeling [8] transforms in human experience into
some kind of universal, but very difficult for rationalization intuition of beauty. In many respects
this intuition has an attribute to sublimate the very state of our mind in different fields of its
experience including our artistic, scientific, philosophical as well as religious experience [2].
(4) The notion of invitation of interlocutor as one of the basic principles of lyrical poetry is described
in my book “Meanings in History” [7. P. 319—332].
(5) We have in Russian a very strong noun for denoting this process: воссоздание.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Bachelard G. Le droit de rêver. — Paris: Presses univ. de France, 1970.
[2] Campbell J., Moyers B. The Power of Myth. — N.Y.: Doubleday, 1988.
[3] Croce B. Philosophical Anthology. History. Economics. Law. Ethics. Poetry / Transl., Coll. a.
Comm. by Sv. Mal’tseva. — St. Petersburg: Pneuma, 1999. (Кроче Б. Антология сочинений
по философии. История. Экономика. Право. Этика. Поэзия / Пер., сост. и комм. Св. Мальцевой. — СПб.: Пневма, 1999.)
[4] Eckermann J.P. Gesprache mit Goethe in der letzen Jahren sense Lebens. — Berlin: Aufbau,
1956.
57
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[5] Kuznetsova N.I., Rozov M.A., Shreider Yu.A. Science as a Subject of Research. — Moscow:
Novyi Khronograf, 2012. (Кузнецова Н.И., Розов М.А., Шрейдер Ю.А. Объект исследования — наука. — М.: Новый хронограф, 2012.)
[6] Polanyi M. Genius in Science // Encounter. L. 1971. Vol. 38. N 1.
[7] Rashkovsky E.B. Meanings in History. Studies in the History of Faith, Knowledge and Culture. — Moscow: Progress-Traditsia, 2008. (Рашковский Е.Б. Смыслы в истории. Исследования по истории веры, познания, культуры. — М.: Прогресс-Традиция, 2008.)
[8] Rudneva S.D., Fish E.M. The Musical Movement. — Moscow: Prosveshcheniye, 1972.
(Руднева С.Д., Фиш Э.М. Музыкальное движение. — М.: Просвещение, 1972.)
ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ СМЫСЛЫ В ЛИРИЧЕСКОЙ ПОЭЗИИ:
К ПОСТАНОВКЕ ВОПРОСА
Е.Б. Рашковский
Комплексный научно-исследовательский отдел
Всероссийская государственная библиотека иностранной литературы
им. М.И. Рудомино
Николоямская, 1, Москва, Россия, 109189
Феномен лирической поэзии описывается как особая, внутренне необходимая форма самоосуществления человека в мысли и культуре. В основе этого феномена лежит принцип спонтанного
самонахождения человеческой личности в ритмическом речевом потоке и одновременно — спонтанного приобщения личности к стихиям и смыслам языка и культуры. Оба эти принципа предполагают, во-первых, расширение поискового поля человеческой памяти и ассоциаций, а, во-вторых,
поискового поля общения между людьми. Таким образом, лирическая поэзия, развивая и мысль
и язык, оказывается необходимым ингредиентом развития самих процессов истории. Исторически
поддерживая в нас потребность неявного, но глубокого и задушевного собеседования с другими,
непохожими на нас людьми, лирическая поэзия оказывается неявным, но существенным ингредиентом социальности и гражданских отношений, приучая нас к самопознанию и стремлению найти
контакты с другим человеком и, следовательно, к мудрости и толерантности.
Ключевые слова: философия, лирическая поэзия, творчество, культура, язык, экзистенция,
внезапность, «спонтанная интеграция», собеседник, соотнесение.
PHILOSOPHIC CONTENT
OF ANTON CHEKHOV’S WORK
E.S. Grevtsova
Department of History of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10a, Moscow, Russia, 117198
Understanding of the philosophic content of the A.P. Chekhov’s oeuvre, which is based on the writer’s
idea of the original religious and philosophic world view and at the same time of him as a thinker of an existential type, who had a significant impact on the development of Russian philosophy of the XX-th century
is presented and exposed in the article.
Key words: Chekhov, Russian philosophy, Russian literature, intelligentsia, existentialism, existential
nature of Russian philosophy, world view, self-knowledge.
“Russia loved itself in Chekhov.
Nobody had ever expressed its collective type like he did,
not only in his works but also in his face, his appearance,
his manners and it seems that also in his living and behavior”.
(V. Rozanov)
According to Vasily Rosanov, Chekhov, a great classical author of Russian literature, expressed a “collective type” of Russia and Russians in his writing (and that is a philosophic challenge). However, the historical and philosophic analysis of artistic legacy
of Chekhov is still a rare occasion. Famous books on the history of Russian philosophy
written by V. Zenkovsky and N. Lossky do not mention Chekhov as a thinker; this
fact may breed an illusion of his low priority for philosophic community. Also there are
no articles about Chekhov in contemporary reference scientific publications including
encyclopedia “Russian Philosophy”. Unfortunately, there is no section on Chekhov as
a thinker in the recently published monograph by S. Semenova, a scholar of Metaphysics of Russian Literature [1].
Chekhov’s work, being, may at least be named to be close to philosophy (if not
philosophic) as many specialists allow an opinion that Russian philosophy and literature a
closely connected and literature is the embodiment of Russian philosophic ideas. However, historically Chekov gained an unjust reputation of “non-philosophic” writer in
Russian culture, especially as compared to L. Tolstoy and F. Dostoyevsky. Chekhov’s
“non-philosophic” stereotype has been following him since the end of 19th — early
20th century. Moreover, the stereotype was mostly established by book critics and essay
writers those who are responsible for the great bulk of publications on Chekhov; they
ignored philosophic content of his writing absolutely. Chekhov was blamed to have “no
ideals”, “no wings”, “no ideology” and even “no general idea”. Even the critic D. Merezhkovsky (who was no alien to philosophy) argued that regarding philosophic thinking
Chekhov was just a “pure tramp”. These negativistic statements are part of the antholo59
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
gy “A. Chekhov: Pro et Contra. Works of A.P. Chekhov in Russian thought of the
XIXth — early XXth centuries. (1887—1914)” [2].
The stereotype of “non-philosophic” nature of Chekhov still persists. Penetration
into the worldview part of his writings is still shallow and some up-to-date efforts to
include the writer into the context of “metaphysics of Russian literature” look like a
worthless playing for deconstruction from the point of view of postmodernism. Let us
consider one of such efforts: “Russia found in Chekhov its ideal for secularity — the
secularity which removes religious strain of culture but at the same time acts as a criticism for secularity according to the religious programme of this culture. Its result is
an absolute zero, a full-weight zero that embodies an absolute in itself” [3. P. 507].
The occurrence of these negative, even “twaddle” records of Chekhov’s worldview
was mentioned by V. Katayev, a well-known Russian Chekhov scholar and the chairman
of the Chekhov Committee of Russian Academy of Sciences: “New works on the peculiarities of Russian idea, Russian notion are published. Chekhov is either not mentioned there or is mentioned in a negative context” [4. P. 366]. According to Katayev,
the pseudo-original presentations result in inability to penetrate into the depth of philosophic measurement of Chekhov’s work. Katayev states that Chekhov was an original thinker indeed, one of “epistemological” writers. According to Katayev (being a
reputed expert of Chekhov works), the distinction was that Chekhov had never proposed any final metaphysical solutions of ideological issues; he called to search for
truth and never left room for any possibility of giving up the process. As for Chekhov’s “secularism”, his “disbelief in anything”, the bottom of this long-standing cliché
may be knocked out by the words of the writer saying: “There is a huge gap between
notions “the God exists” and “there is no God” and it may be narrowed with a great
difficulty by a genuine man of wisdom”. On the one hand, Chekhov’s attitude to the
idea of God was serious and responsible; there was no blasphemy in it. At the same
time he was strange to the “intellectual” search for God and any “greasy religiosity”. He
wrote: “A man shall stray, seek for a goal, be dissatisfied until he understands and
finds his God. One cannot live in the name of children or humankind. And if there is no
God then there is no reason to live one should perish” [5. P. 214].
A remarkable article of S. Bulgakov “Chekhov as a thinker” (1904) that originated
the study of philosophic content in Chekhov’s work states that “spiritual capital” left
by him is far from mastering and comprehension and that Chekhov’s deep penetration
into the “mystery of a human” is the main value of his writing. Bulgakov’s focus here is
on the fact that Chekhov writes not about heroes but about “ordinary people” and this
is an issue of comprehensive and universal importance because it does not refer to
Russian life only but opens ways to learn human nature itself.
So what is a reason for the mentioned underestimation of Chekhov as a thinker
in Russia (as opposed to, for instance, England where Chekhov is looked upon as an
intelligent writer, in particular a play writer)? To answer this questions at least in broad
terms one needs to look at differences in the meaning of an image of intellectual leader
in the West and in Russia.
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Grevtsova E.S. Philosophic content of Anton Chekhov’s work
The main distinctive feature of philosophy in Russia, in particular regarding its
maintenance and development is the existence of inconsistences between philosophic
ideas and living conditions in Russia. M. Gershenzon noted: “Truly, historians would
not make any mistake if they begun studying the life of Russian society in two separate ways — life and ideas — – as there was almost nothing in common between
them” [6. P. 81]. Thus, the immersion of Russian thinkers into the world of feelings
of an individual devoted to the sense of life that determined general existence-oriented
philosophical nature of Russian philosophy follows. And, the migration of philosophic
ideas into the fields of culture adjacent to philosophy including imaginative literature
follows too.
It is well known that Chekhov possessed the highest level of civic awareness. No
matter where he lived — in Moscow, Melikhovo, Yalta — he had wide connections
with “general public” in an old Russian meaning: he maintained contact with fellow
countrymen from Taganrog, he sent books to the Taganrog public library, he took
part in a jury, participated in the work of the Serpukhov district council, in various
charity events, in the census of enumeration, he helped starving people, he was building
a school and a hospital. And finally, having a degree in medicine Chekhov performed
his medical duties. During the noisome pestilence of cholera he worked voluntary as
a district doctor (without being paid). However, being socially active and concerned
about the chaos of Russian life Chekhov never claimed to be a teacher of life and a public leader. He simply stated: “We have no politics”.
I have no aim and intention to prove that Chekhov belonged to one commonly
recognized school of philosophy. There is no so-called conceptual existentialism in his
writings. Nevertheless Chekhov expresses an existential orientation which is very typical
for Russian philosophy.
Emphasising the existential nature of Russian philosophy it is necessary to underline that there is no any attempt here to establish a link with existentialism, one of the
prominent schools of European philosophy. However, there is an idea that existentialism
in itself cannot be considered as a special philosophy as, according to the well-known
American studier Walter Kaufman, “it is not a distinct branch of philosophy but a general
name for various riots against classical philosophy”. And he continues further: “To be
precise, existentialism is neither a school of thought not a combination of philosophic
statements” [7. P. 11].
It might be concluded that within a general interest to the topic of a human being
in Russian philosophic thought there appeared divergent directions for its interpretation
due to distinctions in philosophic and theoretical foundations.
Chekhov’s existential orientation is marked not only by a vital interest to the
“mystery of a human” but also by his style in which his interest is expressed — the
shape in which his idea of combination of individual plan of human existence and social
being is stated. The style and the shape are definitely in conflict with that interpretation
of combination of individual and social issues that existed in the anthropologism of
Chernyshevsky and have been eventually inherited by Soviet Marxism in its dogmatic
version. It is typical that Chernyshevsky in his “Anthropological principle in the philoso61
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
phy” does not define the anthropological principle per se and does not raise an issue
about it at the very beginning; he states the social and political determination of philosophy and the bound connection of philosophy and politics. First of all, Chernyshevsky
wrote that every philosopher was a member of some sort of political party that “fought
to dominate above the society”. Purpose and intent of Chernyshevsky philosophy
mainly aimed not to study a human as he or she was but to solve topical problems of
social restructuring in a socialistic way which was supposedly to establish all conditions to “make human better”. Here it is possible to distinguish not only an educational utopianism but also an uncompromising political attitude to philosophic ideas that
contravened the materialistic anthropologism of Chernyshevsky. Eventually the modified
version of his standpoint took shape of a well-known “principle of party spirit in philosophy” in dogmatic Marxism.
On the contrary, Chekhov rejected and disliked any kind of party spirit, sectionalism as well as nihilistic illiberality and attitude to different ideas. He followed the
same principles both in life and in writing. Chekhov should be considered to be ideologically broad-minded or, speaking contemporarily, an extremely tolerant thinker.
He was very delicate and amiable in his attitude to the opinions of other people. He
helped anyone very patiently and in spite of being severely ill accepted enduring
crowds of admirers and pilgrims “to Chekhov” in his country house in Yalta. As A. Suvorin, the shrewd publisher of Chekhov writings, justly specified, he never was a
“man of theory” (for instance, as compared to D. Merezhkovsky). With all dislike of
Suvorin for “common liberalism”, assumed that Chekhov’s liberalism is quite acceptable
for a conservative as he has “his own personal liberalism that enables him to tell the
truth as he sees and understands it, not how it is stated in the theory” [8. P. 391].
It is possible to conclude that Chekhov has sought to tell and been actually telling
the truth about human and this is the principal value of philosophy of this outstanding
Russian thinker.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Semenova S.G. Metafizika russkoy literaturyi: V 2 t. M., 2004. (Semenova S. Metaphysics
of Russian Literature: In 2 v.)
[2] Chehov A.P.: Pro et Contra. Tvorchestvo A.P. Chehova v russkoy myisli kontsa XIX nachala
XX v. (1887—1914). SPb. 2002. (A.P. Chekhov: Pro et Contra. Works of A.P. Chekhov in Russian thought of the XIXth — early XXth centuries (1887—1914)).
[3] Epshteyn M.N. Slovo i molchanie. Metafizika russkoy literaturyi. M., 2006. (Epstein M.
Words and silence. Metaphysics of Russian literature).
[4] Kataev V.B. Chehov plyus... Predshestvenniki, sovremenniki, preemniki. M., 2004. (Katayev V.
Chekhov plus... Predecessors, contemporaries, successors.)
[5] Chehov A.P. Poln. sobr. soch. i pisem: V 30 t. Soch. T. 17. M., 2009. (Chekhov A. The complete
works and letters: In 30 v. Works. V. 17.)
[6] Gershenzon M.O. Tvorcheskoe samosoznanie // Vehi. Iz glubinyi. M., 1991. (Gershenzon M.
Creative consciousness // Milestones. From the depth.)
[7] Kaufmann W.A. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. N.Y., 1989.
[8] Kuzicheva A. Chehov. Zhizn «otdelnogo cheloveka». M., 2010. (Kuzicheva A. Chekhov.
Life of an “ordinary individual”.)
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Grevtsova E.S. Philosophic content of Anton Chekhov’s work
ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ
ТВОРЧЕСТВА А.П. ЧЕХОВА
Е.С. Гревцова
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая,10а, Москва, Россия, 117198
В работе раскрывается понимание философского содержания творчества А.П. Чехова, основывающееся на представлении об оригинальном религиозно-философском мировоззрении писателя
и одновременно мыслителя экзистенциального типа, оказавшего значительное влияние на развитие
русской философии ХХ в.
Ключевые слова: Чехов, русская философия, русская литература, интеллигенция, экзистенциализм, экзистенциальная природа русской философской мысли, мировоззрение, самопознание.
PHILOSOPHIC IDEAS
IN THE ARABIC LITERATURE
E. Mussawi, N. Kovyrshina
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Mikluho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, Russia, 117198
The paper analyses the specifics of the usage of philosophic ideas in modern Arabic literature on the
basis of traditional Arabic themes and forms.
Key words: the Arab-Islamic philosophy, the genre of the “Zuhdiyyat”, Abu Ala al-Maari, Faiz Mahmud, West-European skepticism.
From the very beginning of its appearance (early VIII century) the Arab-Islamic
philosophy was considered to be “a science of sciences” and comprised studies of different questions related to the socio-political role of the philosopher in the medieval
society. Scientists and philosophers such as Al-Kindi (died in 837), Al-Farabi (died in
950), Ibn Sina (Avicenna, died in 1037), Al-Gazali (died in 1111) and many others
were interested in the nature of the Divinity and its relation with the physical world,
problems of anima, mind, good and evil and “freedom of will” (as between divine decree and human activity) knowledge. Moral and social aspects of life are subject matter
for both representatives of the Arab-Islamic philosophy and the foremost Arab writers.
During the reign of the Abbasid dynasty a new development in the Arabic poetry appeared — “philosophical verses”, the authors of which touched on the themes of the
outward world using the analytical approach. Philosophical musings over the reason
for being, its transience and certainty of death in the form of austere sermon (the genre
of the “Zuhdiyyat” — “abstention, austerity”) became a frequent practice in the works
of Abu al-Atahiya (748—825), who can be justly designated as the father of the genre
of philosophical lyric poetry. Ibn ar-Rumi (836—896), a talented poet, was called an
“eminent philosopher”. The ideas of rationality and fairness, which were prevailing
concepts for the ideologists of the “mutazilizm” (VIII century), attracted medieval
prose-writers, such as: al-Jahiz (775—868), A. Ibn al-Muqaffa (approx. 720—756), Abu
Ala al-Maari (979—1057) and others.
The closest rapprochement of the philosophical ideas and Arabic literature can
be traced nowadays, when the crisis phenomena in politics, economy and social life
of the Arabic communities are exacerbated by the moral and ethic “diseases”, by selfdissatisfaction of the human being. One of the contemporary writers-philosophers is the
Jordanian writer Faiz Mahmud. His philosophic novel “al-Ablah” (“Idiot”), in which
the author used a parabolic form, was published in 1979. The author borrowed this
name from the Russian writer F.M. Dostoevsky, but the novels practically have nothing
in common. Behind the fancy plot a real context — socio-historical events in the life
of Jordan, segregation of people in the modern Jordanian community, commotion of the
spirits of the person under the difficult conditions of the socio-economical situation in
the Middle East — can be traced.
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The Jordanian writer realizes the need for a new moral code to be adopted, which
could give the Arabic society a good shake and startle it out of its apathy, release from
loafing, vacancy of mind, and passivity. Against the background of the political processes
taking place in the Middle East countries, the writer is striving to match a new strength
against the evil, having returned to the traditional ways of society salvation already
used by the Arabic literature.
The main idea of the novel — narration of a gradual revival of the human personality, its moral quest, liberation from vices — is expanded by the author in the ideas
classical for the Arabic literature, by the refraction of the “pathway to the light”. In quest
of this way of the human being’s transformation into the more perfect person, and
then of the spiritual transformation of the whole society, F. Mahmud comes to the assertion of the beauty of human nature, its aspiration for good and general welfare. According to his statement “ugliness of the worldly aspect is a lamp of clay, but in the
spiritual aspect there is neither pain, nor fear or ugliness, only the beauty is incarnated
in there” [5. P. 15]. Therefore, Faiz Mahmud has regard to the idea of the variety of
the natural and morally-psychological human phenomena, which he sees as the organic
integrity of the spirit and body, at that the spirit cannot be destroyed — only the body
can be born and can die. So, it is the spirituality, the “spirit”, that is a key component
in F. Mahmud’s structure of personality.
Every person occupies a certain position in life and wends the multi-level path of
the spiritual insight implementing their ideals of the good and love, and finally gains
inner liberty gradually overcoming their own vices, malices and winning perilous desires.
For F. Mahmud moral, spiritual values become especially significant. The platform of the Jordanian writer’s novel is the people’s ability to see with their own eyes
the true reason for being through the pure life.
Under the conditions of internal and external conflicts of the Arabic East countries situated in the Middle East, the problems of life and death, problems of all
people and each individuality salvation cannot but worry the Jordanian clerisy. Faiz
Mahmud is looking for the solution of difficult problems of the contemporary reality
trying to turn the personal existence to the world.
Trying to understand the destiny of an ordinary person whose acts and hopes are
units of measurement of all philosophic, moral and spiritual values of the society,
F. Mahmud absorbs historical and art experience of his nation resorting to the genre
of the parable. At that, the parable is a decompressed vivid narrative granule that is not
only a preaching in the form of the exciting story about the residents of the “city of
death” doomed to destruction because of a strange illness but, first of all, it is a philosophical statement of the person’s destiny dependence on the outside world, of the necessity of the person’s moral relation with the world. Through the lens of a fable
F. Mahmud is trying to show the Arabic community people and system of this community, to bring to light causes of appearance of the difficult vexing problems which his
contemporaries are facing every day.
In the novel the author is a narrator — Ravi: “It happened years and years ago.
With every sunrise there were a lot of dead bodies in the great city at sight of which
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people became lost, and the doctors were unable to cure people” [5. P.14]. Artistic fiction, which F. Mahmud uses in his novel, helps him to present events in such a way as
to show facts of life more vividly with the help of allegory. Socio-ideological imperatives that are contained in the folk tale are sustained by their “matching” to the rational
experience, to the daily life. The more cruel the world around the man is the more our
anguish for an ideal is and the more the artist’s duty is — to “find a man in the man”,
to show realistically not only ugliness and chaos prevailing in our world but also the
flush to the ideal hidden in the man’s soul, his desire to “return the lost soul” suppressed
by the burden of circumstances. F. Mahmud interprets the parable in terms of Sufism —
the hero should choose the path that leads to the supreme awareness of existence and
to the spiritual perfection; heroes are accompanied by a certain abstract character
(taif), who acts as a sufi teacher — sheikh. At the end of the way viators “open up
new horizons” (cashf al-ufuk) and “understand the existence” (fath al-vudjuk). Using
the parable as the edifying or a cautionary example, the author used also its genre resources, gave it a modern substance, and turned his work in a certain experiment. The
parable underlines and enhances morally-philosophical concept of the novel, and the
concept is to approve honorable motives which the man should follow during his life.
F. Mahmud is searching for ways of social transformations related to the creation of a
new model of personality. It is the heroes’ arduous quest of the mutual understanding
under the conditions of the contemporary social existence that can awake the heart
and the mind. Heroes do forth for the sake of people’s salvation. During this pilgrimage “the honour is above all things whatever the aim is” [5. P. 20].
Through the uplift of the person’s feeling and its awakening, the personal spirit
in man’s behavior and thinking becomes supreme. This process can take the most
contradictory shapes. In a complex environment the liberated person may equally become a great creative or a negative, destructive power, and the author is trying to
show it.
A man, according to the author’s opinion, cannot lose dreams and love during
their life because they value “these top things” though it is difficult for them to confess it in conditions of cold reality [5. P. 21]. Hence the duality of the human nature
where the good and the evil closely interweave, purity of feeling and sensitivity get
along with the turning deep into the selfish inner world. In this regard the author especially draws the reader’s attention to the relationships between a man and a woman
in the belief that they are equal. “No one should de-emphasize the woman’s role thus
soothing the man’s vanity”, — he says [5. P. 23]. The radix of the common love tragedy of the heroes and their attempt to make a family should be seeked in the “human’s nature” but not in that who is prevailing in the relationships [5. P. 24]. Psychological gap between the heroes is inevitable as the exalted impulse to the alliance of souls
faces the inner segregation and impossibility of the absolute mutual understanding.
Reality and delicacy of Vafa’s feelings to Ablah resembles the attempt to combine pure Eros with the worship to “the beautiful man” as an object of the kind of an
absolute godhead or the prophet gifted with a great vision of the prophet. In this novel
Vafa becomes a symbol of the whirl of thoughts and actions. She eagers to find “rest
and peace” after the long wandering over the old city ruins which the author by the
words of his hero calls “the traces of the world’s depravity” [5. P. 21].
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And her father helped her to make a choice. Vafa finds her way of salvation
avoiding eventual meetings with Ablah. This choice is disputed by the author himself
as the passive existence leads to the mental block which causes “chill over the heart
though the life is successful” [5. P. 41]. In such a manner F. Mahmud asserts the necessity to trust to own longings and this is the spirit of the novel. And the hero begs
vainly for one more chance. It is difficult for Ablah to go through the separation. Only after the anguish of the body and the mind related to the bitterness of loss and loneliness, the hero could fully aware what had happened and regret and repent.
Here, the author again addresses the theme of knowledge of life through the pilgrimage, wandering through the desert. Steeping into the mental world of the hero
becomes kind of exit to the immensity of the universe. Through Ablah’s conscience
F. Mahmud is trying to recreate an immediate unity of the man and the world. The life
as well as the nature never rests “the wind lifts the sand that flies up and falls down
just to sail up into the clouds again” [5. P. 48]. After the storm calmness and quietness
come and the sun warms the Earth and every live creature. “During my pilgrimage
I have been everywhere and I tell you that the Earth will always have sand hills and
winding coulees. The Earth and the Heaven are measureless as the sea which my soul
desires to plunge to. Wild forests and mountains. I would like to enumerate at once all
the life forms, all the ways of existence I have not passed yet. Is this the immortality
of soul that becomes free after the death of the lamp of clay of the temporary guest?”
[5. P. 45—46]. The second chapter practically deprived of the strand of the plot is full
of expatiative philosophical sanctions interspersed with the moral wisdoms. Ablah’s
realization of his selfishness that led him to the vicious circle of the relationships with
Vafa and her relatives, showed by F. Mahmud, inevitably causes the isolation and then
the death of the hero.
The writer says that at the time of national and social convulsions it is necessary
to see in the man a worthwhile person, to cultivate by all means a reasonable aspect of
their being as the base of the commonwealth; the natural aspect of the human being —
his animal nature inducing the man to the selfish and mercenary existence — is considered as the source of the social evil. Naturally people are prone to show a lack of determination that is why according to the author’s opinion “the crimes are committed
in the world” [5. P. 33]. According to the Islamic cosmology, a man who stepped on
the spiritual path is capable to gradually release his spirit from the chains of his ego,
acquiring knowledge, conscience and virtues. The whole man’s life is an endless path —
“desert hills climbing” [5. P. 48]. Now we see again the same philosopho-mystic movement: identification of the path inside with the path in space.
It seems to us, that the novel “al-Ablah” by F. Mahmud is written in accordance
with the creative interests of a number of the Arab writers of the 60—90s. (Naguib
Mahfouz, Muhammad Gazi Arabi, Gamal al-Gitani) whose works embodied rich traditions of Sufism.
At the same time, influence of the West-European skepticism, French existentialism with their tragic vision of man’s destiny, sense of inanity of people’s ambitions to realize their potential in this world and to find happiness and peace cannot go
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unnoticed. Apparently, all this together with political and social problems of the Arab
community incurred that feeling of disappointment in the world, which F. Mahmud
masterfully showed in his novel.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Kuzmichev I.K. Introduction into General Theory and History of Literature of XXI century.
Nizhniy Novgorod, 2001.
[2] Kirpichenko V.N., Safronov V.V. History of Egyptian Literature of XIX—XX cc. M., Vol. 2,
2003.
[3] Stepanyants M.T. Oriental Philosophy. M., 1997.
[4] Filshtinskiy I.M. Arabic Literature in the Middle Ages. VIII—IX cc. M., 1918.
[5] Faiz Mahmud. “al-Ablah”. Amman. 1979.
ОТРАЖЕНИЕ ФИЛОСОФСКИХ ТЕМ
В АРАБСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЕ
Е.В. Муссауи, Н.Б. Ковыршина
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 6, Москва, Россия, 118198
В статье анализируются влияния философии на арабскую литературу, особенности трансформации философских идей в темах и формах современной арабской литературы.
Ключевые слова: арабо-исламская философия, жанр «зухдиййат», Абу Аля ал-Маарри, Фаиз
Махмуд, западно-европейский скептицизм.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR INTERPRETATION
OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGE CULTURES
SOTERIOLOGICAL CAPACITY
OF THE GODHEAD AND А PROBLEM
OF INDIVIDUALS’ DEPENDENCE AND RELEASE
ACCORDING TO HINDU TANTRISM
S.V. Pakhomov
Department of Philosophy and Culture of the Orient
Faculty of Philosophy
Saint Petersburg State University
Mendeleevskaya Liniya, build. 5, St. Petersburg, 199034
The issue of the spiritual liberation in Hindu Tantrism is closely linked with an idea of the primeval
source of everything, or of that supreme, absolute Reality, God. Only such a free divine Being who has
never known any bondages, can provide the release for the poor samsaric souls. The participation of the Godhead in life of suffering beings looks like a manifestation of a compassion. The divine grace is expressed in
sending down of the blessed power (anugraha). Tantric deities paradoxically combine in themselves truly
incompatible things, for example, knowledge and illusion. However, the duality of the tantric Deity is
rather apparent than real. It is a consequence of the distorted focus of perception and of the unenlightened
level of a person. The great soteriological gift bestowed by God, is rarely obtained by an adept without
any effort or intent on his (adept’s) part. The spiritual path unfolds as from below, i.e. from a position of
the subject, and from above, i.e. from the ultimate Reality.
Key words: liberation, soteriology, Hindu Tantrism, Tantric Deity, individual’s dependence and
release.
The issue of the spiritual liberation in Hindu Tantrism is closely linked with an
idea of the primeval source of everything, or of that supreme, absolute Reality, which
is the scope of the ultimate freedom. This Reality is personified in the form of a Deity
(first of all Śiva, but also Śakti, Viщхu, etc.). God is the absolutely free being who
never was conditioned in any way. He establishes “rules of game”, he forms cosmic laws,
and the universe with all variety of living and non-living forms contained in it don’t
exist outside of this “game”. The factor of the full and original independence of God from
categories of causality, space and time holds the essential water parting line between
it and the rest, empirical world. The power of spiritual blindness, sensual affections,
that rules among finite beings, don’t influences God. Tantric texts directly equate
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freedom and the Highest Principle of the universe. Thus, “Kāmākhyā-tantra” (I. 10)
speaks of the Goddess Kāmākhyā as following, “... it is called nirvāna, it is the union
(sāyujya), sālokya and sаharūpa, Kāmākhyā is the high road!” (1). Only such a divine
Being who has never known any bondages, can provide the release for the poor saьsāric
souls; but only if they wish to obtain it themselves.
Being absolutely unconditioned by anything, the Godhead acts freely without
encountering the slightest hindrance. This liberty of his action is the power of his unobstructed self-spontaneity (svātantrya). In a striking contrast with it there are living
beings which almost contemptuously are called as “livestock” (paśu) in Tantrism.
This very name emphasizes that such beings are too attached to the world, they can’t
break the attachment on their own without help from above. This participation of the
Godhead in life of suffering beings looks like a manifestation of a compassion. One
of many epithets of God that is “Ocean of the nectar of compassion” (karuхāьзtavāridhi)
alludes on it (2). According to the “Kiraхāgama” (I. 23), “liberation is achieved with
the help of pure Śiva”. “Saundaryalaharī”, 3 praises passionately the Great Goddess,
describing her merciful qualities: “For those who submerged into a darkness of ignorance [you] are a city on the sunny island; for dullards you are a stream of nectar flowing
from flowers of the [highest] Consciousness; for poor men you are the wish-fulfilling
treasure; for those who plunged into the ocean of rebirths you are the Boar tusk, the
enemy of Mura”.
This very kindness often has a special designation, identifying itself with a form
of Śakti: for example, A. Avalon says of Vidyā Śakti. There are many kinds of such
“Vidyas” (“knowledges”) “which, though appearing to be different as between themselves, yet have, as their common aim, the highest end of all human life, that is, Liberation” [17. Ch. 12]. In Kashmir Śaivism, a notion of “vidyeśvarāю” (lit., “lords of
knowledge”) is used in a similar context. On this occasion, R. Torella tells as following:
“The Vidyeśvaras are a group of eight deities headed by Ananta, whom Śiva invests
with determinate functions; in particular, they are called to cooperate in the liberation
of limited souls, acting as intermediaries in the revelation of the teachings of Śiva,
etc. They employ another class of subjects as their instruments, the seventy million
Mantras” [15. P. 201].
In Tantric movements compassion is usually personified by the female form of God.
In particular, it is typical for the Pāñcarātra school: “It is Lakщmī, mythologically
God’s wife, and always intent on delivering, by her favour and compassion, the incarnated souls out of the misery of mundane existence” [20. P. 60]. Lakщmī says of
herself in a tantra of the same name in such a way: “Souls, which I, Śrī, threw my eye
on, are exempted from their sufferings” (“Lakщmī-tantra”, XIII. 8).
The divine grace is expressed in sending down of the blessed power (śaktipāta).
This power has many varieties: for example, Kashmir thinker Abhinavagupta (X—
XI cent.) in his treatise “Tantrāloka” (XIII ch.) lists nine of its patterns. It is called
anugraha also; known by that name, the grace is one of five functions of God
(pañcakзtya), along with self-concealment (tirodhāna), creation (sзщсi), conservation
(sthiti) and destruction (saьhāra) of the universe. Tantric adherents (as well as all
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the Hindus) attach great importance to the soteriological support from the side of
God. In fact, anugraha is a constant chance to get rid of sufferings [21. P. 227]. Anugraha don’t impose itself on the man, and moreover, a person can spend a lifetime
without noticing it; anugraha attracts only those who is ready to begin a spiritual life
and to change themselves drastically. In the case of such a readiness anugraha manifests itself as a wide range of spiritual situations and practices, and each individual
will perceive this spectrum in its own way.
The Godhead sends down the redemption, either alone or together with other
important values, both temporal and spiritual. Often the enjoyment is referred to as a
gift together with the redemption. Tantras considered the Godhead to be a giver of
pleasure and liberation (bhuktimuktida) (3). Just as often, the redemption is granted
as if in passing, among many other things, and its position as the highest value isn’t
too noticeable. In this case, it isn’t for the author so much important to demonstrate
concrete benefits conferred by the Deity, as to emphasize the nature of such a bestowing, which shows supernatural, miraculous capacities of the Godhead, his superiority
over others, non-Tantric gods. “While some of gods are capable of granting Svargabhoga, and others Mokśa alone, the Devī bestows on her votaries both the enjoyment
of celestial pleasures and liberation” [12. P. 35—36]. Generously the adherents of
Tantric Goddesses from Mahāvidyā group are heaped with favors, in particular, by
Chinnamastā: “The usual rewards for her worship are cited: poetic speech, well-being
and security, control over one’s enemies, the ability to attract others (specifically
women), the ability to influence kings, and liberation” [24. P. 163]. And there are
similar words about Bagalāmukhī: “We find in Bagalamukhi’s epithets reference to both
her power to give worldly enjoyment and her power to grant wisdom, knowledge, and
liberation” [24. P. 201]. Truly, there is no gift that could not be sent down by these
powerful goddesses. However, Tantric Goddesses differ in their soteriological abilities:
“All the aspects of goddess-transformations bring liberation, although some may
bring the aspirant to the shores of knowledge, others to the summit” [23. P. 60].
A symbolic detail elaboration inherent for Tantras makes evident of itself in the
case of the famous quartet of life values of Hinduism (caturvarga), among which
there is mokщa also. For example, in “Toуala-tantra” (VI ch.) a bīja-mantra of the
Goddess (krīm) is decomposed into individual components, and each letter represents
a particular value. “... Oh Devi, K grants Dharma, P grants Kâma, I grants Artha and
M grants Moksha. Oh beloved, the recital of these combined give Nirvâna Moksha”(quoted in [5. P. 31].
The soteriological action is performed by the highest power relatively easily, and
it is to a large extent because this power that binds knots of existence. A. Avalon rhetorically asks: “This can only be by the grace of the Mother, for who otherwise can
loosen the knot of Maya which She Herself has tied?” [17. Ch. 20]. Tantric deities paradoxically combine in themselves truly incompatible things. The cover of cosmic illusion organically interweaves here with the rejection of illusions, sensual affection —
with a sincere acceptance of things as they are. “The Goddess is called Mahāmāyā,
the great delusion when she is seen as responsible for the unsatisfactory and transient
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nature of this life... But paradoxically the Goddess is also identified as supreme
knowledge, Vidyā, which releases individuals from their bondage of desire and the
consequent endless succession of lives and deaths. This is one of the many paradoxes
that constitute the mystery of the Goddess’s divine nature” [22. P. 468].
This amazing, incomprehensible for ordinary logic, duality of Tantric God is
a paradoxical manifestation of his essentially non-dual nature. Before us is coincidentia oppositorum, the integrity of life, where “light” and “dark” sides of life close to
each other. This is an inevitable repercussion of the manifold global transformation,
whose elements completely are reduced to the divine abyss and drown in it; so God
can’t be non-contradictory. Tantric Deity isn’t a mild benevolent angel; his freedom,
among other things, implies independence from the ordinary contrast of good and
evil. Kashmir philosopher Kщemarāja (XI cent.) in his treatise “Pratyabhijñāhзdaya”
quotes from Vimuktakas by Bhaссa Dāmodara: “Vāmeśa and others [goddesses]
free [an individual] by the true knowledge, [or] enslave [him] by bonds of ignorance”
[7. P. 30].
However, the duality of the tantric Deity is rather apparent than real. It is a consequence of the distorted focus of perception and of the unenlightened level of a person. This duality is perceived according to degree of a spiritual development of a man
who refers to this power. For example, “Spanda-kārikā”, 48, says: “Thus, this power
of Śiva, the essence of which is the action, while staying at an enslaved soul is the
source of enchainment, [and that she, being] known [by awakened one], stands in her
intrinsic way, giving a success [in yoga]” (4). A criterion of such a perception is a phenomenon of desires: “...She who grants enjoyment or Liberation according as the
Sâdhaka is desire-ridden or free from desires”, says Swāmī Vimalānanda [5. P. 30].
This is an echo of the ancient ascetic tradition, which is often manifested in the tantric
texts (5); but on the other hand, sādhaka (practicioner) may not to leave his desires
because they can well be combined with his spiritual path: “Powerful to give Nirvâna
Moksha and by Mâyâ to grant the desires of Sâdhakas”, says the same author [5. P. 32]
(6). As a matter of fact, the soteriological activity of the Godhead is inseparable from
other kinds of his activities, which, we repeat it, are also not unconditioned by anything
(and in this sense, any action of the Godhead is soteriological). André Padoux writes
about tantric universe as a “systeme total qui englobe tout, où tout se tient, où les niveaux
se répondent d’un domaine à l’autre, où l’énergie est à la fois humaine et cosmique, et
donc où manifestation des mondes et esclavage de l’homme, résorption cosmique et
délivrance sont des processus rigoureusement homologables: quand on parcourt l’une,
on parcourt l’autre, puisqu’il s’agit toujours d’un movement de la même énergie” [11.
P. 45]. In truth the Deity, whose embodiment is the universe, is everything for Tantrists;
in Tantras for a glorification of the personified highest Reality is often applied an
“universal” style that associates the highest foundation with all forms of empirical reality: “Without Kāmātmikā no one is able to grant achievements and a good fortune.
Kāmākhyā is the eternal dharma, Kāmākhyā is the benefit, Kāmākhyā is the abundance
of pleasures, Kāmākhyā is the true liberation” (“Kāmākhyā-tantra”, I. 8—9).
The reality is holistic and indivisible, but it has an impact from individual karmic
peculiarities. “This continuum is what the enlightened adepts realize as nirvāna and
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what unenlightened worldlings experience as samsāra... That essence merely appears
different to different people because of their karmic predispositions... To ordinary
worldlings, the One remains utterly hidden. To spiritual seekers, it seems a distant
goal, perhaps realizable after many lifetimes... To the Self-realized sages, it is the only
One that exists, for they have become the Whole” [19. P. 51].
In Hindu iconography, as in Buddhist one, Tantric Deities are often portrayed in
a sinister appearance. This fact also has a soteriological significance. According to
Madhu Khanna, who describes Mahāvidyās, “their gory associations are meant to horrify
and shock. They strip reality bare in order that the seeker may confront the truth of
transience” [23. P. 60]. This “shock therapy” is a necessary, but unavoidable measure
oriented against the spiritual “thick skin” of an individual being, which cannot be
“broken” any other way. Visual bloodiness and aggression of “demonic” images of
Chinnamastā, Kālī, Bhairavī and other Tantric Goddesses churn a sleepy swamp of
chaotic everyday existence, causes a person to do spiritual quest, think about dark
sides of his soul, — sides, which he usually doesn’t notice, but under whose influence he
nevertheless permanently resides. But as soon as an individual acquires the correct understanding, sinister, dark, depressive forms of tantric deities transform themselves into
light areas of pure consciousness, and the fear gives way to the joy of enlightenment.
Tantrism is ambiguous in the question of whether creatures are introduced into
the spiritual deception by the highest power, or they bear quilt for their problems
themselves. According to L. Silburn, the Goddess doesn’t mess with beings’ heads intentionally: “La mère ne trompe ni ne se plaît à emprisoner les êtres dans les horreurs de
la transmigration; elle ne donne naissance qu’ à un flot unique, celui des divines énergies.
Mais l’ignorant qui court de désir en désir, de vague en vague, fait de ce flot puissant
un douloureux devenir... Elle ne détruit donc pas la nature, elle la parfait et la mène à son
accomplissment” [28. P. 101]. So, an alleged destruction actually is the transformation,
the transition of a substance (or a living being) from one qualitative state to another.
Thus, the highest power is not responsible for the fact that it isn’t understood correctly.
We can agree with it, but the question arises: from where these very “ignorants” appear
who “court de désir en désir” (“run from desire to desire”)? If they are not also the
product of “un flot unique, celui des divines énergies” (a wave unique, i. e. as divine
energies”)? After all, the ultimate source of their condition that worsens itself because
of karma, is the same Deity, and the very fact of their spiritual ignorance and of their
stay in saьsāra is an effect of the divine creative activity, which creates constraints and
the relative level in general, because it can’t create the second absolute fundamental
principle: only one monarch can reside on the metaphysical divine “throne”. In other
words, the individual limitations are the “charges” of this divine creativity. Metaphorically speaking, two possibilities weigh on a supernatural scale: either a dynamic existence of the populous universe, but with the inevitable limitations and dependence in
various forms, or a free existence of all beings, but with the elimination of the world
as such. From the point of view of the divine Providence, a lesser “evil” is a creation
of the universe with the provision to beings to be developed on the basis of opportunities granted to them. However, these opportunities are slim. Free will of an average
person is woefully weak; predetermination dominates all his thoughts and actions.
According to B.N. Pandit, “it is never in the hands of a person either to do or not to
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do something that is worthy of being done. People are always bound to do what they
are destined to do. We are urged to act a certain way according to own nature which
is bestowed on us by the Lord” [26. P. 85]. Accordingly, the choice of perception of
God is conditioned not by us, but to some extent also by this God. As “Kulārхavatantra” speaks (II. 93), “they don’t know kula bewitched by your māyā” (7).
There is no doubt that the great soteriological gift bestowed by God, is rarely obtained by an adept without any effort or intent on his (adept’s) part. The personal spiritual practice prepares the ground on which the fountain of divine grace will pour out
later. This is quite logical, because an untrained person who is residing in captivity of
sensual affections and who is quite satisfied with this condition, generally speaking,
doesn’t need the freedom, and therefore he hasn’t a necessity to engage in a special
psycho-practice. In accordance to one version, as reflected in Tantras, gaining of the
freedom involves the abandonment from sensual desires: it is a reminiscence of ancient ascetic beliefs. Such pathos is laid in the words of Abhinavagupta (in his commentary “Arthasaьgraha” to the “Bhagavadgītā”, VII. 24) according to whom, “to one
who gave up the desires and relies on one or the other image of a Deity, it (the image —
SP) gives the state of purity and liberation. Otherwise, [the result will be] the opposite” (8). However, as mentioned above, a desire may not be in conflict with the movement along the path of liberation.
The deliberate refusal of anything interfering in the spiritual path is a negative,
passive side of a Tantric practice. In addition to forming such a “platform” for the acquisition of divine mercy, the follower in some way tries to increase the chances of success in an attempt to influence the Godhead actively. In particular, this occurs through
a ritual worship. As stated in the “Mahānirvāхa-tantra” (III. 153), “Just as through
instruction in Brahman one can free from all sins and go to union with Brahman, so
[it is] owing to the worship you”. Besides that (or in the context of the ritual worship),
vehicles of devotional service, or bhakti. can become methods that accelerate the flow
of divine grace. “Divine grace implies its human complement of devotion (bhakti)”
[29. P. 174].
Acquisition of a mercy of the Deity, in some cases, implies an even more active,
“heroic” conquest of the divine realm. Tantric sādhaka of the “hero” level (vīra) boldly
challenges the reality’s negative sides that are personified in the form of some aspects
of the Deity. Taking possession of those parties, he turns them into an instrument for the
salvation. It has already been said above about terrible elements of Tantric iconography
of Deities. In contrast to ordinary people, the “hero” isn’t running in fear from dark, gloomy faces of reality, but integrating them into his “world’s picture”. Here how D. Kinsley
writes about it on the example of goddess Kālī: “The figure of Kālī conveys death,
destruction, fear, the all-consuming aspect of reality. As such she is also a ‘forbidden
thing’, or the forbidden par excellence, for she is death itself. The Tantric hero does not
propitiate, fear, ignore, or avoid the forbidden. During the pañcatattva ritual, the sadhaka boldly confronts Kālī and thereby assimilates, overcomes, and transforms her into a vehicle of salvation” [25. P. 124].
Nevertheless the only personal efforts of a Tantric practicioner aren’t enough to
achieve the ultimate goal. It is believed that the supreme cult object must deliver a soteriological assistance at some stage of the adept’s practice. According to the Tantric
74
Pakhomov S.V. Soteriological capacity of the godhead and а problem of individuals’ dependence...
alchemical work “Rasārхava” (I. 25), “So long, however, as Śiva does not descend to
block the impurity that impedes the soul’s liberation, and so long as one’s fetters to
thei world remain uncut, there is no way that true discrimination can arise through the
use of calcinated mercury” (quoted in [29. P. 174]). In other words, individual psychotechnologies must necessarily combine with their legitimization from the side of
Absolute; thus the spiritual path unfolds as from below, i. e. from a position of the
subject, and from above, i. e. from the ultimate Reality. “God helps us in our endeavours”, teaches S. Radhakrishnan [27. P. 728]. Jan Gonda, exploring theology of the
Pāñcarātra school, wrote the following: “... each vyūha (manifestations of the Godhead — S.P.) has two activities, a creative and preservative one and an ethical one, by
which they lend assistance to those devotees who seek to attain the ultimate liberation” [20. P. 53].
A special case in our topic is represented by the notion of non-being (abhāva),
or emptiness, which in the eyes of some Tantric followers is a perfect example of disconnectedness, unconditionality, absence of any backbone. Therefore, non-being is
associated with the highest reality, God, and, consequently, with the release. The “Jñānatilaka” says: “Non-being is the supreme God. Non-being os the supreme Śiva. Non-being
is supreme knowledge. Non-being is the supreme path. All being is Non-being. Nonbeing is all the gods. Non-being is eternal and all-pervasive. [All things] merge into
Non-being and from Non-being arise again... There is nothing higher than Non-being —
liberation is in the hands of those who contemplate Non-being (abhāvabhavīnām).
Those who have a support (sālamba) in phenomenal existence are never freed. Therefore one should contemplate that which is free from of support, namely, the stainless
plane of the Void... He whose mind is established even for a moment in the state of
emptiness is freed of Dharma and Adharma and is liberated from the body” (quoted in
[18. P. 62]).
It is necessary to summarize our small study. From the Tantric point of view, the
freedom is an essential feature of the ultimate reality, personified in the image of a
Deity. Various epithets, attributes and symbols of the Godhead, its functions, the myths
swirling around it, show its free nature or hint at it. It works without any conditionality,
and one of kinds of its activity is a deliverance of limited beings from the power of
various constraints. The Godhead pours mercy on all those who aspires to spiritual
heights. In a sense, any action of the Godhead in relation to the world in general and
people in particular, is soteriological. The paradoxical nature of the Godhead consists
in the fact that it is simultaneously a saving knowledge and an ignorance, tying living
beings to various global processes; and therefore they can be freed from these attachments, in fact, only by the Godhead. But it performs this action not without effort
on the part of Tantric teachings’ supporters, which in the course of their spiritual
practice, create favorable conditions for the acquisition of the divine grace.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Some varieties of liberation are represented there. The highest level is nirvāхa and sāyujya
(unity), just below are located sālokya (stay in the world of the Deity), and saharūpa (more
often sārūpya), that is the acquisition of the divine form.
(2) “Kulārхava-tantra” (I. 3), etc.
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(3) See, for example “Kulārхava-tantra” (II. 113), “Kāmākhyā-tantra“ (II. 49), etc.
(4) Cf. also the judgment of the kuхуalinī in the “Haсhayoga-pradīpika” (III. 117): she “[gives]
the release for yogis and enslavement for fools”.
(5) Cf: “Death devours man who is torn by spines of desires, who is seduced by sensuous objects,
who is burnt by fire of passion and hatred” (“Kulārхava-tantra”, I. 44).
(6) See also: “Devi herself is both desire and that light of knowledge which in the wise who have
known enjoyment lays bare its futilities” [16]. But in general an ascetic discourse isn’t typical
for the Tantric teachings favorably relating to the world as a manifestation of Śakti.
(7) A little further (II. 96) Śiva professes: “Owing to me, Devi, paśus wander in a myriad of
śastras”, i.e. God deliberately misleads those who dislikes to him, and they are confused in the
treatises containing false knowledge, not seeing the true path. Even lower (II. 97) it appears
that all that false knowledge produced by the same Śiva.
(8) Cp. also the words of the “Gorakщa-śataka” (verse 5): “The mind, which turned away from
enjoyments, overcomes death and connects with the highest Ātman. This is a ladder to liberation”.
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Śamkara-Bhagavatpada, Śrī. Saundarya-laharī (The Ocean of Beauty) / With Transliteration,
English Translation, Commentary, Diagrams and an Appendix on Prayoga by S. Subrahmanya
Sastri and T.R. Srinivasa Ayyangar. 9th ed.; 1st ed. in 1937. Adyar, Wheaton: The Theosophical
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Avalon A. Shakti and Shākta. Essays and Addresses on the Shākta tantrashāstra. — London,
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[18] Dyczkowski M.S. G. A Journey in the World of the Tantras. New Delhi, Varanasi: Indica
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[19] Feuerstein G. Tantra: the Path of Ecstasy. Boston: Shambhala, 1998.
[20] Gonda J. Viщхuism and Śivaism. A Comparison. London: University of London, 1970.
[21] Gupta S. The Pā$caratra Attitude to Mantra // Understanding Mantras / Ed. by H.P. Alper.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991. Р. 224—248.
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D.G. White. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2001. Р. 463—488.
[23] Khanna M. Yantra. The Tantric Symbol of Cosmic Unity. 2nd ed. London: Thames and Hudson, 1981.
[24] Kinsley D. The Ten Mahāvidyās. Tantric Visions of the Divine Feminine. Delhi: Motilal
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[26] Pandit B.N. Specific Principles of Kashmir Saivism. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1997.
[27] Radhakrishnan S. Indian Philosophy. In 2 vols. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948.
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(reprinted; 1 ed. in 1923). Vol. II.
[28] Silburn L. Hymnes aux Kālī. La roué des énergies divines (études sur le śivaisme du Cachemire. École Krama). Paris, 1975.
[29] White D.G. The Alchemical Body. Siddha Traditions in Medieval India. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2004.
СОТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ПОТЕНЦИАЛ ВЫСШЕГО БОГА
И ПРОБЛЕМА ЗАВИСИМОСТИ И ОСВОБОЖДЕНИЯ
ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫХ СУЩЕСТВ
В ИНДУИСТСКОМ ТАНТРИЗМЕ
С.В. Пахомов
Кафедра философии и культурологии Востока
Философский факультет
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет
Менделеевская линия, 5, Санкт-Петербург, Россия, 199034
Вопрос о духовном освобождении в индуистском тантризме тесно связан с идеей первоисточника всего сущего, т.е. с высшей, абсолютной Реальностью, Божеством. Только такое свободное божественное Существо, которое никогда не знало никаких ограничений, может даровать освобождение для бедных сансарических душ. Участие Божества в жизни страдающих существ выглядит как
проявление сострадания. Божественная милость выражается в ниспослании благословенной силы
(шактипата, ануграха). Тантрические божества парадоксальным образом соединяют в себе поистине
несовместимые вещи, например, знание и иллюзию. Впрочем, двойственность тантрического Божества скорее видимая, чем реальная. Она есть следствие искаженного восприятия и непросветленного
уровня того или иного человека. Великий сотериологический дар, ниспосылаемый Божеством, редко
обретается адептом без каких-то усилий с его (адепта) стороны. Духовный путь развертывается как
снизу, т.е. с позиции субъекта, так и свыше, т.е. со стороны высшей Реальности.
Ключевые слова: зависимость и освобождение индивида, сотериология, индуистский тантризм, тантрическое божество.
77
ONESELF AS ANOTHER:
THE BENGAL RENAISSANCE THINKER
IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST
T.G. Skorokhodova
Theory and Practice of Social Work Department
Pedagogical Institute named after V.G. Belinsky
Penza State University
Krasnaya str., 40, Penza, Russia, 440026
Personal peculiarities of Eastern subjects of dialogue with the West are described in the paper
based on Paul Ricoeur’s conception of “Oneself as Another” (“Soi-même comme un autre”) On the example
of the Bengal Renaissance thinkers (XIX — early XX century) from new intellectual elite are demonstrated
otherness and identity of their personal positions. They are Others both for their own Indian social-cultural
surroundings and for Western subjects of inter-cultural dialogue. Otherness along with Indian identity had
determined the specific role and works by Bengal thinkers in dialogue with the West.
Key words: Ricoeur, “Oneself as Another”, the Bengal Renaissance, problematic thinker, understanding of Other, dialogue with the West.
Cultural dialogue with the West by Eastern countries involved in modernization
process can be presented as lively interaction by its thinkers-subjects with Other/
Another: Western culture and its representatives. This dialogue has generated in the
Eastern countries specific sociocultural processes, which can be conditionally described as national-cultural renaissances. These Eastern subjects of dialogue with the
West have been receiving and understanding Other, and they are creators of the renaissance processes in religious, social and cultural spheres. It is necessarily to take
into account the personal peculiarities of thinkers-subjects of dialogue with the West
for a deeper interpretation of philosophy in Modern Eastern countries. I think, the
conception “Soi-même comme un autre” (“Oneself as Another”) by Paul Ricoeur is
methodologically productive in this sense. It helps to describe the peculiarities of
these subjects of dialogue as intellectual action subjects. This action is accomplished
with realization and acceptance the responsibility for consequences of both understanding and social practice ensued from one’s results. Personality as autonomous persona is capable to free action, which is independent of social group demands and able
“to be the author of his own behaviour, i.e. to be sane” [1. P. 16]. This personality is
seriously different from personality in traditional society. I propose to depict the subject of dialogue in Indian material, viz. on the example of thinkers of the Bengal Renaissance XIX — early XX century. The main subject of dialogue with the West is
‘problematic thinker’ (M. Buber). After establishing of British colonial rule in Bengal,
the Challenge of Western civilization questioned stability and self-regulating existence
of traditional society. Problematic thinkers appeared in new Bengal elites, which had
intercourse with new power, but both didn’t change their sociocultural identity and liberated from rigid group enforcement, traditional norms and notions of their society.
These thinkers were formed most active part in new elite (bhadralok), which is ‘creative
minority’ (A. Bergson) in epoch of the Bengal Renaissance [2. P. 280].
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Skorokhodova T.G. Oneself as Another: the Bengal Renaissance thinker in a dialogue with the West
Bengal problematic thinker puts many questions, and answers to principally new
question in traditional thinking paradigm are unacceptable for him. That’s why, he
distances evidently or latently from both traditional form of thinking and philosophical
schools and answers independently to existential questions. These answers are not
perceived as ‘right’ by traditional thinkers, but ones form the foundation for development
of principally new thinking paradigm, in which human personality’s value is acknowledged in its connection with the Absolute and other people.
Problematic thinker, on the one hand, is torn down from the traditional society
and orthodoxy on the other hand, is not accepted as equal by ruling classes in India.
These circumstances form a personality of special type, which has experienced existential
solitude, has found the support in faith, have opened and realized own freedom and
has been embodying this freedom in philosophical, cultural and social creativity.
Bengal problematic thinker takes a specific position concerning to the society. R. Tagore spoke about it, characterizing ‘first Modern India reformers and enlighteners
Rammohun Roy (1772—1833) and Iswarchandra Vidyasagar (1820—1891): “Both
were of Indian people’s flesh and blood, but had in the character many European traits,
and these traits were not borrowed. Both were true Bengali, had no equal in knowledge of our Motherland’s ancient wisdom, both had laid the foundation of education
in vernacular language and also, akin to great Europeans, had firm fortitude, philanthropy, followed to principles of truth and good steadily. Another European virtue is deep
sense of their own dignity, that manifested in disdain to external imitation of Europeans” [3. P. 65]. The specific of the position is determined by their position as Another
(Other) in the new situation, viz. according to their problematicness and addressing to
understanding of Others instead of xenophobia. The meaning-creating core is otherness and identity of personal position by Bengal intellectuals, which I refer to the
term “Oneself as Another”.
According to Paul Ricoeur, “Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the
selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be
thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say
in Hegelian terms” [4. P. 3]. In this aspect, everyone thinker of the Bengal Renaissance
feels, knows and comprehended his own Self in correlation to his otherness towards
natal social surrounding (in difference of selfness towards identity with own varna,
jati, traditional community). Simultaneously, he is Another towards West, Other-Europeans, because he have socialized in Indian sociocultural space, notwithstanding to his
European education and/or existential meeting with the West and its culture. Ability
to be the Self / the subject is fourth from important spheres of man’s abilities to which
are foregoing, according to P. Ricoeur: 1) “ability to speak, to enter into conversation
with other by language (‘I can speak’)”; 2) “ability to interfere in the course of events
by actions, efforts (‘I can act’)” and 3) “ability to narrate about his life and consequently, to form his own identity by narration, based on reminiscences (‘I can tell
about myself’)” [1. P. 15—16]. And if first two abilities are in traditional person,
third one are developed more in autonomous person, which is capable to reflection.
Let us look at how these capabilities appears in thinking and practice of the Bengal
creating minority according to P. Ricoeur’s “four manners of questioning: Who is speak79
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
ing? Who is acting? Who is recounting about himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of imputation?” [4. P. 16].
1. Ability to enter into conversation with Others is stipulated some common
language, which helps both ‘Self’ to speak, and ‘You’ to understand and answer. In Indian traditional society the priority right to speak was imparted elites, especially brahmans as varna of bearers of sacred knowledge, language and Sanskrit culture and other
twice-born varnas, i.e. learned man. Other groups had right to listen and to make their
actions and life according to what was said by elite. It wasn’t exclude everyday equal
status and hierarchy intercourse by regional (vernacular) language, which have developed
to new Indian languages later. The idea of superiority of brahmanism’s language and
culture had been stipulated negative relation to Other-remote (mlechchha) without inclination to understand him, and unwillingness to speak other language.
The question “Who is speaking?” in XIX century colonial Bengal allows to discern orthodox representatives of traditional elites from problematic thinkers-subjects.
Latters (but not all) were capable to speak sacred Sanskrit with brahman elites, to speak
languages of traditional Muslim culture (Persian and Arabic), to speak Bengali and to
speak English, an language of British conquerors. Certain representatives of new
Bengal elite (bhadralok) were polyglots in European language. So, Michael Madhusudan Dutta knew also Latin, Greek, French, Italian, German.
Knowledge of other European language means the capability to understand Otherremote and it is placed into position of Another for his own community. Bengal intellectual adopts along with foreign language outlandish and strange to traditional consciousness ideas and symbols and translates ones consciously in his own social surroundings. Hostile reaction of orthodoxy towards key figure of the Bengal Renaissance
sociocultural process such as Rammohun Roy, Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar, Krishnamohun Banerjea and others; it is additional indicator of ‘otherness’ of new problematic
thinker’s person.
Bengal thinkers’ ability to dialogue comes from this otherness, among them language otherness. Orthodoxy has not this ability and learns English forcedly, from
need of adaptation to new conditions and grounding their exclusive status before new
power in India.
The dialogue with the West in its language widens opportunities of understanding, comprehending, adopting and appropriating its ideas, notions and scientific conceptions. A large corpus of the Bengal Renaissance texts was created in English; it is
testified to active dialogue with the West, notwithstanding they mostly addressed to
Indian audience, than Western one. So, Rammohun Roy addressed to Europeans English versions of his Upanishad and Vedanta-Sutra translations, An Appeals to Christian
Public in Defense of ‘The Precepts of Jesus’ (translated by him from Greek to English),
the set of the text-defense his vision of Indian religious tradition, treatise against sati
rite, an Letter to Amherst in defense of European education in India, an corpus of
documents written for the British parliament and others. Or the first Indian Englishlanguage poet, Eurasian H.L. V. Derozio sang his Motherland India and admired Western
philosophy, culture and history. Journalism and works by Derozio’s pupils, theological
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Skorokhodova T.G. Oneself as Another: the Bengal Renaissance thinker in a dialogue with the West
works by Krishnamohun Banerjea, articles and speeches by Keshubchundra Sen, early
novels and journalism by Bankimchandra Chatterjee (Chattopadhyay), lectures and
articles by Swami Vivekananda, philosophical works and poetry by Aurobindo Ghose,
speeches, lectures and own translations of verse by Rabindranath Tagore are most general
and incomplete list of English texts written in the Bengal Renaissance; in these texts
are evidently and latently carries on the dialogue with the West, sometimes turns to sharp
discussion, but never last an respect to Other subject of dialogue.
But familiarization of Other’s language and reflections in English had turned to
powerful stimulus for development of mother tongue. It is evidently in a case of each
concrete thinker, how he passed from dialogue with compatriots in mother tongue to
dialogue with Europeans and all world in English (as Rammohun Roy or Rabindranath Tagore), or, on the contrary, from addressing to educated compatriots and nonIndian audience he returned to mother tongue and created new Bengal poetry and
prose (as Michael Madhusudan Dutta, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, partly Swami
Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghose).
2. Ability to interfere in the course of events by actions and efforts also depended from “who is acting”. In traditional society the right to interfere (or, by Ricoeur’s words, the right “to lay his own path in physical world”) [1. P. 15] was appropriated by brahmans, who had determined limits of acting and sacred rules of life for
themselves and all varnas. Finally, the special social system is completed in which action by individuals is predictable and under control [See: 5. P. 24]. In colonial Bengal,
people had appeared, which acted initiatively at their own free will without religious
norms’ and elite’s sanction for that, i.e. ceased both to operate predictably and to fear
the impact of social control. But if an initiative in economical (co-operation with the
British in commerce etc.), political and legal (consulting in legal sphere and administrative office in East-India Company), educational (teaching Europeans to Sanskrit)
spheres and even proposal on developing European education in India were quite acceptable to traditional consciousness, being a way of adaptation to changing reality, any
initiative in thinking about religious theme and interpreting social relations, rules and
common precepts, moreover in attempt to change rules and to reform any sphere of
traditional society immediately born strong negative reaction by orthodoxy.
Branmanical status of Rammohun Roy did not defend him from attacks by traditional learned brahmans. It was made him odious figure in the eyes of orthodox elite
notwithstanding set of victories in learned debates, troublemaker and ‘the father of
Modern India’. Moreover, intellectual occupations and social activity by non-brahman
jatis representatives (first of all kayastha, or scribers) were inadmissible for orthodoxy. Therefore, answer to the question “Who is acting?” is representatives of highstatus varnas and jatis, who are capable to spontaneous activity independently from
traditional norms and prescribed status — first of all, owing to heterodox critical
thinking and developed sense of their own responsibility for others.
A special quality of acting person is bravery. Objecting oneself and his own position and actions against all community and united social control system demanded
serious fortitude in a situation in which general circle of supporters of new models
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both thinking and acting is small. Objecting oneself person evidently declares his own
otherness; at the same time traditional brahman refers to tradition and authority both
sacred texts and social stratum, defending beforehand from lower strata critics. So,
Rammohun Roy is brahman, who objected himself to all brahman strata. He said, that
brahmans defended idolatry for its own prosperity and enrichment, they were main begetters of “that decay of learning and virtue, which... may be at present observed. For
wherever respectability is confined to birth only, acquisition of knowledge, and to
practice of morality, in that country, must rapidly decline” [6. Vol. I. P. 15]. The notion about exclusive right to say about the proper and just for all other varnas is typical for any brahman; and, it might seems, Rammohun Roy acted as man socialized in
brahmanical ideology. But he was other brahman, because none orthodox brahman
would came into question and discuss the ideas and themes monopolized by his varna,
moreover to address literally to all society, free disseminate his treatises and to address
to mlechchha (Europeans) about any social questions.
There were many other brahmans among problematic thinkers of the epoch. Tagore
family from Jorasanko destroyed the brahmans stereotypes of behaviour from generation to generation and had become famous for many distinguished creators of culture
and reformers. Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, Bankimchandra Chatterji, Sivanath Sastri, Surendranath Banerjea and others proposed innovations in different spheres of thinking
and practice. In the contrast to orthodox brahmans, other brahmans explain constantly
to all, what and why they are acting and why their arguments and words must be listened
and examined. “...One can hardly inform anyone else about what one does without saving at the same time why one is doing it, — said P. Ricoeur. — Describing is beginning to explain, and explaining more is describing better” [4. P. 63]. Like them, other
kayastha explains what and why must be changed in society. Discovery of Other and
realizing self as Another made their to explanation and dialogue with Other, who would
say also.
Two vectors arise from this explanation in dialogue with the West. Firstly, each
Bengal thinker is unusually receptive to Western information about its culture, Christianity, science, social institutes, history and he familiarizes it critically. This vector
can be called “Journey to the West” [7. P. 66; 8], it is intellectual, spiritual and real
transference to Western culture space for understanding and dialogue with it. Secondly,
every Bengal problematic thinker explains persistently to the West the dignities of Indian spiritual tradition, culture and social life, peculiarities of her history and life of
her people, notwithstanding his critical relation to Indian social reality, so this explanations becomes vindication of India. This vector can be called by J. Nehru’s term
“Discovery of India”. Two aforesaid vectors mutually complemented each other in
attempt by Bengal reformers to find paths to modern world for Indians.
3. Ability to narrate about his own life and consequently, to form his own
identity appears in way of different autobiographical narratives by Bengal thinkers.
These narratives are evidently denoted that unique person tells about herself. Autobiographical narrative was motivated by wish both to explain his own ideas and actions and
to be understood by Others. This indicates developed personal reflections and desire
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to tell on his own Self to social surroundings. There is living synthesis both knowledge of “Oneself as Another” and Dialogue by “Self” with Other people. Autobiographies and other memoirs appeared in that developed form in Indian culture only in
XIX century, though genesis of the autobiographical genre is referred to late Middle
Ages.
Traditional person had not developed self-consciousness and reflection, because
desire to tell about herself appeared so late. So, autobiographical literature had developed
in India only in XVII—XVIII centuries. Person as “Subject of dealing” (M.M. Bakhtin)
came out to foreground in Bengal autobiographical narratives of XIX — early XX centuries. The same narrate about himself is free act by man which conscious his own
dignity, respects himself and others, appreciates his own actions and takes responsibilities of his acts and all it happened around them. Telling about themselves Bengalis
wished to change actual situation in spiritual, social, cultural and political aspects
of life.
The first attempt of ‘narrative about himself’ was “Autobiographical letter” by Rammohun Roy, but conventionally, because it authenticity is questioned. But the first
large narration “Atmajivani” (“My Life”) had written in Bengali by Devendranath
Tagore (1818—1905) [9]. He narrates about his own religious experience, reflections
on belief and knowledge of God, criticizes actual condition of Hinduism, in which
rites and idolatry make to forget true One God and high ethics, and he also dreams
about of renaissance of all India, her unity in the spirit and high morals. Events of author’s life is more background, than main line of the narration. At the same time, Devendranath Tagore tells about his own reformist activity in the Brahmo Samaj and
explains all his steps and solutions, which he offered to his adherents in belief sphere.
He combines brahman’s persuasion in rightness of his path with explanation of necessities of spiritual changes in life; but neither change he impose his surroundings. Devendranath prefers to set an personal example of righteous life and to wait the changing
of consciousness of people from within. Deep respect to Other, who thanks and lives
differently, is characteristically for his dialogue. His “Autobiography” is narration by
person more and more conscious of his own otherness and finding himself as Another
in his own social surroundings.
Many coryphaei tells about himself anyway. Keshubchundra Sen kept a diary in
journey in England, politician Bepinchundra Pal had written “Autobiography”, Surendranath Banerjea — a memoir “A Nation in Making”, Aurobindo Ghose had created autobiographical outlines, Rabindranath Tagore had written “Reminiscences”. Those thinkers,
who did not write likewise books always refered to his life experiences of important episodes of it in their works and speeches (so did Swami Vivekananda). Besides they had
written memoirs or biographies of contemporaries. This is absolutely unlike to traditional eulogies of mythologized heroes.
Reflection and narration about self is sign of personal identity of Bengal thinkers,
which is opposite to collective identity but exists in the context of realizing self as Indian,
the inhabitant of India. It is also sign of accepting for own self the role of subject of
dialogue with the West and their own country. That’s why, Bengalis wished to tell about
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India, its people, heritage, culture, history, to discuss modern theme of social and political life. This stories/narratives were results of understanding-and-discovery of their
own country and, in this means, is a part of narrative about oneself, because Bengal
thinker creates certain image of India, which appears in his consciousness as result of life
experience, intellectual work in selected sphere and emotions. On the one hand, this
image presents in the course of dialogue with the West, and on the other hand, rendered
to Indian audience for creating source in inspiration and wishing to change social life
to good. Moreover, narrative about India becomes sociocultural text by Bengal thinkers, which tells about people of the Bengal Renaissance, its society and culture, which
develops both dialogue with the West and accepting-and-questioning of his achievements and heritage, but these one cannot exists without interaction with the West.
4. Ability to be the Self / the subject, i.e. personally responsible for his actions is
depended on three aforesaid capabilities of Bengal problematical thinkers. Ability to tell
encourages to turn to language of Other for interaction and understanding. Ability to act
independently and freely to turn for Other with explanation of action and wishing of
answer both permits to offer different initiatives in all spheres of social life. According
to Ricoeur, “Initiative... is an intervention of the agent of action in the course of the
world, an intervention which effectively causes changes in the world.” [4. P. 109]. In difference of traditional elite, acting for supporting of existing life orders, Bengal thinkers considered and offered their initiatives to change aforesaid order both by revival
of lost high values and norms and accepting new. It is main, they offer to realize and
understand the importance of changes. These two abilities come Bengal thinkers in
situation of Anothers, in which combines both group and regional culture identity and
otherness — both outward in relation to ‘innovator’ and inward consciousness ‘Oneself
as Another’.
This combination is demonstrated well in works by Rammohun Roy. He said on his
brahman origins in traits ‘A Present to believers of One God’: “I... having been born
amongst them, have learnt the language and got those injunctions by heart, and this
nation (brahmins) having confidence in such divine injunctions cannot give them up
although they have been subjected to many troubles and persecutions and were threatened
to be put to death by the followers of Islam” [6. Vol. IV. P. 954]. Rammohun did not
accepted outward estimation of himself even from benevolent circles: “In none of my
writing, nor in any verbal discussion, have I ever pretended to reform or to discover
the doctrines of the unity God, nor have I ever assumed the title of reformer or discoverer...” [6. Vol. I. P. 90]. At the same time he believed, that he did an important work:
“...A day will arrive, when my humble endeavours will be viewed with justice — perhaps acknowledged with gratitude” [6. Vol. I. P. 6].
Realizing oneself as Another by representatives of new elite in Bengal as response to appearance of Other in Indian sociocultural space was combined with realizing of necessary of this Other for oneself. Rabindranath Tagore had given best expression of that state of consciousness: “The same fact of our existence is confirmed
by that all exists — also, and ‘I am’, which is in me, crosses borders of its own termination, when it grasp itself deeply in ‘You are’. That crossing of extremity causes joy,
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which brings the beautiful, love and greatness, Renunciation, and the more degree,
self-sacrifice, are evidences of knowing of infinity” [3. P. 63]. ‘Oneself as Another’
Bengal thinker lives and acts as new prophet, who translates his own knowledge from
deeps of experiences and reflections and want to be heard.
According to Ricoeur, each Bengal thinker can be called “moral subject of imputation”, which somehow or other appears in intellectual and social spheres. He takes the
personal responsibility for his own interpretation of spiritual tradition, values and
norms of the Indian culture, course and meanings of Indian history, modern state of
society and for determination both ends and ways of development in new conditions.
Derozians, brahmoists and neo-Hindu thinkers and public men of national-independence
movement in early XX century are working that. At the same time Bengal thinker is practician in religious reformation sphere, acting almost alone against common stereotypes
and traditional norms of society. He also is enlightener, who moves forward modern
scientific knowledge and European culture heritage, to minds of his compatriots. He is
defender of rights and politician, who familiarize constitutional norms of acting in defending of rights and freedoms of colonized people. He is creator of Modern Indian culture, its literature in English and vernacular, new language in art and new styles in music.
All this activity is addressed to all country and doing for India with consciousness
of the full responsibility for the process and results. But besides origins from dialogue
with the West, this activity is sign for it about dignity of Indian people, culture, about
efforts for development of society, and because is the continuation of dialogue.
Thus, the Bengal Renaissance thinker’s otherness along with Indian identity described on the base of Ricoeur’s conception, helps to interpret his specific role and
actions in dialogue with the West. Firstly, Bengal thinker acts as autonomous personality
in Western mode, but socialized in Indian surroundings, that’s why he run dialogue
with the West on an equal footing. Secondly, broad opportunities of Other’s understanding are provided by capacity to speak on one of Western languages. Thirdly, Bengal
thinker discoveries and knows her own country and opens her dignities along with dialogue with the West. Fourthly, Bengal thinker takes the initiative and responsibility for
own thinking and reformist and cultural activity, and for more deep understanding
both the West and India. That’s why, dialogue with the West is continued in dialogue
with India.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Ricoeur P. History and Truth. — St-Petersburg, 2002. (In Russian)
[2] Skorokhodova Tatiana G. The Bengal Renaissance. Essays on History of Socio-cultural Synthesis
in Modern Indian Philosophical Thought. — St-Petersburg, 2008. (In Russian)
[3] Tagore R. Complete Works. In 12 Vols. — Moscow, 1961—1965. Vol. XI (In Russian)
[4] Ricoeur Paul. Oneself as Another. L., 1992.
[5] Uspenskaya E.N. Anthropology of an Indian Caste. St-Petersburg, 2010.
[6] Roy Raja Rammohun. The English Works / Ed. by J.C. Ghose. In 4 vols. New Delhi, 1982.
[7] Rashkovsky E.B. Scientific Knowledge, Institutions of Science and the Intellectuals in the East:
19th–20th centuries. Moscow, 1990. (In Russian)
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[8] Skorokhodova Tatiana G. “Journey to the West” in the Experience of the Bengal Renaissance Thinkers // Voprosy Filosofii. 2011. № 11. (In Russian)
[9] Tagore Devendranath. The Autobiography. Transl. from Original Bengali by S. Tagore and
I. Devi. Calcutta, 1909.
Я=САМ КАК ДРУГОЙ:
МЫСЛИТЕЛЬ БЕНГАЛЬСКОГО РЕНЕССАНСА
В ДИАЛОГЕ С ЗАПАДОМ
Т.Г. Скороходова
Кафедра теории и практики социальной работы
Педагогический институт им. В.Г. Белинского
Пензенский государственный университет
ул. Красная, 40, Пенза, Россия, 440026
В статье на основе концепции Поля Рикёра «Я-сам как Другой» (“Soi-même comme un autre”)
описаны личностные особенности восточных субъектов диалога с Западом. На примере новых интеллектуалов Индии — мыслителей эпохи Бенгальского Возрождения (XIX — первая треть XX в.)
показана другость и идентичность их личной позиции. Они Другие как для собственного индийского
социокультурного окружения, так и для западных субъектов межкультурного диалога. Другость
вместе с индийской идентичностью определяет специфическую роль бенгальских мыслителей и особенности их трудов, созданных в диалоге с Западом.
Ключевые слова: Рикёр, «Я-сам как Другой», Бенгальское Возрождение, проблематичный
мыслитель, понимание Другого, диалог с Западом.
THE DENIAL OF SEMANTIC RELATION
IN INDIAN CLASSICAL CULTURE
E.A. Desnitskaya
Chair of Oriental Philosophy and Culturology
Faculty of Philosophy
Saint-Petersburg State University
Mendeleevskaya Liniya 5, Saint-Petersburg, Russia, 199034
The existence of semantic relation was postulated in Katyayana’s Varttika (3 B.C.E.), which served
a key-stone for the further development of Indian language philosophy. However in different Sanskrit
texts (Tantras, the Nirukta, works on ritual and poetics) the existence of semantic relation had been denied
explicitly. This paper considers specific characteristics of extralinguistic kinds of activities that stipulated
the genesis of these texts and elicits the reasons why their authors rejected to use ordinary language, for
the sake of establishing new semantic relations.
Key words: Indian language philosophy, samdha-bhasha, Nirukta, Tantra, Indian poetic.
Indian classical culture was especially attentive to language. Nature of language,
its interrelation with consciousness and the way language functions in everyday communication were central subjects of Indian language philosophy (Vyakarana), the basic
principles of which go back to Panini’s Grammar (~5 B.C.E.). Other Indian philosophical systems, e.g. Nyaya, Mimansa, poetics (Alankarashastra), also dealt with different
linguistic problems. One of the most important subjects, investigated by almost every
school of philosophy, was the meaning or — more generally — the nature of relation
between language and the world.
The basis of Indian semantics is the first Varttika of Katyayana (~3 B.C.E.),
which says:
siddhe shabdarthasambandhe...
“Established / permanent is the relation between the word (shabda) and its meaning
(artha)...” [1. P. 7] (1).
The precise meaning of the Varttika was controversial already for Patanjali
(2 B.C.E.), the author of the ‘Great Commentary’ on Panini’s Grammar (the Mahabhashya). First, because the compound ‘shabdarthasambandha’ can be analyzed in different ways, providing three different translations of the Varttika:
— Established / permanent are the word, its meaning and their relation;
— Established / permanent are the word and its relation with meaning;
— Established / permanent is the relation of the word and its meaning.
Notably, the third possible translation, which seems more plausible from our
point of view, was never mentioned by Patanjali, probably because the high respect to
the word in Vedic ritual system made him to consider the word to be eternal. Nevertheless Katyayana could have in mind the third interpretation, because the subject of his
interest was obviously pure grammar, not the nature of the word and its referent.
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Secondly the meaning of the word siddha, used in the Varttika, may have different
explanations. The further part of the Varttika, which appeals to ordinary language,
prompts to translate siddha as ‘established’. Patanjali however considers siddha to be
a synonym of the word nitya ‘permanent’ or ‘eternal’. Later commentators usually
followed him, providing in turn different interpretations of the notion of permanence.
According to the first interpretation, Katyayana proclaimed semantic relation to be
permanent from ontological point of view. The universal meaning of all words is
Brahman, thus the relation of the word and its meaning is also considered to be permanent and eternal. According to the second interpretation, Katyayana spoke of the
functional permanence of semantic relation. Unless semantic relation is permanent,
there is no opportunity for language activity to occur. Thus the permanence of semantic
relation is a pre-requisite for the use of language (2).
The first interpretation is close to Mimamsa, which considered the word and its
relation with the meaning to be eternal [4. P. 37—47]. However Katyayana most
probably held the second opinion, because the Varttika belonged to the ‘technical’, i.e.
non-philosophical level of grammar, which was usually accepted by all schools as
a kind of normative discipline. Different schools of Indian philosophy, notwithstanding
all their disagreements in ontological matters, accepted inevitably the existence of relation between word and meaning; otherwise their own arguments would become
senseless.
Having this in mind, it is more surprising to find the contrary opinion on the existence of semantic relation expressed explicitly. It is in Buddhist Tantra Prajnopayavinishcayasiddhi by Anangavajra [5], that Katyayana’s Varttika is paraphrased in negative sense:
shabdarthayor-asambandhat (II. 5c)
...as there is no relation between the word and [its] meaning...
This statement seems to be self-contradictory, because if there were no semantic
relation, the meaningfulness of all texts, including this very Tantra, would be called into
doubt. One may assume, that Anangavajra denied the ontological status of semantic
relation only, but not its very existence. However, the context, from which the quotation
is extracted, does not support this assumption. In the whole the passage reads:
(3) Even Buddhas are unable to say ‘This is that’, because [that, what] everyone
perceives in himself, is not grasped in external objecst.
(4) Therefore [those], awakened by three paths, bringing joy in the world, have
never expounded [their knowledge] consistently in sutras, mantras, instructions etc.
(5) As there is no relation between the word and [its] meaning, it can never be
learnt by hearing of the shastras, which explain [by means of] definitions (lakshana).
(6) Thus one should constantly and devotedly worship the teacher, because
without him the realness (tattva) is not to be attained even in the course of ten million
kalpas [5. P. 12].
In other words, artha, i.e. the intentional object of the discourse, is inexpressible
and as such is to be grasped under the direct guidance of the teacher. Thus it is not the
semantic relation, that Anangavajra denies, but the very possibility to express some
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nonverbal experience in words. Similar statements are typical for many spiritual traditions in different cultures. However it was in Indian culture with its tendency to reflection on language, that the denial of semantic relation resulted in specific forms of sophisticated textual discourse. The most remarkable example of it is the Tantric ‘twilight
language’.
The Sanskrit term for ‘twilight language’ is samdhya-bhasha, in texts also referred
to as samdha-bhasha, the word samdha being a corrupted form for samdhya ‘twilight’.
Samdha-bhasha can be also translated as ‘intentional language’. This language is
widely used in Buddhist and Hindu Tantras and related texts. As an example let us consider a list from the Hevajra Tantra:
madhya (wine) is madana (intoxication)
mamsa (flesh) is bala (strength)
malayaja (sandlewood) is milana (meeting)... (3)
One could suggest, we have here a kind of glossary, where words of the ‘secret’
language are elucidated by ordinary ones. However, Elder claims, that all the elements
of this chain belong to ‘twilight language’, they are interchangeable and refer to one
the same object, viz. some details of Tantric Yoga [6. P. 242]. If one uses ‘twilight language’, it means, ‘that for him language has ceased to function in an ordinary way... because meanings overlap or intersect, like day and night at the time of twilight’ [6. P. 250].
Twilight language is opposed to nontwilight (nasamdhibhasha), i.e. to ordinary
language with all its semantic relations established. Similarly two other oppositions
were elaborated in Buddhist Tantras, i. e. the opposition of hinted meaning (neyartha)
vs. evident meaning (nitartha) and the opposition of standard terminology (yatharuta)
vs. non-standard (coined) terminology (nayatharuta) [6. P. 236; 7]. The first opposition
concerns the modes of verbal expression (shabda), the second the modes of the meaning (artha), whereas the opposition of terminology deals both with word and meaning
in their interrelation (sambandha), which is an obvious throw-back to Patanjali’s triad
of word-meaning-relation.
‘Twilight’ semantic relation between word and meaning is established on the basis
of samaya. The primary meaning of this word is ‘coming together’, but in some contexts
it means ‘vow’ and ‘opportunity’ [8. P. 1630], the two latter meanings being not so
far from each other as it seems, because a vow is to be made and solved in order to afford a favorable opportunity for the accomplishment of certain goals. In grammar and
rhetoric samaya usually means ‘conventional meaning of a word’, being a synonym
for samketa [9]. Thus we may conclude, that a vow, made by initiated, consists inter
alia in acceptance of semantic convention concerning the use of 'twilight language',
which affords a favorable opportunity for Tantric realization.
This use of language is not a unique trait of Tantras. Many other Sanskrit texts
belonging to different fields — from ritual to poetics — are based on denial or violation
of semantic relation. One of the earliest examples is to be found in the beginning passage
of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, which concerns the Ashvamedha ritual:
“The head of the sacrificial horse, clearly, is the dawn; its sight is the sun; its breath
is the wind; and its gaping mouth is the fire common to all men. The body (atman) of the
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sacrificial horse is the year; its back is the sky; its abdomen is the intermediate region...” (4).
Sementsov claimed, that this passage was stipulated by its ritual function, being
a part of the Ashvamedha, intended for ritual performance. The passage was not an
exposition of some philosophy, but an instruction in a specific form of psychotechnique,
which makes the mundane world sacral, so that for the participants of the Ashvamedha
ritual the Universe becomes a gigantic sacrifice [11. P. 48—50] (5).
As a result, in the passages of this kind the relation between a word and its
meaning is no more obvious and needs to be justified. This is especially relevant with
regard to the words which traditional grammar considers as avyutpanna, i.e. ‘nonderivable’ according to the rules. This problem could be solved by means of Nirukta, one
of the six Vedic auxiliary disciplines (Vedangas) (6).
Nirukta is often characterized as etymology, which is not true, because traditional
Indian culture had no interest to history in general and to history of words in particular.
According to traditional explanation, Nirukta provides derivation of a word in correspondence with its meaning [14. P. 27]. The basic principle of Nirukta — anvartha, lit. ‘similarity with the object (artha)’ — can be compared with European concept of iconicity, i.e. structural correspondence between the word and the essence of the referent.
Nirukta’s procedure (nirvacana) provides an answer to the question of how does a
word denote, what it denotes, not in general, but in the certain context. Thus it seems
more appropriate to follow Bronkhorst and Kahrs in defining Nirukta as a technique
of semantic analysis [15; 16; 14].
An example of such analysis is derivation of the word ahar ‘day’:
‘Why ahar? [because] one carries out (upa-ahar-anti) actions in the course of
it» (7).
This ‘derivation’ contradicts the rules of Sanskrit grammar, and is obviously absurd for everyone, who knows Sanskrit. Another example of nirvacana is the word
anna ‘food’, derived from two verbal roots simultaneously, though only one of the derivations seems plausible [Bronkhorst 1981: 7]. Derivations of this kind are against
the innate linguistic intuition, however they may help to understand the meaning of
the word in some context.
European scholars usually characterize Nirukta as a folk or popular etymology
that is inconsistent with modern linguistics (8). In Ancient India however there was
no concept of history in European sense of the word. Indian traditional culture regarded
time as cyclical, not linear. Thus one can hardly expect, that in Vedic ritual system
there will emerge a specific Vedanga, concentrated on historical derivation of words.
According to Bronkhorst, most probably Yaska had never considered the hypothesis
of language being subject to alteration. For him Vedic language and Sanskrit did not
represent different stages of language history, but were two coexistent aspects of one
language [15. P. 5—7].
By means of nirvacana a new semantic relation is established, transforming an
incomprehensible text into a distinct reality and at the same time modifying the way
one perceives this reality. In this regard nirvacana is very similar to samaya, discussed
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earlier. The problem of the affinity between Vedic culture and Tantra is too complicated
to be discussed here, though certain relations as well genetic, as typological are very
plausible. Anyway the denial of ordinary semantic relations and re-establishment of
the new ones are common both to Vedic and Tantric ritual traditions.
The same tendency can be discovered in another cultural realm, viz. in poetry.
In poetry the established semantic relation of the word to its meaning is sometimes
intentionally violated, in order to make the word designate some other referent, different to its usual one, but somehow connected to it. In Indian poetics usual examples of this
metaphoric transfer (lakshana) were sentences: ‘The cots cry’ (though in fact the babies in cots cry) and ‘The cows graze on the Ganges’ (on the bank of the Ganges) [17.
P. 232—273].
Indian classical poetry was famous with its sophisticated means of expression, so
that even educated people were unable to understand for instance Kalidasa’s poem,
without having recourse to commentaries. Thus we may say that even in poetry there
was a kind of samaya, based on allusion and association. Anandavardhana claimed in the
Dhvanyaloka, that suggested meaning is not to be grasped by means of grammar, only
those understand it, who know the essence of poetry (9).
Poetical means affect the audience aesthetically, changing the mode of apprehension. Thus Indian rhetoricians had good reasons for comparing aesthetic and spiritual
experience. Abhinavagupta proclaimed aesthetic experience (rasa) to be of the same
nature as the direct non-duel experience of the Ultimate Reality [Cf. 19, 20].
Thus we may conclude that established semantic relation is a necessary condition
for philosophy, grammar as well as for various kinds of everyday activities, based on
the use of ordinary language. On the contrary some kinds of activity, i.e. ritual, religion
and poetry, which are aimed to change the usual world-view, handle with semantic
reality skillfully. The subject of a text of this tape is not to be grasped directly by
means of established semantic relation; on the contrary it can be comprehended only
after this relation has been destroyed.
FOOTNOTES
(1) According to the full text of the Varttika, introduced in further parts of the Mahabhashya,
after the relation between the word (shabda) and its meaning (artha) is established from ordinary
language, grammatical restrictions are applied, as in mundane and Vedic activities. [Cf. 1. P. 7]
But commentators usually analyze the first part of the Varttika separately as a distinct statement.
(2) Bhartrhari in his commentary on Patanjali’s Mahabhashya (the Mahabhashyadipika was
probably the first to introduce the idea, that the permanence of semantic relation can be the
two types of [2. P. 74, 207—208]. Later on this concept was mentioned by Kayyata (XI A.D.)
in his commentary on the Paspashahnika of the Mahabhashya) [3. P. 91, 110—114].
(3) Translated by Wayman. Cited by Elder [6. P. 241].
(4) Translated by P. Olivelle [10. P.37].
(5) Probably this textual practice originates from the ancient Indo-European poetic opposition of
‘language of people’ and ‘language of gods’ (or even languages of asuras and gandharvas in India, dwarfs, jotunns, vanir etc. in Norse mythology), each of them possessing special synonyms
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(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
for designation of same realia [12. P. 43]. For example in many Vedic hymns the word ‘cow’
(gau) is the secret name of Speech [13. P. 23—37].
Vedangas were six in number: phonetics (Shiksha), metrics (Chandas), grammar (Vyakarana),
semantic analysis (Nirukta), astronomy (Jyotisha), ritual (Kalpa). The first two provide correct
pronunciation of the Vedas, next two correct understanding of the Vedas and two latter correct
performance of the ritual. Thus the pairs of the Vedangas regulate respectively the activity of
speech, mind and body in the course of ritual.
Nirukta II. 20. Kahrs’ translation slightly modified [14. P. 54].
Cf. [21. P. 68—73]. A review of interpretations of Nirukta, dominated in European Indology
since 19th century, see [15. P. 1—3].
Dhvanyaloka I. 7: [18. P. 5].
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Patanjali’s Vyakarana-Mahabhashya. Edited by F. Kielhorn. Vol. I. Bombay, 1880.
[2] Iyer K.A.S. Bhartrihari. A study of Vakyapadiya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries.
Poona, 1992.
[3] Patanjali’s Vyakarana-Mahabhashya. Paspashahnika. Introduction. Text. Translation and
Notes by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen. Pune, 1986.
[4] Devasthali G.V. Mimamsa — the Vakya-shastra of Ancient India. Bombay, 1959.
[5] Prajnopayavinishcayasiddhi of Anangavajra // Two Vajrayana Works. Gaekwad’s Oriental
Series, NXLIV. Baroda, 1929.
[6] Elder G.R. Problems of Language in Buddhist Tantra // History of Religions. Vol. 15/3,
1976. P. 231—250.
[7] Wayman A. Buddhist Tantra and Lexical Meaning // Current Advances in Semantic Theory.
Amsterdam — Philadelphia. 1992. P. 465—478.
[8] Apte V.Sh. The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi, 1998.
[9] Houben J.E.M. Bhartrihari’s Samaya / Helaraja’s Samketa. A Contribution to the Reconstruction of the Grammarian’s Discussion with the Vaisheshikas on the Relation between
Shabda and Artha // Journal of Indian Philosophy. 20. 1992. P. 219—242.
[10] The Early Upanishads. Annotated Text and Translation by Patrick Olivelle. Oxford, 1998.
[11] Семенцов В.С. Проблемы интерпретации брахманической прозы. М., 1981.
[12] Елизаренкова Т.Я., Топоров В.Н. Древнеиндийская поэтика и ее индоевропейские истоки // Литература и культура Древней и Средневековой Индии. М., 1979. С. 36—88.
[13] Гринцер П.А. Тайный язык «Ригведы» // Избранные произведения. Том I. Древнеиндийская литература. М., 2008. С. 9—74.
[14] Kahrs E. Indian Semantic Analysis: the Nirvacana Tradition. Cambridge. 1998.
[15] Bronkhorst J. Nirukta and Ashtadhyayi: their shared presuppositions // Indo-Iranian Journal.
23. 1981. P. 1—14.
[16] Bronkhorst J. Etymology and magic: Yaska’s Nirukta, Plato’s Cratylus, and the riddle of semantic
etymologies // Numen, Vol. 48. Leiden, 2001.
[17] Raja K.K. Indian theories of meaning. Madras, 1963.
[18] Anandavardhana. Dhvanyaloka. http://sanskritdocuments.org/all_pdf/dhvanyaloka1.pdf
[19] Анандавардхана. Дхваньялока («Свет дхвани») / Пер. с санскрита, введение и комментарий Ю.М. Алихановой. М., 1974.
[20] Gnoli R. The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta. Varanasi, 1968.
[21] Катенина Т.Е., Рудой В.И. Лингвистические знания в Древней Индии // История лингвистических учений. Древний мир. Л., 1980.
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Desnitskaya E.A. The denial of semantic relation in indian classical culture
ОТРИЦАНИЕ СЕМАНТИЧЕСКОЙ СВЯЗИ
В ИНДИЙСКОЙ КЛАССИЧЕСКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЕ
Е.А. Десницкая
Кафедра философии и культурологии Востока
Философский факультет
Санкт-Петербургский государственный Университет
Менделеевская линия, 5, Санкт-Петербург, Россия, 199034
Существование семантической связи постулируется в варттике Катьяяны (III в. до н.э.), послужившей отправной точкой для дальнейшего развития индийской лингвофилософии. Тем удивительнее встретить отрицание существования семантической связи, эксплицитно выраженное в санскритских текстах различной тематики (тантры, «Нирукта», труды по ритуалу и поэтике). В статье рассматриваются особенности видов внеязыковой деятельности, лежащие в основе подобных текстов,
и выявляются причины, побудившие авторов отказаться от использования обыденного языка и устанавливать новые семантические связи.
Ключевые слова: индийская философия языка, самдхья-бхаша, нирукта, тантра, индийская
поэтика.
PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION
OF ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS
HAPPINESS AS SELFREALIZATION:
TWO ISLAMIC APPROACHES
A.V. Smirnov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Volknonka, 14, Moscow, Russia, 119991
Al-Suhrawardī, the founder of Ishrāqī school of Illumination, understands happiness as ultimate
self-realization. According to al-Suhrawardī, the human self, or ego (’anā), is light embedded and immured in material body, and to attain ultimate happiness means to knock off the shackles of dark matter
and, breaking free, to merge with the Absolute Light. This goal is attained after a painstaking vertical
ascend and is reached only by a few. Ibn ‘Arabī, on the contrary, holds that happiness is not only attainable, but actually attained by everyone, placing it not above, but within the horizon of human existence. This
view is backed by Akbarian ontology of God-to-world relation and his understanding of human being and
his universal significance. The universally attainable happiness in Akbarian perspective is human selfrealization as well, though with the different understanding of the human self.
Key words: al-Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, self, ’anā, illumination, happiness, sa‘āda, Ibn ‘Arabī.
Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that the quest for sa‘āda “happiness” was
a general concern of Islamic culture in its classical period. With the advent of Islam,
when human aspirations were universally shaped and posited in religious perspective,
the word sa‘āda started to signify the ultimate goal to be attained by human being, the
absolute bliss which humanity might hope to gain.
This very general meaning presupposed plurality of interpretations. Let me mention some dividing lines which differentiated understanding of happiness and ways
leading to it.
The first of them is drawn by an answer to the question whether happiness can
be attained only in the hereafter (’ākhira), or it is attainable in the worldly life (dunyā)
as well. Generally, there was no doubt that life in the hereafter will be life of happiness
and bliss, provided we follow the right path; the disagreement concerned the question
whether sa‘āda may be attained exclusively in the hereafter, or the worldly life can be
happy too. Once again, there was no doubt that the worldly happiness and happiness
of the other life are incomparable. Yet the question was not about their “equating” in any
way, as this was out of question; the question was whether worldly life may be happy
at all, in principle.
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Smirnov A.V. Happiness as self-realization: two islamic approaches
Generally speaking, Islamic doctrine (‘aqīda), Mu‘tazila and (at least some of)
the Ṣūfī thinkers answered positively. The reasoning behind that positive answer was
very different in the three cases, but what is important for the moment is the point of
agreement, and not disagreement.
Falāsifa and Ismā‘īlī thinkers answered negatively, and the founder of Ishrāqī
school Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī should be classified as the same type.
Here as well the explanation of why the answer was negative differ substantially for
the three groups of thinkers, but this does not affect the basic commonality of answer.
It is true that al-Suhrawardī and some of the falāsifa recognized the possibility of
happiness during life and before death, but they understood it as “death before death,”
that is, as leaving this material world by the soul, so it was happiness outside this
world anyway.
The positive and the negative answers may be expressed metaphorically as horizontal and vertical orientations, or orientations of balance and hierarchy. In the first
case, the thinkers tend to find a sort of coordination between the two lives and the two
types of happiness, while in the second all the hopes are placed exclusively above the
worldly horizon.
The second question is the following: does the human being possess all the prerequisites for attaining happiness? To put it in an ontological language: is human nature
basically sufficient for gaining it, or, on the contrary, it is basically deficient and, therefore, needs to be completed before one can hope to catch the glimpse of happiness?
This is the question of whether perfection (kamāl, tamām) is crucial for happiness.
The dividing line that runs through the domain of Islamic thinking as the result
of answering the second question more or less coincides with the first one. This is interesting enough, for it suggests that the two questions may be interconnected. Whether
this is the case and there is a sort of affinity between the two answers, remains to be
explored. But it seems to me rather obvious that Islamic doctrine and Mu‘tazilite ethics do not presuppose necessity of any, so to say, additional ontological perfection to be
added to initial human nature (fiṭra). An ethical effort is needed, this is true, and the
Mu‘tazila require perhaps an ultimate ethical energy from the human being rising
those requirements to the highest possible degree, where they almost cease to be feasible
for the mass of believers. But this does not deny the fact that human nature is initially
sufficient for attaining happiness, both in this life and in the hereafter, and does not
need to be ontologically perfected. Nothing needs to be added to it, and no additional
completeness is required. The Ṣūfī thinkers, with their theories of the “Perfect man”
(insān kāmil) and the “Way” (ṭarīqa) to God, are generally regarded as advocates of
the need for perfecting human nature. I will argue that though this may be true in some
cases, in others it is not, and as long as the Akbarian view of happiness is considered,
“perfection” (kamāl) as a process of developing human nature is not a condition for
happiness.
As for the falāsifa who followed Neoplatonic models of understanding happiness,
perfection is unconditionally needed to transform human nature and make it fit for
eternal bliss. The Ismā‘īlī philosophy, which culminated in Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī’s
Rāḥat al-‘aql, also stresses the need for perfection and, despite some very important
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points of difference with falāsifa, understands happiness as eternal bliss of the soul
freed from the body.
As for al-Suhrawardī, with whom we are concerned in this paper, his answer is
not so easy to classify. On the one hand, happiness, according to al-Suhrawardī, is
unattainable unless the human being breaks free from the shackles of material world.
Happiness is impossible as long as we remain inside this world, and only by transcending its bounds do we attain it. This seems to be very much alike what Neoplatonic thinkers hold. However, the way leading to it can hardly be called “perfection”
of the soul in the Neoplatonic sense, because for al-Suhrawardī human soul is not a
substance. And this is more than just a scholastic argument over philosophical terms,
as we will see.
Finally, the third question needs to be asked. Those who posit happiness exclusively outside this world, — how do they understand the way that leads to happiness?
What is, so to say, technology of transition from the state of being captured in this
world of suffer — to the world of bliss?
I think that the two basically different answers to that question are the following.
The first emphasizes the need for perfecting the soul. This understanding relies upon
Greek legacy and interprets the soul as a substance which needs to be completed and
perfected in order to become self-subsistent and independent of the body. The soul of
an ordinary human being is bodily dependant because it is deficient and imperfect.
Perfection as completeness of all the soul’s attributes brings the soul independence
and, finally, eternal bliss. This logic of reasoning is apparent in the writings of falāsifa
when they follow the Neoplatonic line, as well as in al-Kirmānī’s Ismā‘īlī reading of
Qur’ānic eschatology.
The other answer to that question is both similar and strikingly different. It is
similar in its stress of the need of self-subsistence. The difference is that the quest for selfsubsistence is not backed by the theory of human soul as a perfect substance. Rather,
the way to happiness, eternal bliss and self-subsistence is self-disclosure. To disclose the
self, we do not need add anything to what we have (by adding I mean ontological gain
and augmentation). We have to do something different. We have to make appear what
is darkened and veiled. If we manage to get rid of those obstacles that blur and dim
our self, we reach the goal of self-disclosure.
This understanding of the way to happiness is proposed by the greatest Ṣūfī philosopher Ibn ‘Arabī, and by the founder of the Ishrāqiyya school al-Suhrawardī. To my
mind, those two thinkers provide a very clear-cut understanding of happiness as disclosure of human self (1). But they differ much in their understanding of what the
human self is, and in what follows I will outline al-Suhrawardī’s understanding of the
way to happiness and compare it to Ibn ‘Arabī’s treatment of the same topic. Though the
two great thinkers follow basically the same line of self-disclosure, their theories explaining the self and how it can be disclosed differ drastically.
In the very beginning of his Ḥikmat al-ishrāq al-Suhrawardī speaks about
“ranks” (marātib) of the universal hierarchy of human beings. This is, firstly, the hierarchy of “sage” (ḥakīm) and “seeker” (2) (ṭālib); those who do not belong to those two
groups, are not mentioned by al-Suhrawardī at all. Perhaps it is not unjustified to say
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Smirnov A.V. Happiness as self-realization: two islamic approaches
that al-Suhrawardī is concerned here with khāṣṣa “special” people, and not with
‘āmma “ordinary” people. Secondly, each of those two layers is further classified
through combination of two features. Those are ta’alluh “divineness” (3) and baḥth
“investigation” (4). The first is a sort of intuition that grasps the truth without mediator,
that is to say, immediately. The second is the logical way of cognition, which is a wellknown path of falāsifa.
When al-Suhrawardī starts constructing his hierarchy, it may seem that he seeks
a sort of balance between ta’alluh and baḥth. He first marks the extreme opposites as he
says that the first two ranks are occupied by
divine sage proficient in divineness and devoid of investigation; sage active in investigation
and devoid of divineness (5).
After that he mentions the most perfect rank:
divine sage proficient both in divineness and investigation (6),
and this means that ta’alluh alone, though it leads to ultimate truth, is not the highest
rank; more perfect is the one who combines ta’alluh and baḥth.
Another example. When al-Suhrawardī introduces his book to the reader, he says that
[it] is for those who seek both divineness and investigation (7).
Among the “seekers” the first to be mentioned is the seeker of “both divineness and
investigation,” to be followed by the seeker of divineness alone, and at last — the seeker
of investigation [1. {5}].
And, finally, he says about the “leader” of humankind and God’s viceroy (khalīfa)
on earth:
If it happens some day that there exists someone proficient both in divineness and investigation, then to him belongs leadership (ri’āsa), and he is God’s viceroy (8).
However, this first impression of al-Suhrawardī’s balancing the opposites and
following classification based on two poles and two scales, very quickly gives way to
strict hierarchy with ta’alluh as its only pole. Yes, it is fine to have ability of investigation
added to ta’alluh; and yet it is ta’alluh, and not baḥth, which is crucial for ri’āsa and
condition sine qua non for it. The essence of ri’āsa, i. e., universal leadership of humankind, is the ability of ta’alluh, and it cannot do without it. Baḥth, on the contrary, is
something inessential, though praiseworthy:
The earth does not ever remain without one who is proficient in divineness, and the
leadership of the God’s earth does not belong to investigator proficient in investigation
but devoid of divineness (9).
Why is it so? I think the answer can be found in a short phrase of al-Suhrawardī:
Receiving (talaqqī) is indispensable for being [God’s] viceroy (10).
This means that ri’āsa can be handed down to man from God and received by him
only directly, without mediator. As Shahrazūrī explains, in the same way and without
mediator the monarch handles down to his wazir authority needed to execute wazir’s
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duties. As for logical knowledge, it is always mediated by premises, figures of syllogisms, etc. In other words, it cannon be immediate by its very nature, as Islamic philosophers always noted.
Though Ḥikmat al-ishrāq was written for seekers of both ta’alluh and baḥth, it is
ta’alluh, and not baḥth, which is crucial for reading the book and grasping its content:
The Illuminationists cannot set things going without luminous inspiration (11).
Now, what is ta’alluh? The most evident and simple answer would be that ta’alluh
is ability of human self to get access to world of divinity. This access is granted to
a trained soul (al-Suhrawardī uses nafs “soul” and dhāt “self” as interchangeable in this
context) even during its life and before death; moreover, this training is necessary for
the soul to remain in celestial world after death and not be dragged down to the material
world through its attraction to the material “fortresses” (ṣayāṣī). Thus the training diminishes the soul’s dependence on the material “barriers” (barāzikh). This dependence,
however, is not essential; it is not caused by any deficiency of human soul which in such
a case would need a remedy and a sort of substantial perfection. No, the only cause of
being “tied” to dark substances is soul’s “weakness” (ḍu‘f): it only needs to gain “intensity” (shidda) in order to escape from material world to the world of divinity.
Intensifying the soul as the result of its training is not the same as gaining perfection
(kamāl). Intensity (shidda) and weakness (ḍu‘f) are characteristics of something absolutely simple, while perfection in its initial sense presupposes fullness of attributes
(12). Human soul is light, weakened and therefore captured by material fortress which
has become its abode. However, it is still a light, and nothing but light; and, regarded
as light, it does not differ from the Light of lights in any respect except intensity.
Since happiness is closeness to the Light of lights, it is, so to say, guaranteed to human
being ontologically, for there is no ontological deficiency that hinders human soul’s
access to happiness. Al-Suhrawardī’s view of the topic is very optimistic: there is a basic
affinity between human soul and the Light of lights, as well as other celestial lights,
which guarantees its ascend to the world of light provided it breaks free from the ties
of material “fortresses.”
Now, let us remember that the material (barzakh “barrier,” ṣīṣiya “fortress,” etc.) has
no, so to say, ontological power: it is only “darkness” (ẓulma), that is to say, absence
of light, which takes its beginning in the notion of a “shadow” (ẓill). This is a very
important point in al-Suhrawardī’s system of thought, since at this step he tries to reduce
the apparent duality of light and darkness to the actual unity of light, where darkness
is nothing but absence of light. So, initially shadow is the result of a “need” (faqr)
which the Proximate Light (al-nūr al-aqrab) notices in itself when it contemplates the
Light of lights: this realization of its need is the shadow itself. Eventually it becomes
darkness and is found in the material world as fortresses for light and barriers hindering
its movement and expansion. Now, what is this realization of need and dependence? —
It is nothing but a result of relative weakness of the Proximate Light in comparison
with the Light of lights.
It means that in the final analysis the “barriers” which block soul’s ascend towards
its ultimate goal, to the abode of closeness to the Light of lights, are nothing substantial:
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they are just the soul’s own weakness, and nothing else. To overcome those barriers
means to intensify the soul. After acquiring intensity enough to do without its “fortress”, the soul immediately finds itself witnessing the world of lights. This selfstrengthening of an absolutely simple light which is the human soul is what can be
called self-realization in the case of al-Suhrawardī.
Let me cast a glance at Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of happiness. He says in Fuṣūṣ that
the Creation is drawn towards happiness in all its variety (13).
The Greatest Shaykh holds that no one is unhappy; moreover, no one can be unhappy.
It means that there is no ontological ground for unhappiness; on the contrary, Ibn
‘Arabī’s ontology presupposes absolute and unlimited happiness of every and each
creature.
There is one important reservation, though. If happiness is universal ontologically,
it does not mean that it is universal psychologically. On the contrary, most of the
people are unhappy — because they do not realize that they are in fact happy. Ibn ‘Arabī
says about “ascend” (taraqqī) of any human being to God:
One of the most amazing things is that he is in constant ascend and does not feel it (14).
It means that most of the people are ignorant about the basic truth of the “new
creation” (khalq jadīd): each and every moment of time the world loses its existence
to dive into the Divine Self and at the same instant reemerges anew as existent. This
back-and-forth movement between Divine Self and the world is repeated incessantly.
This is why the human being is incessantly close to God. For al-Suhrawardī, ascend
towards the Light of lights is something to be gained, something which a human being
does not possess; for Ibn ‘Arabī, man has only to realize, that is, to disclose in his own
self (dhāt), this basic truth of his constant closeness to God. Such taḥaqquq “(self-)realization” is not granted to everyone, but those who have it, i.e., muḥaqqiqūn “thosewho-realized” their own selves as the basic truth of the universe, are ultimately happy
not only ontologically, but psychologically as well, already in this life, and not only
in the hereafter.
FOOTNOTES
(1) To some extent we can trace this view in Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt and Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān
too, though it is not always expressed consistently and is followed by understanding of the soul
as a substance which needs perfection to become self-subsistent.
(2) Or “philosopher” and “student,” according to J. Walbridge and H. Ziai’s translation.
(3) J. Walbridge and H. Ziai render ta’alluh as “intuitive philosophy” saying that “mysticism” might
also do and that the word literally means “deification”.
(4) “Discursive philosophy,” according to J. Walbridge and H. Ziai.
(5) ‫[ حكيم الھي متوغل في التأله عديم البحث؛ حكيم بحاث عديم التأله‬1. {5}].
(6) ‫[ حكيم الھي متوغل في التأله والبحث‬1. {5}].
(7) ‫[ كتابنا ھذا لطالبي التأله والبحث‬1. {6}].
(8) ‫[ فأن اتفق في الوقت متوغل في التأله والبحث فله الرئاسة‬1. {5}].
(9) ‫وال تخلو االرض من متوغل في التأله ابدا وال رئاسة في ارض ﷲ للباحث المتوغل في البحث الذي لم يتوغل‬
‫[ في التأله‬1. {5}].
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(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
‫[ ال بد للخالفة من التلقي‬1. {5}].
‫[ االشراقيون ال ينتظم امرھم دون سوانح نورانية‬1. {6}].
“The quiddity of luminosity does not necessitate perfection,” al-Suhrawardī says [2. {137}].
‫[ مآل الخلق الى السعادة على اختالف انواعھا‬3. P. 166].
‫[ ومن اعجب االمور انه في الترقي دائما وال يشعر بذلك‬3. P. 124].
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Al-Suhrawardī. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. OEuvres philosophiques et mystiques de Shihabaddin Yahya
Sohrawardi [par] Henry Corbin. Prolégomènes en français et éd. critique. Téheran, Institut
franco-iranien, 1952. V. <1>.
[2] Suhrawardī. The Philosophy of Illumination. A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat
al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary, and Introduction by John Walbridge &
Hossein Ziai. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1999.
[3] Ibn ‘Arabī. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam / Ed. A. Affifi. Beyrouth. 1980.
СЧАСТЬЕ КАК САМО=ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИЕ
У АС=СУХРАВАРДИ И ИБН ‘АРАБИ
А.В. Смирнов
Институт философии РАН
Волхонка, 14, Москва, Россия, 119991
Для ас-Сухраварди, основателя философии ишракизма, «счастье» (саада) — это достижение
полного осуществления человеческого «я». Заключенное в оковы темной материи и представляющее собой полностью противоположный ей свет, человеческое «я» достигает счастья, сбросив
оковы материи и слившись с Абсолютным Светом — началом всего. Этот путь вертикального восхождения, прорывающий рамку земного мира и обычного существования, могут преодолеть лишь
немногие. Ибн ‘Араби, напротив, считает, что счастье не только достижимо, но и фактически достигается всеми, полагая его, в отличие от ас-Сухраварди, в пределах горизонта человеческого существования. В основе этого лежит онтология отношения между Богом и миром, а также представление о человеке как центральном звене универсума, скрепляющем все его многообразие. Для Ибн
‘Араби счастье — также полное самоосуществление человеческого «я», но при ином понимании
человека.
Ключевые слова: ас-Сухраварди, Хикмат ал-ишрак, я, озарение, счастье, Ибн ‘Араби.
HISTORICPHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
AS A WAY OF INTERPRETING A CONCEPT OF BRAHMAN
IN THE EARLY VISHISHTAADVAITA SCHOOL*
R.V. Pskhu
Department of History of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, Moscow, Russia, 117198
The paper deals with the concept of Brahman in the early Vishishta-Advaita-Vedanta School, particularly in Yamunacarya’s treatise “Ishvarasiddhi”, the main passages of which are lost.
Key words: Yamunacarya, Brahman, nyaya, Ramanuja, Ishvara, anumana, shabda, “Ishvarasiddhi”.
The early period of Vishishta-advaita-vedanta school was formed on the base
Yamuna’s works. The main philosophical ideas of this school are elaborated in the
famous philosophical trilogy “Siddhitraya”, which includes the part devoted to the
concept of individual soul nature (“Atmasiddhi”, or “Realization of Atman”), the part
devoted to the concept of the Highest Reality (“Ishvarasiddhi”, or “Realization of Personal God”) and the part devoted to the concept of self-realization or salvation of Atman
(“Samvitsiddhi”, or “Realization of the Highest knowledge”). Unfortunately most of
these texts have been lost and now we have no possibility to know exactly the full
content of Yamuna’s works. The part devoted to the concept of the nature of Brahman,
or Ishvara, has been saved only in several fragments, which contain only the polemics
between a mimansaka and a nayayaka (Mimansa school and Nyaya school). In other
words the arguments of Yamunacarya concerning the concept of Brahman and his ideas
have been lost and we cannot restore them, basing on the text. We have to reconstruct his
ideas on the nature of Brahman on the base of the treatises of the later philosophers of
Vishishta-advaita school: mainly from the references and interpretations of Yamunacarya’s ideas, contained in the works of Ramanuja and Venkatanatha. This fact was the
main reason, why “Ishvarasiddhi” was not investigated deeply and, we dare to say,
adequately: it is rather difficult to study the fragments of the text, the subject of which
(or clue passage) is lost. All translations and interpretations of the philosophical trilogy
“Siddhitraya” are devoted mostly to two other parts of it: “Atmasiddhi” and “Samvitsiddhi”.
The saved fragment of “Ishvarasiddhi” is a purvapaksha, which contains some
arguments of the other schools on the problem of existence of Ishvara. This purvapaksha
presents a dialogue between a mimansaka, who tries to refute the idea of the existence
of Omniscient God, and a nayayika, who tries to prove this idea.
The basic argument of a mimansaka is that Personal God, or Ishvara, cannot be
perceived and that is why we cannot demonstrate His existence. If we take a sensual
* Статья подготовлена при поддержке гранта РГНФ № 11-03-0033.
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perception (laukika pratyaksha) or even a supersensual perception (alaukika, or yogika
pratyaksha), we can see that no one of these two types of perception can overcome
the sensual borders and, consequently, become a base of proving that Personal God
exists. The same principle can be applied to anumana, or logical syllogism. “A man,
who doesn’t know what the fire is, how can he say that the smoke is its attribute?”
(the argument of Mimansa). And the same principle is applied to shabda, or the Sacred
Books. To summarize Mimansa arguments we can say that, according Mimansa, the idea
of Brahman is surplus or it is not necessary.
The Nyaya argumentation defends the opposite point of view. The main argument
of Nyaya is that the world is a result of God’s creation. That is why we can conclude,
says a nayayika, that the Creator exists, because we can see His creature, like all human
handmade work proves human existence. But to this argument a mimansaka notices
in a very right manner that Personal God is Omniscient and Omnipotent and that He has
no desire, nor necessity to create anything because He is Perfect Being. And here, says
a mimansaka, a question arises, why this God creates the world, for what reason? He
cannot do it because of His love to human beings: we see that this world is imperfect
and that human souls are suffering in it. A nayayika tries to refute this argument and
he begins to do it, but the text of “Ishvarasiddhi” is cut on this idea. Thus we haven’t
the lost siddhanta of Yamuna (his point of view) and the end of the purvapaksha. This
great loss or defect of “Ishvarasiddhi” became a reason why many scholars, for example,
S. Dasgupta or W. Neevel, confirmed that Yamunacarya had followed a Nyaya method,
trying to prove that existence of Personal God is a subject of anumana (or logical syllogism). But other scholars radically insist that it is a great mistake or absolute misunderstanding of Yamuna’s philosophical position on this point.
In this case we should mention the introduction to “Siddhitraya”, written by the
Indian scholar Ramanujachari, who radically insists on the idea that Yamunacarya
confirmed that God could be got to know only on the base of the Sacred Books or shruti,
and that no anumana, nor pratyaksha could be useful in His being got to know. The same
confirmation we can find in Mesquita’s investigation of Yamunacarya’s works. In other
words it means that the saved passage of “Ishvarasiddhi” doesn’t include Yamunacarya’s point of view. As a corroboration to this idea we can remember Ramanuja’s
“Shribhashya”, where the philosopher reproduces the basic ideas of Yamunacarya and
where he says that God could be known only by the base of the Sacred Books. The Sacred Books (such as Upanishads, Bhagavadgita etc) say that the Supreme Reality is
a multitude of all good qualities. In other words it means that we can describe Brahman
only positively or by enumerating His good qualities, and negatively or by denial any
imperfections in His nature. But in this case we can see the ontological abyss or precipice between the Perfect God and the imperfect world. This ontological abyss cannot be explained: it should be overcome by faith that the Sacred Books are true. Ramanuja refutes Mimansa’s argument that Brahman could create the world by the following
argument. Ramanuja says that the motive or reason of creation could be two types: 1) for
one’s sake; 2) for the good of the others. Both of these motives are impossible for God,
Ramanuja says. Consequently, the only motive, why God creates the world is a lila
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Pskhu R.V. Historic-philosophical method as a way of interpreting a concept of Brahman...
(a play). It means that God creates the world as a child plays his play. The specific
feature of Ramanuja’s philosophy is that Brahman is the center of all his worldview,
of his doctrines (be they ontological, or gnoseological or soteriological). We can understand Vishishta-advaita system only in prism of the notion of Brahman. And the
main definition of Ramanuja, by means of which he describes the nature of Brahman,
is that Brahman is free from any imperfections. He is absolutely good and perfect. It’s
very important that Ramanuja always emphasizes the highest position of Brahman,
His exclusiveness and uniqueness. And that God has a personality: He is Purushottama, who rules everything in this world, the Inner Ruler (antaryamin) of all creatures.
Ramanuja named Him Vishnu, some places Shiva or Indra. He says that even jiva or
individual soul could be named as Brahman, because jiva is a part of Brahman, the
last forms an essence of jiva, rules from inner his body. According Ramanuja, Vishnu-Narayana is efficient and material cause of the world. Above all of this Brahman
has plenty of perfect good attributes which are necessary to be known for adequate
understanding of Brahman. Here we should mention that Ramanuja in his description
of svarupa or true nature of Brahman depends on Vishnu tradition (Pancaratra texts).
The final definition of Brahman, according Ramanuja, is that Brahman is the Highest
“ego”, “aham”, the main attribute of which is knowledge and bless. And a man, who
knows Brahman or His true nature acquires all His attributes. In other words ne becomes identical with or like Brahman.
In any way Ramanuja saved in different names he uses to denote Brahman (Vishnu,
Paratattva, Narayana, Sat, Paramatma etc.) His exclusive High Perfectness, and thus
tries to widen or enlarge human experience, or to pull out, to ennoble a human nature,
to make it closer to Brahman’s nature. That’s why we cannot be saved from sansara’s
sufferings without help of the Personal God, or personal understanding of true nature
(svarupa) of Brahman. This is main conclusion of Ramanuja which explicates very
well the sense of the lost passages of Yamunacarya’s “Ishvarasiddhi”.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Dasgupta S. History of Indian Philosophy. Delhi, v. III, 1975.
[2] Pskhu R. Philosophical texts of Yamunacarya: treatise “Atmasiddhi” // Bulletin of the
Peoples’ Friendship university of Russia, Series Philosophy, № 3, 2012, Moscow, p. 172—180
(Псху Р.В. Философские тексты Ямуначарьи: трактат «Атмасиддхи» // Вестник РУДН.
Серия «Философия». — № 3. — 2012. — С. 172—180.)
[3] Pskhu R.V. Philosophical texts of Yamunacarya: basic ideas of “Samvidsiddhi” // ASIATICA.
Works on Oriental Philosophy and Culture. Saint Petersburg, 2012, p. 107—118 (Псху Р.В.
Философские тексты Ямуначарьи: Основные идеи «Самвидсиддхи» // ASIATICA. Труды
по философии и культуре Востока. — СПб., 2012. — С. 107—118.)
[4] Ramanuja. Vedarthasamgraha // Pskhu R.V. Ramanuja’s “Vedarthasamgraha” and Becoming
of Vishishta-advaita-vedanta. Moscow, 2007. (Рамануджа, Ведартхасамграха // Псху Р.В.
«Ведартхасамграха» Рамануджи и становление вишишта-адвайта-веданты. — М.,
2007.)
[5] Ramanuja. Sharanagatigadya // Pskhu R.V. Religious and Philosophical doctrine of Yamunacarya. Moscow, 2012. (Рамануджа. Шаранагатигадья // Псху Р.В. Религиозно-философское
учение Ямуначарьи. — М., 2012.)
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[6] Sri Yamunacarya’s Siddhi Traya with Sanskrit Commentary (Goodha Prakasa). Madras,
1972.
[7] Walter G., Neevel, Jr. Yamuna’s Vedanta and Pancaratra: Integrating the Classical and the
Popular. Montana, 1977.
ИСТОРИКО=ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ МЕТОД
ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ КОНЦЕПЦИИ БРАХМАНА
В РАННЕЙ ВИШИШТА=АДВАЙТА=ВЕДАНТЕ
Р.В. Псху
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 10/2, Москва, Россия, 117198
Статья посвящена проблеме исследования представлений Ямуначарьи о природе Брахмана,
а также выдвигаемых им доказательств существования Личного Бога на базе трактата «Ишварасиддхи» Ямуначарьи, основная часть которого не дошла до наших дней.
Ключевые слова: Ямуначарья, Брахман, ньяя, Рамануджа, Ишвара, анумана, шабда, «Ишварасиддхи».
THE CONCEPT OF PUGDALA
IN THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL OF PUDGALAVĀDA:
THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTION
L.I. Titlin
Department for Oriental Philosophy Studies
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Volkhonka, 14/1, build. 5, Moscow, Russia, 119991
The article investigates the notion of the self in Pudgalavādа — one of the least studied schools of
Buddhism. The Pudgalavāda is an “unorthodox” trend of early Buddhism, which holds the doctrine of the
existence of the self, or person — pudgala. The author examines the history of the formation of the Pudgalavāda, makes an overview of available literature on the topic and analyzes the concept of the self in the
key texts of this philosophical trend, analyzes in detail the philosophical arguments of debating parties —
classical Buddhism and Pudgalavāda Buddhism. The author comes to the conclusion that the apparent contradictions in the interpretation of pudgala can be explained by the consistent and logical evolution in the understanding of the concept of pudgala in the school of Pudgalavāda. The article will be of interest to researchers in the fields of history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and to scholars investigating the problem of the self.
Key words: Buddhism, Pudgalavāda, self, person, pudgala, soul, ātman, anātman.
The problem of existence of the self and the problem of its properties seems to be
one of the most important for the whole Indian philosophy. The largest contribution to
the development of this problem was made by the controversy between the Buddhists
and the Brahmanists. The catalyst for these discussions was the emergence of the
Buddhist doctrine of the “non- self” (anātmavāda).
In the debate on the self in Buddhism the school of Pudgalavāda (Pali Puggalavāda)
comes forth. In contrast to most of the Buddhists it advocated the teaching of the existence of the self (“pudgala”).
The doctrine of anātman, as presented in the Pali Canon (hereinafter — the PC),
was not entirely clear because of its lack of rationalization and hence necessarily required some sort of philosophical and exegetical interpretation. The main “intraBuddhist” problem in the doctrine of anātman was that the Buddha nowhere in the PC directly denied the existence of the ātman, but also nowhere did he openly claim it.
Moreover, in many discourses he refused to directly answer this important philosophical
and religious question, relating it to the category of avyākṛta (Pali avyākata — lit.
“indeterminate” questions, to which it is impossible to give any answer). The followers
of the Buddha, who tried to somehow rationalize Master’s words, were to solve in a philosophical way the problem deliberately excluded by him from the discourse. In addition,
the doctrine of anātman as such was fraught with considerable difficulties and inevitably caused heated controversy by other philosophical schools.
Thus the concept of the existence of pudgala, i.e. the self with a specific ontological status, was designed, on the one hand, to rationalize the philosophical teachings
of the Buddha and to explain the dark places of anātmavāda for the Buddhists them105
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
selves, and on the other — to answer to the criticism of the Brahmanists and to give a
rational explanation of the phenomena of rebirth and karmic retribution given the actual exclusion of the subject of these phenomena from the ontological and epistemological system of early Buddhism.
Although Pudgalavāda continues to be regarded as a “heretical” trend in Buddhism,
the followers of this school considered themselves to be loyal to the ideas of the
Buddha. They believed that their treatment of the self allows to protect the Buddhist
teaching against many absurdities which arise, in their opinion, from a mere denial of
ātman as a reality.
However, Pudgalavāda, which offered an alternative to the traditional interpretation
of anātmavāda, still remains one of the “dark spots” among the variety of the Buddhist schools for the most part of Russian and foreign scholars. This happens, on the
one hand, because the original Sanskrit texts of the Pudgalavādins didn’t remain (being
now available only in a small number of Chinese translations), and on the other because
the concept of the self as proposed by the Pudgalavādins, proved to be itself quite
complicated and difficult to expound. Due to these facts, in various texts we have seemingly contradictory accounts of the concept of the self in Pudgalavāda. As a result this
notion appears to be extremely hard for interpretation. This article makes an attempt to
explain the above mentioned apparent contradictions and to give more or less adequate interpretation of the concept pudgala in Pudgalavāda Buddhism.
In Russian there are no works devoted entirely to Pudgalavāda, the texts of the
school still remain untranslated. Among the foreign works we know of only one monograph of Canadian scholar L. Priestley “Pudgalavāda Buddhism. The Reality of the
Indeterminate Self” [8] (main ideas of which are summarized in his article in the “Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” [9]). The classic edition on early schools of Buddhism
is A. Bareau “Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule” [2]. It is possible to find in it information on all the schools of Pudgalavāda Buddhism, including their basic theoretical
guidelines. The monograph of bhikshu Thich Thien Chau “The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism” [10] contains the most complete account of the history of
the Pudgalavādins and their ideas.
A. Bareau [2], (1) considers that Pudgalavāda emerged from a split among the
Sthaviravādins (the future Theravādins), which occurred c. 280 BC during the reign
of King Bindusāra Maurya. The first school of Pudgalavāda trend was Vātsīputrīya
(Pali Vajjiputtaka), from which in the period from about the 3rd century BC and up to
the 3rd century AD four schools separated (listed in order of their appearance):
Dharmottarīya and Bhadrayānīya — both appeared about three centuries after the
Buddha's Parinirvana, Sāṃmatīyā — emerged in the period from approximately the
2nd century BC to the 1st century AD, and Ṣaṇṇāgārika — the latest school of Pudgalavāda, emerged c. the 3rd century AD. Thus Pudgalavāda consists of five schools of
early Buddhism in total. The gradual split of the Pudgalavādins was caused mainly by
disagreement on some theoretical questions of Buddhist doctrine and philosophy (such
as, for example, the problem of the nature of Arhat).
C. the 7th century this school, nowadays known only to the limited number of
specialists in the history of Buddhism gains tremendous popularity. As early as by the 3rd
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Titlin L.I. The concept of pugdala in the buddhist school of pudgalavāda: the problem...
or 4th centuries Sāṃmatīyā, which was identified by contemporaries with the previously
famous but later disappeared ancient school of Vatsiputriya, known also as VātsīputrīyaSāṃmitīya or Arya-Sāṃmatīyā, becomes the dominant school in one of the largest
Buddhist centers Sarnath, where it even surpasses the popularity of “orthodox” Sarvāstivāda. Since the 7th century it turns into the most popular and in fact the only one
school of Pudgalavāda Buddhism. At this time Sāṃmatīyā is a set of two schools separated, most likely, mostly by geography: Kurukula and Avantaka.
The famous Chinese monk and traveler Xuánzàng (602—644/664) reports that at
the time of his stay in India (c. 630—645) Sāṃmatīyā community had more than 60
thousand monks, being the most numerous of the Buddhist communities [3. P. 117.].
The school also enjoyed the sympathy of the royal power: chronicles say that even the
sister of King Harṣavardhana (606—646) joined the Pudgalavādin sangha as a nun.
Despite its popularity, unlike Theravāda and Mahāyāna, Pudgalavāda still didn’t
manage to spread beyond the Indian subcontinent (although some interest in the school
was in China — this is evident because Pudgalavādin treatises preserved only in Chinese
translation). Therefore, c. 11th century due to the Muslim conquest and expulsion of
Indian Buddhism into the neighboring regions Pudgalavāda completely ceases to exist.
Thus, other schools of Buddhism turned out to be “historic winners”. Nowadays they
have the status of “orthodox” and regard Pudgalavādin current as “heretical”.
Due to the mentioned historical reasons very few textual sources of this school
are available to us. We have only four writings, preserved only in Chinese translation:
the “Vinaya-dvāviṃśati-vidyā-śāstra” (in Chinese “Lu erh-shih-erh ming-liao lun”), a
treatise with a Chinese name “Ssu-a-han-mu ch'ao chieh”, the “Sāṃmitīya-nikāyaśāstra” (hereinafter — the SNSH) and the “Tridharmaka-śāstra” (2).
Apart from the mentioned treatises, the most important source of our knowledge
of Pudgalavāda is the criticism of its views preserved in the writings of the philosophers of other Buddhist schools. Among them we should mention the “Kathāvatthu”
(2nd century AD), “Satyasiddhi-śāstra” of Harivarman (3rd century AD), “Vijñānakāya”
of Devasharman (2nd century AD.), “Mahāyāna-sūtra-laṃkāra” of Asanga (5th century AD), “Tattva-saṃgraha” of Shantarakshita, or the compendium of the teachings
of all schools (8th century AD), “Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti” of Bhavaviveka, “Bodhicaryāvatāra” of Shantideva (8th century AD.). The most important sources for the
formation of various Buddhist schools and their views also include works of Vasumitra,
Bhavya and Vinitadeva (3). The teaching of the Pudgalavādins also was subject to severe
criticism by famous philosophers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu and Chandrakirti.
From all sources regarding the Pudgalavādins the oldest and one of the most important is the “Kathāvatthu” (c. 2nd century AD), or “The Topics for Discussion”, part of
the Abhidhamma-Pitaka of the PC. The “Kathāvatthu” reflected numerous discussions
which took place between various Buddhist schools during the 3rd Buddhist Council
at Pāṭaliputra under Emperor Ashoka (reigned from 268 to 232 BC). It should be noted
that the text is written by “orthodox” Buddhists, supposedly the Theravādins, so it may
significantly distort the original teaching of Pudgalavāda.
Consider a small excerpt from the debate on pudgala from the “Kathāvatthu”:
“Controverted Point. — That “the person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
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[§ 1] Theravādin. — Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin. — Yes.
Th. — Is the person known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. Acknowledge your refutation: (i.) If the person be known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the
same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known].
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, but (2) we ought not to say,
the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known].
(iii.) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement
(1) should not be admitted.
(iv.) In affirming the former statement (1), while (v.) denying the latter (2), you are
wrong” [7. P. 8—9.].
The essence of the debate is as follows. From the point of view of classical early
Buddhism ontology (Sthaviravāda, Sarvāstivāda etc.) only 75 dharmas, or elements of
psycho-physical flow of existence. The Pudgalavādins argue, that the self, or pudgala is
known, or “perceived” (upalabbhati) as “real and ultimate” (saccikaṭṭha-paramatthenā),
but refuse to admit that it actually is “real and ultimate”.
Indeed, the introduction of pudgala, which was not recognized (but at the same
time was not denied) by the Buddha as the 76th dharma would have been a flagrant
violation of the tradition, which would have been regarded not even as a “heresy”,
a “false view”, but also as a denial of anātmavāda, the cornerstone of Buddhist teaching.
This could lead to an automatic exclusion of the Pudgalavādins from the number of
the Buddhists. Also the position of the Pudgalavādins seems for the Theravādins to be
internally inconsistent. They argue that if pudgala is known, or “perceived” as “real
and ultimate” (1), it must be in fact “real and ultimate” (2). It only remains to add that
from the statement (2) inevitably follows that pudgala is a dharma (3).
It is obvious that the Theravādins and the Pudgalavādins use different ontological
systems of reasoning. The Pudgalavādins believe that there is a category of things (namely, pudgala), which, on the one hand, is known as “real and ultimate”, but on the other
is not a dharma. But as far as they realize that frank assignment of pudgala to the domain
of “real and ultimate” — will make it a dharma from the Theravādins point of view, they
are forced to deny that it is “real and ultimate”. In the case of classical Theravāda
Buddhism we are dealing with a two-part ontology (the “real and ultimate” dharmas
and all other objects, which are conventionally real). Pudgalavāda, on its part, offers
a completely new three-part ontology: the “real and ultimate” level, conventionally
real and the third — pudgala, which is known as “real and ultimate”, but at the same
time is not a dharma. Perhaps here we are dealing with the treatment of pudgala as
a so-called “unspeakable” (avaktavya), the thing which is neither absolutely real nor
conventionally real and constitutes therefore a separate ontological level.
The most important treatise of the Pugdalavādins themselves is the “Sāṃmitīyanikāya-śāstra” (the Sanskrit name is a reconstructed one, the Chinese name is “San108
Titlin L.I. The concept of pugdala in the buddhist school of pudgalavāda: the problem...
mi-ti pu lun”, c. 350 AD). This is the only text of the Sāṃmatīyā school that has survived till our time. Like the rest of the Pugdalavādin treatises it has preserved only in
Chinese translation.
The treatise offers a fundamentally new approach to the notion of the self (pudgala), which is not found in the texts of the other Buddhist schools (4).
Sāṃmatīyās argue that pudgala can be perceived (prajñapta-pudgala) on the
three different grounds.
1. Pudgala which is perceived in relation to its location (āśraya-prajñaptapudgala). By this they mean that pudgala is perceived as a self based on a particular
set of aggregates, which is present in this birth. The treatise clearly states that pudgala
is a concept: «Although the self exists, it is conceptual; the self is not substantial»
(TI649, 464b6). However, the text notes that pudgala is not identical with aggregates,
although not different from them.
2. Pudgala which is apprehended in relation to transmigration (saṅkrama-prajñaptapudgala). The self is one who was someone in a past life and will be someone else in the
future. Pudgala is understood in the perspective of rebirth. It is in this sense, according
to the Pudgalavādins, the Buddha said that in the past life he was that person or other.
3. Pudgala which is perceived in relation to cessation (nirodha-prajñapta-pudgala).
By this they mean the self which before the complete cessation (nirodha), i.e. before
Nirvana, had such and such skandhas. Here pudgala is regarded from the point of
non-existence of the previously existed aggregates (skandhas). From the point of view
of the Pudgalavādins even in the state of Parinirvana when skandhas disappear and it
is impossible to point to a specific denotation of the word “self” it is still wrong to
say that pudgala doesn't exist.
Another text which is very interesting in case of the debate on the notion of the
self between the Pudgalavādins and the “orthodox” Buddhists is the “Pudgalaviniścaya”
(“The Investigation of the Self”, hereinafter the PV) of Vasubandhu (c. 4th cent.).
Here is a quite representative passage from the first part of the PV.
“...Nonetheless, the Vātsīputrīyas hold that there is a person.
Now, this must be examined: do they hold it to be substantial, or conceptually
constructed?
What is [meant by] “substantial”, and what [by] “conceptually constructed?”
If, like physical form, etc., it is a discrete entity, then it is substantial. But if like
milk, etc., it is a collectivum, then it is conceptually constructed.
What follows from this?
If it is substantial, then because it is essentially separate, it must be said to be
discrete from the bundles, just as the bundles are one from the other.
...this would imply [that the Vātsīputrīyas hold] a non-Buddhist view...” [6].
On this the Pudgalavādins answer that pudgala “...is neither substantial nor conceptually constructed...” [6. P. 351].
Pudgala is perceived “As is fire, depending upon fuel.
How is it that fire is conceptually constructed depending upon fuel?
Though the fire is not conceptually constructed without fuel, one can neither assert that fire is discrete from fuel, nor that it is non-discrete. For if it were discrete, the
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fuel would be not hot; and if it were not discrete, then the combustible would itself be
the combustion. Just so, though the person is not conceptually constructed in the absence
of the bundles, one cannot assert that it is discrete from the bundles, because that implies
permanence; nor that it is not discrete, for that implies annihilation” [6. P. 351—352].
Thus, in the PV we see a new significant modification of the teaching of the
Pudgalavādins. In this text pudgala appears not as a concept, but at the same time not
as a reality, that is, is neither one nor the other, in other words — it is avaktavya, or
ineffable.
Tracing the history of the teachings of the Pudgalavādins from the early treatises
(the SNSH, the “Kathāvatthu”) until the era of the developed Buddhist philosophy (Vasubandhu), the apparent contradictions in the interpretation of pudgala can be explained
by the consistent and logical evolution in the understanding of the concept of pudgala
in the school of Pudgalavāda. If in the early texts pudgala was understood as a mere
concept, so their teaching was difficult to be separated from the teachings of the “orthodox” Buddhists, then by the 4th century they state more clearly their understanding
of pudgala as, on the one hand, not just a mere designation, and on the other — not as
a separately existing dharma. So happens the assertion of hitherto unprecedented
teaching of a new type of ineffable realities — avaktavya, or avacya.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Here and after we follow the reconstruction of historical events and dating made by Dutt and
Bareau: Dutt, Nalinaksha. Buddhist Sects in India. D.: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998.
(2) For the exposition of the four treatises see: Thich Thien Chau, Bhikshu. The Literature of the
Personalists of Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
(3) See: Bareau, André. “Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya
et Vinītadeva.” I partie: Journal Asiatique, 242. Paris, 1954, P. 229—66; II partie: Journal
Asiatique, 244. Paris, 1956, P. 167—200.
(4) In the presentation of the main ideas of the SNSH we use mostly the exposition made by
R. Buswell: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100
to 350 A.D. Ed. by K.H. Potter. D.: Motilal Barnasidass, 1999. P. 353—365. English translation
of the Sāmmitīyanikāyashāstra: Venkataramanan, K. “Sāmmitīyanikāya Sāstra.” Visva-Bharati
Annals, 5 (1953), 155—243.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Bareau, André. “Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et
Vinītadeva.” I partie: Journal Asiatique, 242. Paris, 1954, P. 229—66; II partie: Journal Asiatique,
244. Paris, 1956, P. 167—200.
[2] Bareau, André. Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule. Paris: École française d'ExtrêmeOrient, 1973.
[3] Bareau, André. The Buddhist Sects of the Lesser Vehicle. Translated from the French by Gelongma Migme Chodron, 2005. URL: http://www.gampoabbey.org/translations2/animigme/Bareau-Sectes-Bouddhiques%20.pdf
[4] Dutt, Nalinaksha. Buddhist Sects in India. D.: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998.
[5] Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D.
Ed. by K.H. Potter. D.: Motilal Barnasidass, 1999.
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[6] Kapstein M. Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist
Thought. — Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001.
[7] Points of Controversy, or, Subjects of discourse: Being a Translation of the Kathāvatthu from
the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka. by Aung, Shwe Zan and Rhys Davids, C.A.F. — L.: Pali Text Society,
1915. P. 8—9.
[8] Priestley, Leonard. Pudgalavāda Buddhism: The Reality of the Indeterminate Self. Toronto:
Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto, 1999.
[9] Priestley, Leonard. Pudgalavāda Buddhist Philosophy / The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ISSN 2161-0002. — URL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/pudgalav/#H7
[10] Thich Thien Chau, Bhikshu. The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
[11] Venkataramanan, K. “Sāmmitīyanikāya Sāstra”. Visva-Bharati Annals, 5 (1953).
ПОНЯТИЕ ПУДГАЛЫ
В БУДДИЙСКОЙ ШКОЛЕ ПУДГАЛАВАДА:
ПРОБЛЕМА ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ И ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ КОНЦЕПТА
Л.И. Титлин
Институт философии РАН
Сектор восточных философий
ул. Волхонка, 14/1, стр. 5, Москва, Россия, 119991
В статье исследуется понятие субъекта в пудгалаваде — одной из наименее изученных школ
буддизма. Пудгалавада является «неортодоксальной» школой раннего буддизма, которая придерживается учения о существовании субъекта, или «пудгалы». Автор рассматривает историю формирования пудгалавады, дает обзор имеющейся литературы по данной теме и анализирует концепцию
субъекта по ключевым текстам этого философского течения, подробно анализирует философские
аргументы обеих сторон — «классического» буддизма и буддизма пудгалавадинского. Автор приходит к выводу, что кажущиеся противоречия в интерпретации пудгалы можно объяснить последовательной и логичной эволюцией в понимании концепта пудгалы в школе пудгалавада. Статья может
представлять интерес для исследователей в области истории философии, философии сознания, когнитивной психологии и для ученых, изучающих проблему «я» и субъекта.
Ключевые слова: буддизм, пудгалавада, я, человек, пудгала душа, атман, анатман.
THE SELF/OTHER CONCEPTUAL BINARY
IN THE PERSIAN LINGUA=CULTURAL AREA
O.V. Mazepova
Department of Middle Eastern Studies
Institute of Philology
Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University
Taras Shevchenko blvd., 14, Kyiv, Ukraine, 01033
In the article the particularities of lingual representation of the SELF / OTHER binary in the Persian
lingua-cultural area on the basis of the Persian phraseological fund are researched and interpreted within
the terms of cultural codes.
Key words: lingua-cultural area, cultural code, lingual consciousness, lingual representation, idiom.
The anthropocentric nature of contemporary linguistics caused by increasing attention towards human status and communication problems between man and the
world, man and other people, provokes interest from linguists towards the conceptual
binary oppositions inherent in consciousness of representatives of many lingua-cultures,
and the means of their expression. One of these oppositions is “self / other” which is
based on axiological antithesis existed in the perception of primitive man, who regarded
something of his/her own as something positive, safe, and well known on the contrary to
something of another treated as something negative, unknown, and dangerous [1. P. 197].
The significance of this opposition for every lingua-cultural group can hardly be
overestimated as it substantially influences both individual behavior of a single representative of the group, and political and economic life of whole nation, as well as international relations. One may assume, however, that in each lingua-culture this opposition
demonstrates a set of specific conceptual features of both universal and ethnical nature,
which could be determined when analyzing appropriate language material. It is convenient to structure received information through interpreting them by cultural codes, as
we did it on the material of the Persian language within the scope of this research.
The goal of this study is to determine some specific cognitive features of “self /
other” binary intrinsic in Persian lingual consciousness and objectified in phraseological
thesaurus of the Persian language. It is widely known that phraseology — the most
stand-out than any other part of language system — expresses specific features of national ways of thinking, the perception of the world, its categorization and conceptualization.
The “self / other” opposition — together with other oppositions such as “up / down”,
“far / near”, “good / bad”, “right / left”, etc. — are basic cultural oppositions derived from
ancient archetypical concepts. V. Krasnykh believes that these concepts match the so
called “cultural codes”, which “encrypt” them and establish certain “coordinate scale”
determining cultural benchmarks. Thus, cultural code is a macrosystem of characteristics
of objects of the world that are joined by some common categorical feature. This is a sort
of conceptual “grid”, which the culture applies to the surrounding world, and, an individual representing this culture makes use of it to fragment, categorize, structure,
and evaluate both outer and inner worlds of him [2. P. 297—298; 3. P. 125].
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Mazepova O.V. The self/other conceptual binary in the persian lingua-cultural area
Researchers today distinguish a great deal of various cultural codes, viz.: botanic,
zoomorphic, perceptive, anthropomorphic, somatic, itemed, nutritional, color, dimensional, spatial, time, evaluative, theomorphic (religious), etc. [3. P. 127—128]. Of them,
V. Krasnykh regards as basic codes the following ones: somatic, spatial, time, itemed,
biomorphic, and spiritual [2. P. 297]. In the result of analyzing selected language material
it appeared that “self / other” binary in the Persian thesaurus of idioms can be mostly
represented through five cultural codes, namely: somatic, zoomorphic, spatial, anthropic,
and religious. Also, there were registered idioms containing the signs of itemed code,
however, because of insufficient presence they were omitted. Besides, a phenomenon
was detected when several codes coexist within the same idiom, which makes attribution
of this idiom to a certain group rather complex.
In the human mind the “self / other” binary is linked with the category of possession,
which has wide range of subdued objects and in most languages is realized with the use
of structures containing possessive pronouns, or other means expressing appropriate
relations. In Persian the idea of belonging to the speaker is expressed by structures
with personal pronouns, possessive enclitics and reflective pronouns xod, xiš (self),
while belonging to another person is expressed by ezafe construction with identified
pronoun kas-i (somebody), words digar(ān) another/others, mardom people, etc.
Within the frameworks of this study we shall concentrate mostly on the idioms
where “self / other” relationships are expressed using names of parts of human body (somatism) or animals (meronyms), i.e. by the signs of somatic and zoomorphic cultural
codes. Other codes will be used to illustrate how they can overlap with those two
mentioned above in the same idiom.
Somatic cultural code is supposed to be most ancient among others, because a primitive man presumably started realizing the world around him from himself, and then
applied obtained knowledge to the rest of the environs [2. P. 297]. The biggest role in realizing this opposition is played by Persian somatic indices pa foot, post back, dast
hand, gardan neck.
Within the group of Persian idioms with somatic index pā foot and appropriate
possessor (somebody’s foot) a series of etic ideas was detected. In particular, obtaining
independence by a person, striving towards self-reliance, confident standing on own
(two) feet, e.g. pā-ye xod-rā mohkam kardan. to consolidate one’s position (lit. strengthen own legs) — is regarded by speakers positively. On the other hand, attempts to
intrude into business of another person are considered negatively: pā az hadd-e
(xatt-e, andāze-ye) xod birun nehādan. (lit. put legs beyond one’s boundary (line,
size); pā az gelim-e xod derāztar kardan (birun nehādan) (lit. stretch legs beyond
one’s the carpet) [4. P. 86] One may note that two latter idioms also comprise the idea
of spatial code: in the first saying “one’s own” space is “encrypted” by the words hadd
boundary, xatt line, andāze size; in the second one it is limited by size of the carpet.
Also, one’s attempt to involve other people into dishonest affairs is regarded negatively, e.g. pā-ye kas-i-rā be miyān kešidan to involve somebody into something (lit.
to pull one’s leg inside something) [4. P. 90]. The idea of non-interference in others’
business can also be interpreted by employing elements of itemed code, viz.: the word
kafš shoes: pā-ye xod-rā az kafš-e man birun kon! Stay away! Leave me alone! (lit.
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Get your foot out of my shoe!) [4. P. 86]. The Russians and the Ukrainians feel same
negatively about interference into their private business, but to express this idea they
use a somatic idiom with nose (lit. stick one’s nose into another’s business). The same
idea is fixed in the Persian idiom with the word angošt finger: angošt be šir-e kas-i
zadan (lit. to put the finger to one’s milk) [4. P. 49].
Several idioms with the word pa foot are used to express to another person one’s
admiration and respect: be pā-ye kas-i narasidan to be not good enough for somebody
(lit. not to reach one’s foot) [4. P. 92], pā-ye kas-i nešastan to seek somebody’s respect
(lit. to sit at somebody’s feet), pā-ye kas-i istādan to support somebody (lit. to stand
at somebody’s feet) [4. P. 90]
The word of pošt back in the Persian lingual consciousness is attributed to the
help from another person, who is regarded as “one’s own”: pošt-aš garm-ast he relies
on somebody’s supporting (lit. his back is warm); pošt-e kas-i-rā dāštan to protect
somebody (lit. to have one’s back); pošt-aš be šāh kuh (be kuh) ast he has strong support (lit. his back leans on a (big) mountain); na pošt dārad na mošt he has neither
support, nor fists (lit. he has neither back, nor fists) [4. P. 107—108].
The idea of support and assistance from “one’s own” people is normally expressed
by numerous idioms with the word dast hand (sometimes in combination with sar head,
pošt back, ru face): dast dāštan to have support (lit. to have a hand); dast-e yāri
derāz kardan to give a helping hand (lit. to stretch a hand of assistance); dast pošt-e
sar dāštan to have support, to be protected (lit. to have a hand under the head); dast-aš
be pošt-aš nemirasad he can do nothing by himself (lit. his hand cannot reach his
back) [5. P. 632—633]. To render assistance to “one’s own” person one should “touch
him/her, his/her head or face”: dast bar sar-o ru-ye kas-i kešidan (lit. to stroke
one’s head or face with hand) [4. P. 241] dast ru-ye kas-i gozāštan (lit. to put a hand
upon somebody) [4. P. 257]. One can “ask somebody for help” making use of itemed
code element — flap of clothing, e.g. dast be dāman-e kasi zadan (lit. catch / grab
someone’s clothing flap); dast-am be dāman-at! Help me! Protect me! (lit. my hand
is at your clothing flap) [4. P. 242].
Through somatic idioms comprising the word dast hand the Persians conceptualize negative aspects of interaction between themselves and others as well. In this
case one can often face overlapping of several cultural codes within the same idiom.
Thus, in Persian equivalent of English idiom “to reap the fruit of someone else's labor”
or Ukrainian “to catch oven heat by someone else’s hands” — be dast-e digar-i
(digarān) mār gereftan (lit. to grab a snake by someone’s hand) [5. P. 633] — somatic
code coincides with zoomorphic code. Persian version of “be all things to all men” —
dast-aš be arab-o ajam band šode — (lit. his hand is bound to both the Arab and
non-Arab) [4. P. 258] makes use of anthropic code and refers to the time of the Arab invasion. It is based on the cultural and ideological opposition of the Arabs (arab) and
non-arabs (ajam), the word most frequently applicable to the Persians.
The Persians are quite negative about intruding into personal space by “others”,
which is demonstrated in the following idioms: dast tu āstin-e kas-i zadan to spread
rumors (lit. stick the hand into someone’s sleeve) [6. P. 207]; dast derāz kardan be
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Mazepova O.V. The self/other conceptual binary in the persian lingua-cultural area
kas-i, čiz-i to encroach upon something/somebody (lit. to stretch arms towards something/somebody) [4. P. 257]; dast az sar-e (kačal-e) kas-i bar-nadāštan (lit. keep one’s
hand on someone’s bold head); dast az yaqe-ye kas-i bar nadāštan (lit. keep one’s hand
on somebody’s collar) — to annoy someone [4. P. 253].
The Ukrainians when taking some obligations, “burden” them upon their shoulders.
The Persians take them upon their neck (gardan): be gardan gereftan to take upon
oneself (lit. take on the neck); haqq be gardan-am dārid I owe you very much (lit. You
have a debt on my neck); bār-e gardan kas-i šodan to impose oneself (lit. to become
a burden on one’s neck) [4. P. 59]. One can also put a responsibility on other’s neck,
as it is mentioned in Moulavi’s famous saying:
.‫ سعی می کند افتخار فتح را نصيب خود کند و رسوائی شکست را به گردن ديگران بيندازد‬...‫ھر کس‬
Everyone tries to acquire pride of victory, and leave shame of fault to others (lit.
...to put on others’ neck) [4. P. 414].
The distinctive feature of involvement of zoomorphic code when conceptualizing
“self / other” binary is usage of names of animal’s body parts (meronyms) as signs of donor field rather than the names of animals themselves. Thus, meronym bāl wing is
used for expressing the idea of rendering support to someone — which is common
in many lingua-cultures: bāl be bāl-e kas-i dādan support someone (lit. put one’s wing
under the wing of another); zir-e bāl (par-o bāl) gereftan take care about someone
(lit. take someone under one’s wing) [4. P. 62]. Nevertheless, one should not abuse
help from other people: be bāl-e digarān parvāz nemitavān kard one cannot fly with
the wings of others [7. P. 130].
It is also remarkable that the word par wing can be used for expressing the idea
of danger while opposing “another”: bepā par-eš nagirad-et! Behold his wrath falling
upon you! (lit. watch his wing not to hit you!); par-aš be par-e folān kas gereft /
par-aš folān kas-ra gereft his anger fell upon someone (lit. his wing hit someone) [4.
P. 102]. When analyzing the inner form of these idioms obviously a picture of birds
fighting in the air appears in mind.
While opposing “non-one’s own” other scenarios derived from the animal world
appear in the Persian lingual consciousness. The elements of these scenarios are demonstrated in the idioms including meronyms such as: dandān teeth, nāxon claws, šāx
horns, dom tail, panje paw with claws; claws, etc. Thus, to “threaten anybody” someone should dandān nešān dādan (namudan) (lit. to show teeth) [4. P. 291] and šāh-o
šāne kešidan barāye kas-i (lit. stretch horns and shoulders) [4. P. 387], which refers
to a pose of an animal staying against a rival. Meronym dandān teeth and nāxon claws
can also be used to express the idea of encroaching on other’s belongings: dandān tiz
kardan barāye (be) čiz-i/ nāxon tiz kardan barāye čiz-i (lit. sharpen teeth / claws
for something) [4. P. 291, 578]. The idiom containing the meronym šāx horn: šāx dar
jib-e kas-i gozāštan (lit. put horns to one’s pocket) means to provoke, to tempt someone
[4: 386], while the idiom with the word dom tail: pā ru-ye dom-e kas-i gozāštan (lit. put
the foot on one’s tail) — means to irritate someone, making someone upset [4. P. 287].
The word panje paw with claws; claws is also mostly being a part of the idioms having
negative semantics: panje tiz kardan to seek a conflict (lit. sharpen claws) [6. P. 387];
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panje be ru-ye kas-i zadan to be rude, impolite (towards aged people) (lit. to pinch
someone’s face with claws) [4. P. 111].
Another meronym from the animal world pust skin in combination with the
words gušt flesh, ostoxān bones, and nāxon claws is used to express the idea of tight
contact and close relationships with “one’s own” people: pušt-o gušt-rā az ham jodā
kardan to separate close people (lit. separate skin from flesh) [4. P. 112]; gušt-rā az
ostoxān nemitavān jodā kard one cannot separate close people (lit. one cannot separate
flesh from bones) [4. P. 517].
Considering the fact that the Persian word pust stands for both skin and leather,
and the word nāxon — for both nails and claws these idioms could be classified as
somatic ones rather than zoomorphic. In the meaning of skin the word pust is used
in Sa’adi’s poem, rather doubtful from the point of view of modern morality:
‫دشمنان را پوست بر کن دوستان را پوستين‬
‫چون فرو مانی بسختی تن بعجز مده‬
When you are in trouble do not be weak: skin your foes and take the fur jacket
off your friends [4. P. 113].
Spatial code, which is linked with fragmenting the space also plays considerable
role in implementing “self / other” binary. Very often it can barely be separated from somatic cultural code because there are numerous anthropomorphic metaphors “providing”
spatial code [2. P. 299]. The following idioms can demonstrate overlapping of spatial
and somatic codes: dam-e dast under the hand, dast-aš nemirasad he is not able to do
(it) (lit. his hand cannot reach it) [4. P. 113], tā češm kār mikonad as far as eye can see
(lit. till eye works) [5. P. 113]. Beside that we have already seen how these two codes
are bound in the somatic idioms mentioned above: pā az hadd-e (xatt-e, andāze-ye)
xod birun nehādan (lit. stretch legs beyond one’s limit (line, size); pā az gelim-e
xod derāztar kardan (birun nehādan) (lit. stretch legs beyond one’s carpet). The general attitude of the Persians towards “their own and non-own space” can be found in the
following proverb: har kas bāyad ru-ye marz-e xod rāh beravad Everybody shall keep
walking alongside own boundary [4. P. 553]. Thus, the main idea which could be extracted from spatial idioms is as follows: a man should know his own place in this
world, keep his own territory and should not trespass the reasonable limits.
Among Persian proverbs one can find those which depict very special attitude of
the Persians to their home, town, country, e.g. hič jā behtar az xāne-ye xod-e ādam
nemišavad There is no place like home [8. P. 60], be šahr-e xiš har kas šahriyār-ast
Everyone (feels) prince in his home town [7. P. 256] hič jā dar jahān behtar az vatan
nist There is no place in the world better than motherland [8. P. 60]. At the same time
realizing of “one’s own territory” can be done with the signs of zoomorphic code, e.g.
har sag-i dar xāne-ye sāheb-aš šir-ast Every dog (feels) lion in its master’s house
[8. P. 88]; har sag be lāne šir nar ast Every dog in its house (feels) brave as lion
[8. P. 193], kalāq-i sar-e lāne-ye xod qār qār nemikonad A crow does not croak in its
nest [7. P. 256]. In the people’s view once you happen to be among “others” you neither
should look different, nor should you attract attention: rafti be šahr-e kurān didi
hame kur-and to ham kur šow If you come to the town of blinds, and see everybody
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Mazepova O.V. The self/other conceptual binary in the persian lingua-cultural area
there is blind — go become blind [7. P. 212]. To express the same meaning in Ukrainian
the signs of zoomorphic code are used: If you live with wolves howl like wolves do.
Within the group of idioms regarded as anthropic code we can distinguish four
groups of relations of “self / other” type: (1) relations among people in general, (2) relations among neighbors, (3) relations among relatives, (4) relations “friends — foes”.
Since detailed analysis of this — most numerous — group of idioms is beyond the
scope of present article, it would be enough to provide only some notes relating overlapping of several codes within one idiom. Sa’adi determines general rules of behavior
and relations with other people as follows:
‫جای گل گل باش و جای خار خار‬
‫با بدان بد باش با نيکان نيک‬
With evil ones be evil, with good ones be good/ among roses be a rose, among
thorns be a thorn [7. P. 165].
As one can see in these lines biomorphic (or rather plant) code is being used.
The signs of zoomorphic code are used in the idioms with the meaning “close people
always understand each other”: zabān-e morqān morqān midānand (lit. language
of birds only birds can understand) [4. P. 335]; kabutar bā kabutar, bāz bā bāz Pigeon
to pigeon, falcon to falcon. The latter is derived from the following beit by Nizami:
‫کند ھمجنس با ھمجنس پرواز‬
‫ باز با باز‬،‫کبوتر با کبوتر‬
Together can fly only birds of same type: pigeon with pigeon, falcon with falcon
[4. P. 611].
Some aspects of relationships within neighborhood can also be realized through
elements of zoomorphic code. Thus, a neighbor should be respected and in no way be
blamed in vain: pā-ye morq-at-rā beband-o hamsāye-rā dozd makon! (lit. bind legs
of your hen and do not make your neighbor a thief) [4. P. 91]. Property of the neighbor
makes feel jealous: āš-e hamsāye rowqan-e qāz dārad — there is (always) goose fat
in the neighbor’s soup; morq-e hamsāye qāz-ast / morq-e hamsāye be nazar qāz
miāyad — neighbor’s hen looks like goose [4. P. 611; 7. P. 207]. A desire to obtain
some benefits on the neighbor’s account is regarded negatively: mār-e xāne be dast-e
hamsāye gereftan — to grab a snake in the house by neighbor’s hands [7. P. 273].
There were determined several idioms including the signs of zoomorphic code within
the sub-group “relations among relatives”. The idea of own child being the best in the
world is expressed by the idiom referring to the fairytale about Aunty Cockroach: xāle
suske be bačče-aš miguyad: qorbān-e dast-o pā-ye boluri-at Aunty Cockroach tells
her baby: how nice your crystal legs are! [7. P. 184]. A proverb derived from Arabic describes relationships among relatives very negatively: al-aqāreb al-‘aqāreb Relatives
are scorpions [7. P. 248]. Yet, another one in quite straight way declares that relatives
will never let each other down despite any temporary quarrels among them: qoum-o
xiš gušt-e ham boxorand, ostoxān-ešān-rā piš-e sag-e (qaribe) nemiandāzand Relatives even though eat flesh of each other do not throw bones to dogs [7. P. 248].
Thus, we have examined some particularities of “self / other” binary represented
in the Persian phraseology. Received information was interpreted through cultural codes.
While analyzing the linguistic material overlapping of two and more codes within one
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idiom was registered; this made distinguishing idioms by codes more difficult. Within
the frameworks of this article we paid attention mostly to the idioms including the
signs of somatic and zoomorphic codes nevertheless all analyzed material has been
added to the statistics results. In the Picture 1 you can see a chart with ratio of five
cultural codes when conceptualizing “self / other” binary in the Persian phraseology.
One can see that the biggest group is the one comprising idioms with anthropic code
(42.7%). However, if we combine somatic (29.8%) and zoomorphic (14.5%) codes —
considering that zoomorphic code is mostly represented by the names of animal body
parts (meronyms) rather than the names of animals themselves — the share of such
combination would estimate 44.3%, which is bigger than the share of anthropic code.
This, we believe, in the best way demonstrates specific features of representation of
“self / other” binary in the Persian phraseology.
Of course, many questions linked with this conceptual opposition are left beyond
the scope of this study. It would be interesting to examine by what means this opposition
is represented in different types of discourse, in particular, fiction and political ones.
Besides, peculiarities of ethno-nominations demonstrating the attitude of the Persians
towards other nations are also worth studying. These aspects are to be researched in
the future.
Pic. 1. Ratio of Cultural Codes at Lingual Representation of “self / other” binary
in the Persian Phraseology
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Selivanova, O. Oppozitsiya svjy-chuzhiy v etnosvidomosti (na materiali ukrayinskih paremiy). (The Self-Other binary in the ethnic consciousness (based on Ukrainian proverbs)) //
Selivanova O. Svit svidomosti v movi. Mir soznaniya v jazyke. Cherkasy. 2012. P. 196—218.
[2] Krasnykh, V. “Svoy” sredi “chuzhih”: mif ili real’nost’? (At Home among Strangers: Myth
or Reality?). Moscow, 2003.
[3] Pimenova, M., Kondrat’yeva, O. Kontseptual’niye issledovaniya. Vvedeniye. (Conceptual
studies. Introduction). Moscow, 2011.
[4] Goleva, G. Farsi–russkiy frazeologicheskiy slovar’. (Farsi–Russian phraseological dictionary).
Moscow, 2000.
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Mazepova O.V. The self/other conceptual binary in the persian lingua-cultural area
[5] Rubinchik, Yu. Persidsko–russkiy slovar’. V 2 tomah. (Persian–Russian Dictionary, 2 vol.).
Moscow, 1985.
[6] Parchami M. Pas-e kučehā-ye farhangi (biš az 15 hezār kenāye — estelāh va tekyekalām-e
āmyāne-ye šofāhi. (Behind cultural streets (more than 15 thousand idioms and colloquial expressions)). Tehran. 1382 (2003).
[7] Korogly, Kh. Persidskiye poslovitsi, pogovorki i krylatiye slova. (Persian Sayings, Proverbs,
and Idioms). Moscow, 1973.
[8] Okhrimenko, M. Pers’ko–ukrayinskiy slovnyk emotyvnoyi frazeologiyi. (Persian-Ukrainian
Dictionary of Emotional Phraseology). Kiev–Lutsk, 2011.
КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНАЯ ОППОЗИЦИЯ «СВОЙ/ЧУЖОЙ»
В ПЕРСИДСКОМ ЛИНГВОКУЛЬТУРНОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ
Е.В. Мазепова
Кафедра Ближнего Востока
Институт филологии
Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко
бул. Тараса Шевченко, 14, Киев, Украина, 01033
В статье исследованы и проинтерпретированы в терминах кодов культуры особенности языковой репрезентации концептуальной оппозиции «СВОЙ–ЧУЖОЙ» в персидском лингвокультурном
пространстве на материале фразеологического фонда персидского языка.
Ключевые слова: лингвокультурное пространство, код культуры, языковое сознание, языковая репрезентация, фразеологизм.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF AL=QUSHAYRI’S HERITAGE
O.A. Lapitskaya
Department of History of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanitarian and social sciences
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Mikluho-Maklaya str., 10a, Moscow, Russia, 117198
This paper is to name and characterize the most notable works devoted or even just mentioning a famous sufi author of the 11th century al-Qushayri, the author of well-known treatise “Risāla”. Despite of
his significance in the history of Sufism, not much attention he did capture from the European (as well as
the Eastern) researchers of Sufism, and almost all what he was honored by in the modern Orientalism is
his “Epistle on Sufizm”.
Key words: Sufism, al-Qushayri, historiography, Epistle on Sufizm, mysticism, theology, manuscripts.
A historiography research should be a key to any serious historical work in philosophy antedating it, as it gives the most important information for the successful start.
The following article is to throw some light on the most notable works devoted to the
famous sufi scholar of the 11th century, author of the well-known treatise “Ar-risāla fī
‘ilm at-tas}awwuf” (Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufizm) (1), Abu ’l-Qasim al-Qushyri.
This work is not aimed to touch the encyclopedia’s articles mentioning al-Qushayri,
but is to name and characterize papers and monographs devoted (even partly) to this
sufi author and his heritage giving an opportunity to show the measure of investigation
of this theme in the Western Orientalism.
First of all it should be mentioned, that almost all basic historical researches on
Sufism contain general information on al-Qushayri (2). As for the Arabic and Persian
sources touching al-Qushayri’s study and life, among the most significant are the following works: Tāğ ad-Dīn as-Subqi “T}abāqāt aš-šāfi‘iya al-kubra” [22], al-’Asnawi Ğamāl
ad-Din “T}abāqāt aš-šāfi‘iya” [7], ’Abū Bakr al-Bagdādi “Tārīh Baġdād au madīnati-ssalām” [5], Ğāmī Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Abd ar-Rah}mān “Nafāh}āt al-’uns min h}ad}ārāt al-quds”
[16], ‘Alī ’Ibn ’Utmān al-H}uğwiri. “Kašf al-mah}ğūb li ’arbāb al-qulūb” [8], ‘At}ār Farīd
ad-Dīn Nīšābūrī “Tazkiratu-l-’awliyā’” [12].
The only monograph on al-Qushayri was written by Ibrahim Basyuni, named
“’Imām al-Qušyri” containing his biography and the main points of his works and studies
as well as analysis of his sufi way [18]. Another Egypt philologist al-Ğundī provides his
edition of al-Qushayri’s treatise “A Grammar of the Heart” with a significant commentary on this remarkable work and its author’s studies in general [9].
As for the translations of al-Qushayri’s works to the European languages the most
scientific and full translation of his famous “Risāla” was made by the professor of the
University of Michigan A.D. Knysh to English. This work could be characterized as
a highly scientific as it contains, besides the accurate and complete translation, the commentaries of the most hard for understanding sufi terms used by the author as well as
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Lapitskaya O.A. Historiography of al-Qushayri’s heritage
the detailed biographical information on Islamic scholars and thinkers mentioned in the
treatise. The index of proper names, toponyms and concepts contains 32 pages [6.
P. 429—460]. Also this edition includes a short biographic material devoted to alQushayri’s life and scholarship.
Another European researcher R. Hartmann (Germany) also made a significant
contribution to elaboration on this problem. Thus he translated an important part of
“Risāla” in German [17]. This translation contains the parts devoted to the spiritual
“stages”, mystical “conditions” and some other sufi terms. R. Hartmann translated just
the most important, in his opinion, parts of the treatise having provided it with the
great amount of historic and philosophic commentaries. This significant part of his work
represents a deep research of the history and theoretical basis of Sufism.
He divided his translation in several parts which are the following:
— foundation of Sufism;
— sufi practice;
— theory of Islamic mysticism;
— spiritual way;
— sufi psychology.
The treatise “Risāla” also was translated to German by the Swiss orientalist
R. Gramlich who used the copies of the manuscripts of the treatise, what makes his
translation extremely valuable for the later researches [4].
To Persian language this treatise was translated in 1967 by Iranian researcher
Badi az-Zaman Faruzanfar who used in his work earlier translations which he previously
had corrected and systematized.
The great part of “Risāla” also was translated to English by B.R. Von Schliegell
[10]. She devoted much attention to the most important sufi terms — stages and conditions. But this translation doesn’t contain any serious commentary, although includes
some useful information on al-Qushayri’s biography.
Another full translation of the same treatise to English was made by Rabia Harris
and edited by Lateh Baktiar, but this work doesn’t contain either information on numerous personalities mentioned in the text or any commentaries concerning sufi terminology [11]. According to A.D. Knysh this translation is “a free paraphrase of the Arabic
text, which is frequently misconstrued and, consequently, mistranslated” [6].
The following chapters of “Risāla” were translated to Russian by A.D. Knysh:
the moment (waqt), the station (maqām), the state (h}āl), contraction (qabd) and expansion
(bast}), awe (hayba) and intimacy (’uns), ecstatic behavior (tawāğud), ecstatic rapture
(wağd) and ecstatic finding (wuğūd) [1]. The article containing this translation doesn’t
include commentaries although provides detailed biography information on sufies
mentioned in the translated fragments.
Also we should mention here Arabic and Persian authors having made some contribution to elaboration on this problem. Thus Zakariya al-Ansari in the 16th century
commented the treatise in his work named “Ih}kām ad-dalāla ‘ala tah}rīr ar-risāla” (The
Reliable Guide to What the Treatise Contains) which became rather popular so that
another Egypt scholar Mustafa al-‘Arusi wrote in the 19th century a commentary to al121
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Ansari’s commentary and named it “Natā’iğ al-’afkār al-qudsiya fī bayān ma‘ānī šarh}
ar-risāla al-qušairiya” (The Conclusions of Pure Thoughts in the Explanation of the
Meanings in the Commentary to al-Qushayri’s Treatise). A.D. Knysh considers that both
these “critical” editions are “practically identical and do not complete each other” [6].
Also the commentary to “Risāla” was written by sheikh of the Chishti order Abu
al-Fath Bandenavu (died 1422) on Persian in the 15th century.
A Russian orientalist V. Drozdov also has made a notable research on al-Qushayri’s
heritage [2]. His work deserves to be mentioned as far as it represents a significant
accurate and thorough research published in the article «Абу-л-Касим ал-Кушайри
и его трактат о суфизме» (Abu-l-Qasim al-Qushayri and his treatise on Sufism), where
he gives a detailed description of al-Qushayri’s life as well as provides thorough characteristics of the historical situation in the Caliphate of the 11th century together with
the analysis of different Islamic schools and branches that had mostly affected on
shaping of al-Qushayri’s views. The article also pays a particular attention to the historiography research. Thus an author mentions his predecessors which had made some
contribution to this research as well as gives a complete list of al-Qushayri’s works
basing on the results of previous researches. Mostly he uses the materials of the Shafi'i
madhab to which al-Qushayri belonged having been a leader of the Shafi’i-Asharite
community of Nishapur.
“Risāla” became the main object for the PhD research work by Mohammad alMugtaba. His work was named “The Problem of Man in al-Qushayri’s study” [3]. This
PhD defense took place in the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia in the 1994th.
In this work author provides a short biographical material as well as characterizes a social and political situation in the Caliphate. The significant part of the text is devoted
to details of the history of Sufism what slightly distracts from the main theme of the
research. Also this work includes a short analysis of some sufi terms basing on the
“Risāla” although it doesn’t go beyond a few general sentences about each term. The
main accent in this analysis is made on the anthropological factor, i.e. considers a transformation of man’s personality during his passing by the sufi way.
Hungarian orientalist Tamas Ivany has published the results of his research of alQushayri’s “A Grammar of the Heart” in English in the collection of articles with the
results of Colloquim on Logos, Ethos and Mythos in the Middle East and North Africa
(LEM) that took place in Budapest in the 1996th. In this article he introduces European
reader with al-Qushayri’s short treatise “Nah}w al-qulūb” (A Grammar of the Heart)
making an accent on the main idea of this text, i. e. dividing of the knowledge to rational
and mystical. After author’s introduction he provides to reader text of the “Small
Grammar” (Nah}w al-qulūb as}-s}aġīr ) in Arabic.
To French “Small Grammar” was translated by the European researcher working
in France Francesco Chiabotti [19].
Besides “Risāla” and “Small Grammar”, there are several other works of alQushayri translated from Arabic, they are the following: “Tartīb as-sulūk fī t}arīq Allah”
and “’Ah}kām as-samā’” — these two works were translated to Urdu by Pir Muhammad
Hasan and published in Karachi in the collection of articles “Risala al-Qushayriya” in the
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1964th; “Al-fus}ūl fī–l-‘us}ūl” and “Lum‘a fī–l-‘ittihād” published by R.M. Frank in the
periodical «Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire».
The most detailed list of al-Qushayri’s works was composed by the German researchers Brockelmann and Ritter. The first one included in this list twenty works, although it’s quite possible that not all of them really were written by al-Qushayri, as
Brockelmann mentioned several works knowing their names only, although they
could differ for the same manuscripts due to different sources [13]. That’s why his
follower’s, Ritter’s, list of al-Qushayri’s works seems to be more adequate [21]. He excluded from Brockelmann’s list «At-taysīr fī ‘ilm at-tafsīr” (A Help in the Science of Interpretation of the Qur'an), having proved that this treatise was written by al’Qushayri’s
son, Rah}īm. Also Ritter excluded from Brockelmann’s list the work named “Disclosure
of intentions especially with regard to the names of the Most High God” as this treatise
doesn’t have any connection with Sufism.
Thus considering Ritter’s remarks, al-Qushayri was an author of the following
works:
1) Ar-risāla fī ‘ilm at-tas}awwuf (Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufizm) (1046) — one
of the biggest and the most popular (but maybe not the most significant) treatise of alQushayri. The first edition was published in Cairo in 1900th;
2) Lat}ā'if al-Ishārāt bi-Tafsīr al-Qur'ān — according to Ritter al-Qushayri completed this treatise by 1019th, so it became the oldest sufi commentary to Qur'an after
as-Sulami’s one. For the first time this work was published in Cairo by Ibrahim Basyuni
and it includes six volumes, the last of them was published in 1971st;
3) Tartīb as-sulūk fī t}arīq Allah — a short opus written in 1045th which contains
a description of the sufi practice of zikr and states that accompany it as well as explains
the rules of conducts on the sufi path. This manuscript was published by the Austrian
researcher F. Meyer in 1963rd [20. P. 1—39]. Also this work was included in the collection of articles “Risala al-Qushayriya” in Urdu edited by Pir Muhammad Hasan published in Karachi in 1964th;
4) At-tahrīb fī ‘ilm at-tazkīr — treatise devoted to the ninety nine Divine names
mentioned in Qur’an, which includes as well numerous stories about the early sufies.
This work was published in Cairo by Ibrahim Basyuni in 1968th;
5) Mans}ūr al-h}itā}b fī mašhūr al-’abwāb — this work is pretty similar to “Risāla”
though much shorter, including fourty four chapters only, the first of which is named
“tawba” (repentance). This treatise was published in the 1969th and edited by Qasim
as-Samarra in the collectiona named “’Arba‘u rasā’il fī-t-tas}awwuf” which included
besides the mentioned treatise three other works (although these three might not be
written by al-Qushayri, or wear the titles which are not original, as they differ from
those mentioned in both Brockelmann’s and Ritter’s lists);
6) Nah}w al-qulūb (A Grammar of the Heart) — al-Huğwiri considers that this
treatise is a philological treatrise devoted to Arabic grammar [2. P. 243], although this
pretty short work provides an interesting comparison of two types of knowledge —
mystical and scientific;
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7) ’Ah}kām as-samā’ — this work is devoted to the description of sufy way of
listening to the music. It was included, together with “Tartīb as-sulūk fī t}arīq Allah”,
in the collection of articles “Risala al-Qushayriya” in Urdu edited by Pir Muhammad
Hasan published in Karachi in 1964th;
8) Kitāb al-Mi‘rāğ — the work describing a qur’anic scene of the Night Journey
that, according to the Islamic tradition, the prophet Muhammad took during a single
night around the year 621. This episode is considered very important in the sufi tradition
as far as Muhammad during this journey meats God Most Hight, what is interpreted
by sufies as the highest result of the mystical trainings. In this treatise al-Qushayri gives
several versions of al-Mi‘rāğ as well as provides commentaries of some sufi sheikhs
regarding this journey;
9) Lum‘a fī–l-‘ittihād — a short essay on Asharite study. Published by R.M. Frank
in the periodical «Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire»
[14. P. 53—74];
10) Al-fus}ūl fī–l-‘us}ūl — the work representing a short essay on the Asharite
theology, as well as the previous one. It also was published by R.M. Frank in the periodical «Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire» [15. P. 59—94];
11) ’Arba‘ūna h}adītan — the treatise devoted to the Hadith study;
12) Al-Qas}īda as}-s}ufiya;
13) Al-maqāmāt at-talāta — a short work which Ritter doubted if it really was
written by al-Qushayri.
It should be mentioned that the researchers of al-Qushayri’s heritage don’t mention
his work “Šakiyāt ‘ahl Sunna” (A Complain of the People of Sunnah) as a really serious
theological essay, as well as don’t include it in the list above, taking into account that
it’s more connected with the Islamic law then with the Sufism or theology.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Such translation of the title is given by A.D. Knysh. See Abu ’l-Qasim al-Qushyri. Al-Qushayri’s
Epistle on Susizm.
(2) See A.J. Arberry. Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam; Nicholson R.A. The Mystics
of Islam; A. Schimmel. Mystical Dimensions of Islam; Knysh A. Islamic Mysticism: A Short
History.
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[1] Ал-Кушайри, Абу ал-Касим Абд ал-Карим б. Хавазин. Кушайриево послание о суфийской
науке / Пер. Кныш А.Д. // Ступени. — СПб, 1992. — № 2 (5).
[2] Дроздов В.А. Абу-л-Касим ал-Кушайри и его трактат о суфизме // Востоковедение. —
СПб., 2006. — № 27.
[3] Мухаммад ал-Мугтаба. Проблема человека в творчестве ал-Кушайри: Дисc. ... канд.
философ. наук. — М., 1994.
[4] 'Abd Al-Karim Ibn Ha Qushayri. Das Sendschreiben Al-Qusayris uber Das Sufitum. —
Wiesbaden, 1989.
[5] ’Abū Bakr al-Baġdādi. Tārīh Baġdād au madīnati-s-salām. — Cairo, 1931.
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[6] Abu ’l-Qasim al-Qushyri. Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufizm. Translated by Professor Alexander D. Knysh. — Reading, 2007.
[7] Al-’Asnawi Ğamāl ad-Din. T}abāqāt aš-šāfi‘iya. — Bagdad, 1971.
[8] ‘Alī ’Ibn ’Utmān al-H}uğwiri. Kašf al-mah}ğūb li ’arbāb al-qulūb. — Moscow, 2004.
[9] Al-’Imām ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qušairī. Nah}w al-qulūb as}-s}aġīr. — Libiya-Tunis, 1977.
[10] Al Qushayri Abu’l Qasim ‘Abd al-Karim b. Hawazin. Principles of Sufism translated by
B.R. Von Schliegell. — NY, 1990.
[11] Al-Qushayri Abu’l Qasim ‘Abd al-Karim b. Hawazin. The Risalah: Principles of Sufizm,
translated by Rabia Harris. — Chicago IL, 2002.
[12] ‘At}ār Farīd ad-Dīn Nīšābūrī. Tazkiratu-l-’wliyā’. — Teheran, 1995.
[13] Brockelmann C. Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur. — Leiden, 1943.
[14] Frank, R.M. Two short dogmatic works of Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. First part: Al-Qushayrī’s
Luma‘ fī l-i‘tiqād // Midéo, 14, 1980.
[15] Frank, R.M. Two short dogmatic works of Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. Second Part: Al-Qushayrī’s
al-Fuūl fī l-usūl // Midéo, 16, 1983.
[16] Ğāmī Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Abd ar-Rah}mān. Nafāh}āt al-’uns min h}ad}ārāt al-quds. — Teheran, 1958.
[17] Hartmann R. Al-Kuschairis Darstellung des Sufitums Mit Uebersetzungs. Beilage und Indices. —
B., 1914.
[18] ’Ibrāhim Basyūnī. Al-’Imām al-Qušairī. — Cairo, 1972.
[19] Nahw al-qulūb al-saġīr : La «grammaire des cœurs » de Abd al-Karīm al-Qušayrī. Présentation
et traduction annotée Francesco Chiabotti. URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-bulletin-detudes-orientales-2009-1-page-385.htm
[20] Qusayri’s Tartib as-Suluk // Oriens 16, 1963.
[21] Ritter H. Phililigika XIII: Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul (Fortsetzund) //
Oriens. Vol.3. — Leiden, 1950.
[22] Tāğ ad-Dīn as-Subqi. T}abāqāt aš-šāfi‘iya al-kubra. — Cairo, 1976.
ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ РАБОТ
ПО АЛ=КУШАЙРИ
О.А. Лапицкая
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 6, Москва, Россия, 117198
Данная статья призвана перечислить и охарактеризовать наиболее значимые работы, посвященные знаменитому суфию XI в. ал-Кушайри, автору широко известного трактата «Послание о суфийской науке». Несмотря на значимость этой фигуры в истории суфизма, европейские (равно как
и арабские и персидские) исследователи суфизма не уделили ему значительного внимания, за исключением упоминания в контексте описания его «Послания».
Ключевые слова: Суфизм, ал-Кушайри, историография, Послание о суфийской науке, мистицизм, теология, манускрипты.
125
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
МИРОПОРЯДОК И СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТЬ
В КОНТЕКСТЕ ПРЕДФИЛОСОФСКИХ КАТЕГОРИЙ
ДРЕВНЕЕГИПЕТСКОЙ МЫСЛИ ПЕРВОГО
ПЕРЕХОДНОГО ПЕРИОДА И СРЕДНЕГО ЦАРСТВА
В.В. Жданов
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 10а, Москва, Россия, 117198
Одной из наиболее заметных и важных черт предфилософских категорий
является их ярко выраженная полисемия.
Эта фундаментальная особенность предфилософии как особой формы духовной культуры древнего человека одинаково четко проявляется в самых разных
культурах средиземноморского региона — как в собственно «философских», так
и традиционно и вполне справедливо относящихся с позиций историко-философской науки к разряду «дофилософских» — как, например, Древний Египет, где
предфилософская мысль в силу ряда факторов не трансформировалась в формат
философского мировоззрения. Так, фундаментальная для всей древнеегипетской
духовной культуры предфилософская категория «Маат», хотя и первоначально
формируется в рамках «классической» мифологемы, однако в текстах теокосмогонического содержания обладает четко очерченным набором из трех основных
значений: «миропорядок», «справедливость» и примыкающее к ним уже в эпоху
Нового царства «истина». Сакральный миропорядок, устанавливаемый демиургом
на месте изначального хаоса, есть одновременно и миропорядок справедливый —
так в «онтологический» мотив египетских теокосмогоний в качестве неотъемлемой их части включается и морально-этическая проблематика.
Пожалуй, особенно ярко эта особенность древнеегипетских космогонических
текстов проявилась в эпоху Среднего царства в отдельных заклинаниях «Текстов
саркофагов», основного памятника осирической религии и теологии этой эпохи.
Так, заклинание под порядковым номером 1130 является одним из самых ярких примеров пристального обращения древнеегипетской мысли рубежа III—
126
Жданов В.В. Миропорядок и справедливость в контексте предфилософских категорий...
II тыс. до н.э. к вопросу о генезисе справедливости в рамках общей картины происхождения мира и, как следствие, — к проблеме этических, морально-нравственных
аспектов самого процесса творения. Наиболее важная в данном отношении часть
текста выглядит следующим образом:
Говорение слов (носящим) тайные имена. Владыка всего до предела (его), сказал он, (дабы) успокоить волнение команды барки (1): «Да будете вы невредимы
и довольны! Повторю я вам о четырех прекрасных деяниях моего собственного
сердца, окруженного змеем, (чтобы заставить) замолчать беспорядок. Совершил
я четыре прекрасных деяния в ограде горизонта. Сотворил я четыре ветра, чтобы каждый человек мог дышать во время свое. Это — одно из (деяний). Сотворил
я великую воду разлива, чтобы бедняк мог пользоваться ею так же, как и богач.
Это — одно из (деяний). Сотворил я каждого человека подобным брату его и запретил им творить беспорядок, (но) сердца их воспротивились сказанному мной.
Это — одно из (деяний). Сделал я, чтобы сердца их забывали о Западе (2), дабы
делались подношения богам номов. Это — одно из (деяний)» [4. P. 461—464] (3).
Терминология этого текста не может не вызывать ассоциаций с древнейшими
образцами гелиопольской теокосмогонии. Прежде всего, примечателен сам титул
солярного демиурга — это та же самая формула «Владыка всего до предела (его)»,
или «Всевладыка» (неб эр джер), которой предваряется начало монолога Хепри
о творении мира в папирусе Бремнер-Ринд (26.21).
Оба текста подчеркивают, что творение мира не является по своей сути завершенным процессом. Акт упорядочивания Нуна Солнечным богом и установления на его месте Маат (сакрального миропорядка), имевший место однажды
в прошлом, отнюдь не означает окончания на этом всего процесса творения.
Нун не уничтожается демиургом, он лишь вытесняется на периферию создаваемого универсума, где продолжает ежедневно и еженощно оказывать влияние
на его существование.
В случае с заклинанием 1130 перед нами предстает едва ли не единственный
фрагмент из числа фрагментов «Текстов саркофагов» космогонического содержания, где речь идет не просто о процессе космогенеза, но и о сотворении человека — и это опять-таки роднит данное заклинание с космогонией папируса
Бремнер-Ринд.
Даже несмотря на то, что здесь нет, в отличие от папируса Бремнер-Ринд
(27.2—27.3), упоминаний о «технологии» этого процесса, тем не менее, к теме
антропогенеза этот фрагмент имеет самое прямое отношение. Волнение, охватившее богов, находящихся вместе с Солнечным богом на борту его священной
ладьи — это, по сути дела беспокойство по поводу устойчивости установленного
им на месте изначального хаоса миропорядка, его стабильности. И ответ демиурга представляет собой своеобразную гарантию того, что созданный однажды
мир не падет под натиском сил хаоса и мрака. В качестве таковой выступает тезис
о том, что Маат как установленный в прошлом и сохраняемый и поныне демиургом миропорядок стабилен не столько онтологическими качествами, сколько
своими морально-нравственными характеристиками.
Выражая в общем виде идею изначального равенства людей как продуктов
созидательной деятельности Солнечного бога по упорядочиванию Нуна, закли127
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нание 1130 одновременно интегрирует ее в более всеохватное по своему характеру
и направленности утверждение общих физических принципов существования
мира — обуславливаемых, прежде всего, природными факторами с одной стороны
и факторами социальных отношений — с другой. Это ясно следует из четверичной структуры схемы благих деяний Солнечного бога, где первые два деяния относятся к природным факторам существования мира и человека в нем, а два последних — к факторам социальным. Упоминание о «четырех ветрах», созданных
демиургом, может означать не только намек на четыре стороны света, но также
и подразумевает особую жизненную силу ветра.
Второе деяние связано с таким поистине судьбоносным для всякого без исключения египтянина явлением природы, как ежегодный разлив Нила: это не только указание на воду как на источник жизни в ее обыденном, эмпирическом понимании, но и обозначение ее в качестве «первостихии», служащей генетической
основой всего мира.
С третьим и четвертым деяниями Солнечного бога ситуация складывается
иная. Идея творения всех людей равными в своих физических и социальных возможностях, безусловно, нова для дискурса египетской дидактической и социально-политической мысли и в ее появлении именно на рубеже Первого переходного периода и Среднего царства нельзя не усматривать реакции египетской
«интеллектуальной элиты» на крах культурной и политической модели Древнего
царства, ставший серьезным потрясением как для рядовых египтян, так и для царской власти, носители которой неизбежно должны были теперь выбирать другие
ценностные ориентиры. В упоминании же об отказе людей соблюдать запрет
демиурга на творение беспорядка явно слышатся отголоски «Легенды об истреблении человечества», весьма известного египетского ритуального текста, входившего в состав так называемой «Книги коровы» и содержательно относящемуся
к солярной религии и теологии; к этому сюжету мы еще вернемся при анализе
«Гимна творцу» из «Поучения царю Мерикаре». Указание на «забывание о Западе»
и на необходимость отправления локальных культов также можно рассматривать
через призму поисков этой новой системы ценностей, хотя, конечно же, в этом
можно усматривать и «покушение» на сложившиеся устои осиричской религии,
не носящее, впрочем, радикального характера.
Итак, здесь мы четко можем выделить два основных мотива: а) указание
на «непрерывность» процесса творения как необходимость постоянно поддерживать однажды установленный миропорядок; б) определение справедливого характера этого миропорядка и ориентированность его на человека. Очень важно, что
эти незнакомые более ранним образцам гелиопольской теокосмогонии идеи встречается в этот период не только в заклинании 1130 «Текстов саркофагов»; они
также выражены еще в одном весьма примечательном тексте эпохи конца Первого
переходного периода, относящемся к совершенно иному жанру литературы —
к жанру так называемых «царских поучений», то есть сборников сентенций, наставлений и рекомендаций, оставляемых царями для своих наследников. Речь
идет о «Поучении царю Мерикаре», одном из наиболее известных произведений древнеегипетской литературы эпохи Первого переходного периода и Среднего царства [5], традиционно датируемом временем правления IX (гераклео128
Жданов В.В. Миропорядок и справедливость в контексте предфилософских категорий...
польской) династии (около 2170—2025 гг. до н.э.). Интересующий нас отрывок
текста занимает в нем строки 130—138 и представляет собой описание справедливого миропорядка и указание на творца, этот миропорядок однажды установившего:
(Хорошо) обеспечены люди — паства Бога: сотворил он небо и землю ради
сердец их, потеснил он жадность вод, создал он для них дыхание жизни. (Они) —
подобия его, вышедшие из членов его. Восходит он в небе ради сердец их. Сотворил он для них растения, скот, птиц и рыб, дабы насытить их. Убил он врагов
своих (и) покарал он детей своих, (когда) подняли они мятеж (против него). Сотворил он дневной свет для сердец их, поднимается он, дабы видеть их. Построил
он часовню свою подле них, и когда они стенают — он слышит. Сотворил он для
них правителей, (обретших власть) еще в (яйце) — руководителей, помогающих
нуждающемуся. Создал он для них заклинания против руки судьбы, им предназначенных, из-за которых не спят ни днем, ни ночью. Убил он восставших (против него) подобно тому, как бьет человек сына своего ради брата своего. Бог
знает каждое имя [5. S. 73—75] (4).
Идея антропоцентризма при описании процедуры творения мира, лишь в самом общем виде обозначенная в заклинании 1130 «Текстов саркофагов», здесь
получает свое логическое продолжение. Любопытно, что описание действий демиурга в тексте носит одновременно как черты гелиоморфизма («восходит», «поднимается, чтобы видеть»), так и более антропоморфные детали активного действия («создал», «построил», «покарал», «убил»). Эта своеобразная диалектика
гелио- и антропоморфизма в описании черт творца, безусловно, не была характерна для «классических» образцов гелиопольской теокосмогонии эпохи Древнего
царства, но вполне резонно может проистекать из них, особенно если учитывать
то, что в данном случае мы имеем дело, по образному выражению Г. Франкфорта,
с «логикой мифопоэтической мысли» [2. С. 31].
Явной отсылкой именно к гелиопольской модели космогенеза выглядит упоминание о том, что творец «сотворил небо и землю» и «потеснил жадность вод»;
несомненно, что под последней из приведенных формулировок подразумевается
Нун, являющийся водной праосновой мира в гелиопольской солярной теокосмогонии. Упоминание же о создании «дыхания жизни» не может не вызывать
вполне обоснованных ассоциаций с ролью и местом бога воздуха Шу в заклинании 80 «Текстов саркофагов».
Наконец, еще одним свидетельством дискурсивной близости данного текста с гелиопольской теокосмогонической концепцией может служить двойное
упоминание в нем об убийстве и наказании мятежников, сотворенных самим
демиургом — это опять-таки не что иное, как ссылка на сюжет «Легенды об истреблении человечества» из так называемой «Книги коровы», наподобие той,
что содержится и в заклинании 1130 «Текстов саркофагов».
При этом, однако, автор «Поучения» идет в своем обосновании идеи антропоцентризма творения гораздо дальше, нежели неизвестные создатели заклинания
1130 «Текстов саркофагов». Здесь напрашивается сопоставление с монологом
Хепри (папирус Бремнер-Ринд 27.2—27.3), в котором этот процесс описывается
как рождение людей из слез, вытекших из ока Солнечного бога, но нынешняя
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модель все же иная — это происхождение людей непосредственно из членов,
или частей тела (аут) демиурга, но и она носит ярко выраженный физиологический характер без малейшего оттенка перформативности, так свойственного
космогонической концепции «Памятника мемфисской теологии». А вот упоминание о человечестве как о «пастве» демиурга уже, несомненно, гораздо ближе
по своей смысловой направленности именно к заклинанию 1130 «Текстов саркофагов»: здесь выражена та же самая идея, а именно: творение мира не является
одномоментным процессом, актом, после которого демиург «самоустраняется»
от продуктов собственного творения; напротив, он продолжает заботиться о них
и дальше, продолжая, таким образом, длительный и весьма многотрудный процесс сохранения миропорядка в созданном универсуме.
Образ демиурга как «доброго пастыря» (по выражению Я. Ассмана [1. C. 256])
человечества был, несомненно, весьма актуален на фоне тех многочисленных
социально-экономических, а, возможно, еще и природных неурядиц и потрясений,
постигших Египет в конце эпохи Древнего царства и во время Первого переходного периода. Подобные «протогуманистические» идеалы вполне гармонично
согласуются и с другими частями текста «Поучения», в частности, с советом,
даваемым отцом Мерикаре относительно ограничения использования в борьбе
с мятежниками такого «сильнодействующего» средства, как смертная казнь (Merikarê, 48—51). Эта мысль получает свое естественное продолжение и в предлагаемой текстом гимна модели «обратной связи» человека и творца посредством
храма и религиозного культа, что опять-таки призвано обеспечить близость творца
и его творений не только в теологическом, но и в реальном, физическом отношении. Несомненно, что ту же цель преследует и находящееся в финале гимна
утверждение о том, что демиург «знает каждое имя», иначе говоря — всегда
и везде неразрывно связан со своими творениями.
Есть, правда, в этом гимне один момент, который связывает его не только
с общим вектором развития гелиопольской солярной теокосмогонии этого периода, но и в определенной степени сближает его с одним из базовых принципов,
на которых основывается теокосмогоническая модель, излагаемая в «Памятнике
мемфисской теологии». Это акцентированное внимание на созидающей силе
слова, выраженное в данном случае через идею о создании солярным демиургом
заклинаний, облегчающих людям удары «руки судьбы», мучающих их круглосуточно.
Впрочем, в отличие от мемфисского варианта теокосмогонии, концепция
«созидающего», или «действенного» слова здесь не носит всеохватного характера, а ограничена лишь областью человеческих отношений; этот пассаж, помимо
прочего, еще и, безусловно, призван отразить чрезвычайно большую роль магических заклинаний в повседневной, обыденной жизни человека. Здесь теокосмогоническая концепция уже непосредственно соприкасается с реальной практикой
религиозного культа, помогая отыскать «точку соприкосновения» между сферами
сакрального и профанного в предфилософском восприятии мира. В рамках полисемии, столь характерной для всех категорий предфилософии, творец и творение не просто не разделены, но теснейшим образом взаимосвязаны друг с другом,
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Жданов В.В. Миропорядок и справедливость в контексте предфилософских категорий...
причем едва ли не главным каналом для осуществления такого взаимодействия
является именно религиозный культ.
На примере гимна творцу из «Поучения царю Мерикаре» мы также можем
говорить и о некотором изменении общих нормативов дискурса всей древнеегипетской предфилософской мысли. Онтологический аспект Маат (миропорядок)
здесь, следовательно, оказывается первичным по отношению к этическому (справедливость); при этом сам справедливый миропорядок всегда представляется
в теокосмогонических источниках этого периода как «непрерывное творение».
И гимн творцу из «Поучения царю Мерикаре», и заклинание 1130 «Текстов саркофагов» выражают эту важнейшую идею в равной степени адекватно. Сочетая ее
с традиционными, «классическими» элементами гелиопольской солярной теокосмогонии, эти тексты в эпоху Среднего царства создают, таким образом, новое
и во многом оригинальное направление предфилософского дискурса.
ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ
(1) Видимо, здесь имеются в виду боги, сопровождающие Солнечного бога в его еженощном
путешествии по Дуату в священной барке, или ладье (уиа), во время которого он вступает
в схватку со змеем Апопом.
(2) То есть о загробном мире, иными словами — о неизбежности смерти.
(3) СT VII 461 c — 464 f de Buck.
(4) Merikarê, 130—138.
ЛИТЕРАТУРА
[1] Ассман Я. Египет: теология и благочестие ранней цивилизации. — М., 1999.
[2] Франкфорт Г. и др. В преддверии философии: духовные искания древнего человека. —
М., 1984.
[3] Assmann J. Ma’at. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Älten Ägypten. — München, 1990.
[4] The Egyptian Coffin Texts / By A. de Buck. — Vol. VII. — Chicago, 1961.
[5] Volten A. Zwei altägyptische politische Schriften. Die lehre für könig Merikarê (pap.
Carlsberg VI) und die lehre des königs Amenemhet. — Kobenhavn, 1945.
WORLD=ORDER AND JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT
OF ANCIENT EGYPTIAN PRE=PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORIES
OF THE FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD
AND THE MIDDLE KINGDDOM
V.V. Zhdanov
Department of History of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10a, Moscow, Russia, 117198
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ДИАЛОГ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЙ В ИРАНЕ:
МОХАММАД ХАТАМИ
И.В. Кулагин
Государственный академический университет гуманитарных наук
ул. Волхонка, 14, Москва, Россия, 119019
Особую актуальность вопрос диалога приобретает в отношениях исламского
мира с Западом, а еще конкретнее — Ирана с США и Евросоюзом, после президентских выборов, прошедших летом этого года, и победы на них Хасана Роухани — наиболее либерально настроенного кандидата, к тому же пользовавшегося
поддержкой экс-президента Мохаммада Хатами. Именно Хатами во время своего
президентства в 1997—2007 гг. стремился найти общий язык с США и положил
начало процессу диалога цивилизаций (по его инициативе в резолюции от 4 ноября
1998 г. Генеральная Ассамблея ООН провозгласила 2001 г. Годом диалога между
цивилизациями). С новым Президентом вновь появляется и шанс на восстановление диалога, фактически прерванного с 2005 г. В связи с этим стоит вспомнить,
с чего все начиналось — а именно с работ и речей Мохаммада Хатами.
Мохаммад Хатами был одним из первых интеллектуалов, предложившим
концепцию диалога цивилизаций. Став президентом Ирана, он использовал свое
положение для того, чтобы привлечь внимание людей к данной проблеме: благодаря его усилиям 2001 год был объявлен ЮНЕСКО «годом диалога цивилизаций».
Что понимал под диалогом цивилизаций сам Хатами? Как он оценивал потенциал иранской и вообще мусульманской цивилизации в процессе диалога?
Свои воззрения он изложил в нескольких лекциях и статьях, собранных в книгу
«Ислам, диалог и гражданское общество».
Он предлагает разобраться с понятиями «цивилизация» и «культура». Вот
что он пишет: «Хотя нет окончательного общепринятого определения относительно того, что такое культура и цивилизация, я полагаю, что понятие цивилизации
включает в себя материальные аспекты общественной жизни, а также все институты и организации, которые создают политическую, экономическую, промышленную и другие структуры общества. Культуру я рассматриваю как систему
укоренившихся взглядов, а также традиционных умонастроений и чувств общества» [1. C. 90].
Таким образом, цивилизация — это как бы материальная сторона бытия общества, а культура — духовная, или интеллектуальная. Цивилизация переживает
рождение, кризис и смерть, но это необязательно влечет за собой смерть культуры. «Культура, адаптировавшаяся к конкретной цивилизации, может оставаться
элементом жизни людей в течение долгого времени после гибели этой цивилизации. Цивилизация является базисом и основой культуры. Если существует раскол
между культурой и цивилизацией, последняя теряет свой новаторский и творческий потенциал и становится реальным тормозом на пути развития, ибо ее корни
не глубоки. Постепенно она распадается» [1. C. 90], — пишет Хатами.
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Кулагин И.В. Диалог цивилизаций в Иране: Мохаммад Хатами
Именно в противоречии цивилизации и культуры Хатами видит причину кризиса мусульманского общества: «Одной из основных проблем для нас является
тот факт, что важные аспекты нашей культуры относятся к цивилизации, чье время
давно прошло. А наша жизнь определяется современной цивилизацией, которая
требует соответствующей культуры». Под «современной цивилизацией» Хатами,
безусловно, имеет в виду западную, европейскую цивилизацию — главного соперника и в то же время участника диалога. Он пишет следующее: «Наша личная
жизнь и наша общественная жизнь находятся под прямым влиянием Запада —
той цивилизации, основы которой мы не усвоили и не сделали своими, а с другой
стороны, элементы нашей собственной культуры уходят корнями в цивилизацию,
время которой уже прошло». Что касается Запада, то там подобного кризиса
не наблюдается: «культура западных стран находится в гармонии с их цивилизацией, и, таким образом, жители этих стран не страдают от опасного раздвоения
сознания» [1. C. 89].
По мнению Хатами, диалог подразумевает равенство сторон и снятие конфликта, отказ от использования соответствующей лексики. «Диалог цивилизаций
означает равенство народов и государств. Иными словами, диалог возможен только тогда, когда каждый из его участников уважает другого и относится к нему
как к равному» [1. C. 6].
Критика Хатами
Став президентом, Хатами сразу же обрел много сторонников среди иранцев.
Молодежь, который в Иране по-прежнему большинство, возлагала на него большие надежды. Несмотря на то, что Хатами был из духовенства, он постоянно высказывался за демократию и свободу слова. К тому же о его предыдущей карьере
было мало известно, что защищало его от критики. По большому счету, он был
неизвестной до сих пор фигурой, и это играло ему на руку.
За рубежом его приходу к власти тоже отнеслись положительно — даже американский Президент Клинтон выразил радость по поводу победы демократических сил в Иране. Дело в том, что и Европу, и США давно уже волновали мысли,
высказанные Самуэлем Хантингтоном в его книге «Столкновение цивилизаций».
Нарисованная им картина кровопролитного столкновения Запада и ислама уже
давно занимала умы многих политиков. Согласно Хантингтону, если в мире случится еще одна мировая война, то это будет война между цивилизациями, крупнейшими культурными группами человечества. Постепенное ослабление Запада
и подъем мусульманского мира косвенно подтверждают эту угрозу. Тем более что
антиевропейские и антиамериканские лозунги находят поддержку среди многих
мусульман. Иудейско-христианская цивилизация, именуемая Западом, будет сражаться с другой, называемой Исламом. По мнению Хантингтона, мусульманский
мир станет многочисленнее христианского Запада в 2025 г., и огромное количество безработной мусульманской молодежи под лозунгом установления лучшей
религии выплеснет свою агрессию на ослабевшем Западе. Мировые войны национальных государств более невозможны, т.к. теперь каждый человек определяет свою принадлежность в более широком смысле — не к государству, а к цивилизации.
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Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
После публикации статьи Хантигтона «Столкновение цивилизаций» в 1993 г.
многим казалось, что другой концепции, объясняющей настоящее политическое
мироустройство, и быть не может. На этом фоне и появился Хатами с его теорией
диалога цивилизаций — наконец-то Запад увидел представителя мусульманского
мира, с которым он мог бы говорить.
Хатами был знаком с западной философией и образом жизни, его призыв
к примирению был расценен как сигнал к тому, чтобы начать отношения с чистого
листа. Он не говорил о неверных и во многом признавал достижения и заслуги
Запада. В то же время он верил в ислам и его родную культуру, верил, что Ислам
и Запад могут участвовать в конструктивном диалоге.
Хатами считал, что развал Советского Союза, а вместе с ним и биполярного
мира, является не концом истории, а открывает путь к диалогу, к новому, более
справедливому миру, свободному от монополии одной или двух сверхдержав.
На открытии конференции ООН, посвященной «Году диалога цивилизаций», Хатами говорил: «Мы должны критически исследовать доминирующую ныне парадигму международных отношений, основанную на дискурсе власти и прославлении грубой силы... С этической точки зрения, парадигма диалога цивилизаций
требует, чтобы мы отказались от воли-к-власти и вместо нее обратились к волик-эмпатии и сочувствию. Без воли-к-эмпатии, сочувствия и понимания, не будет
надежды на установление порядка в нашем мире. Мы должны бороться с этим
недостатком сочувствия и эмпатии в нашем мире. Абсолютная цель диалога цивилизаций не в нем самом, но в достижении эмпатии и порядка» [2. P. 15—16].
Что же Хатами понимает под диалогом и цивилизацией? «Диалог — это прежде всего поиск эмоционального контакта и искреннего доверия» [2. P. 20], — говорит Хатами в одной из своих речей. Диалог нужен для того, чтобы приблизиться
к истине, спасению и добиться взаимопонимания и мирного сосуществования.
Уже эти первые характеристики диалога вызывают много вопросов. «Но что
есть истина? Существует ли универсальное, всеми признанное определение или
интерпретация истины? Кто будет определять истину и кто будет решать, нашли
мы ее или нет?» [4. P. 38], — пишет Фарид Мирбагери. Подобное понимание
диалога делает его труднореализуемым.
Другая проблема кроется в вопросе об участника диалога.
Кто является непосредственным участником диалога? Кто может на законных
основаниях представлять такие абстрактные сущности, как цивилизации? Адресаты призыва к диалогу и вправду не ясны. Можно сказать, что формулировка Хатами на этот счет весьма неопределенна: с одной стороны, он заявляет, что государства должны играть ведущую роль в диалоге. С другой же он утверждает,
что интеллектуалы, включая даже артистов, поэтов также должны быть в центре
диалогового процесса. «При ближайшем рассмотрении эта неопределенность
есть лишь видимость неопределенности. На самом деле эти два измерения или
уровня отношений между государствами и между индивидами становятся несовместимыми, только если мы воспринимаем международные отношения как арену,
на которой борются странные, антропоморфные существа, именуемые государствами, по своей природе обреченные руководствоваться своими национальными
интересами» [2. P. 17—18], — пишет Фабио Петито.
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Кулагин И.В. Диалог цивилизаций в Иране: Мохаммад Хатами
Хатами говорит, что цивилизации существовали всегда, даже наши предкиохотники имели свою цивилизацию. Она состоит из «материальных аспектов
общественной жизни, а также всех институтов и организаций, которые создают
политическую, экономическую, промышленную и другие структуры общества»
[1. C. 89].
Культура, в свою очередь, есть система укоренившихся взглядов, а также традиционных умонастроений и чувств общества, и может оставаться элементом
жизни людей в течение долгого времени после гибели той цивилизации, к которой
она была адаптирована.
Оба этих определения чрезвычайно расплывчаты и абстрактны. Но особый
интерес представляет именно то, что культура переживает цивилизацию. Например, Хатами утверждает, что современная исламская культура принадлежит к цивилизации, которая давно умерла, что приводит к кризису в исламских обществах.
Таким образом, получается, что смена культуры ведет к смене цивилизации, но
не наоборот. Возникает вопрос: что может привести к смене культуры? Почему
исламская культура не сменилась, несмотря на отмирание исламской цивилизации? И, наконец, как две цивилизации могут вступить в диалог, когда его инициатор заявляет, что одна из них уже не существует?
Отдельно надо сказать об отношении Хатами к Западу. Хатами говорит, что
«запад действительно добился огромных достижений для человечества» [1. C. 89].
«Наша экономическая, политическая, социальная, культурная жизнь находится
под сильным влиянием Запада», — пишет Хатами. «Для нас, мусульман, жизнь
стала невозможной без наследия и достижений Запада. Мы видим последствия
влияния Запада во всем: в планировке городов, в которых мы живем, в их управлении, в коммуникационных технологиях. И многое другое, что мы используем
в нашей повседневной жизни, придумано на Западе» [1. C. 88].
Но несмотря на все эти похвалы, Хатами утверждает, что Запад создал огромные проблемы для мусульман. Он считает, что западная культура ставит в центр
человека, в то время как ислам ставит в на это место Бога. Раньше духовное спасение было целью жизни, а теперь западная цивилизация поменяла его на материальный достаток.
Другими словами, Хатами утверждает, что на Западе освобождение от внешних факторов заменило освобождение от внутренних страстей. Более того, Хатами
не ограничивается такой сугубо религиозно-философской критикой. Несмотря
на то, что он известен как «либеральный мусульманин» и всегда сторонился радикально настроенных политиков, его отношение к Западу во многих речах можно
назвать откровенно враждебным. Хатами неоднократно говорит о Западе как о «наших противниках». «Мы не можем упускать из виду колониализм, применение силы против незападников, разграбление материальных и культурных ценностей
других людей, загрязнение Земли, укрепления полуправды и лжи, и оппортунизм,
который также характеризует Запад», «западная цивилизация износилась и одряхлела», «в политических конфронтациях враг использует маску науки и культуры,
чтобы обмануть нас». «На этом этапе наша борьба против Запада является необходимой для нашего выживания. Любая форма примирения и умиротворения,
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учитывая склонность противника к обману, приведет к унижению и попранию
нашей гордости. Мы должны всеми своими силами бороться против этого, и победа не за горами» [4. P. 309—310].
Заключение
В том, что касается диалога цивилизаций, у Хатами можно найти много внутренних противоречий. Однако это свойство любого живого, развивающегося мировоззрения. Пусть Хатами не смог довести свою идею до логического завершения, но, возможно, это получится у его продолжателей. Новый Президент Ирана
Хасан Роухани вполне может стать одним из них. «Вместо того, чтобы сосредотачиваться на том, как не сделать отношения еще хуже, мы должны думать и говорить о том, как сделать их лучше... Это суть моего подхода к конструктивному
взаимодействию» [5], — заявил Роухани в своей речи, опубликованной 20 сентября
в Washington Post.
ЛИТЕРАТУРА
[1] Mohammad Khatami, Islam, dialogue and civil society. — Moscow, 2001 (Мохаммад Хатами.
Ислам, диалог и гражданское общество. — М.: РОССПЭН, 2001.)
[2] Fabio Petito, Khatami’ Dialogue among Civilizations as International Political Theory // The International Journal of Humanities. 2004. Vol. 11. С. 11—29.
[3] Khatami, Symposium: Islam, Iran and the Dialogue of Civilisations // Global Dialogue. 2001.
Vol. 3. —The Dialogue of Civilisations.
[4] Farid Mirbagheri, Narrowing the gap or camouflaging the divide // British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, December 2007. С. 305—316.
[5] Hassan Rouhaniю Why Iran seeks constructive engagement // Washington Post, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/
2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html
DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS IN IRAN:
MOHAMMAD KHATAMI
I.V. Kulagin
State Academic University of Humanitarian Science
Volkhonka str., 14, Moscow, Russia, 119019
ЭКСПЛИКАЦИЯ ОДНОГО ИЗВЕСТНОГО,
НО НЕПОПУЛЯРНОГО ФАКТА (1)
Р.В. Псху
Кафедра истории философии
Факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 10/2, Москва, Россия, 117198
В предисловии к своему переводу индийского средневекового романа Баны (2) «Кадамбари» П.А. Гринцер (1928—2009) отмечает, что при столкновении
«с текстами иной литературы хочется соотнести их с собственным литературным
и эстетическим опытом, использовать в связи с ними привычные толкования. Отсюда принятая в литературоведении тенденция вводить классические восточные
литературные памятники в знакомые европейские рамки, накладывать на них
уже апробированную сетку понятий и терминов» (3).
По мнению Гринцера, эта тенденция опирается на идею единства мирового
литературного процесса, явленную в концепции гомогенеза мировой культуры,
которая проходит в разных культурных общностях одни и те же «фазы роста» (4).
Противоположная ей тенденция, отмечает Гринцер, — «рассматривать отдельные
цивилизации и соответственно литературы как более или менее замкнутые монады с особым кругом понятий и принципов, созданным по собственным структурным законам» (5).
Можно согласиться с Гринцером, что данная тенденция спорна, но она, действительно, обладает большим достоинством, поскольку не допускает априорный,
внешний, подход к культуре и утверждает необходимость тщательного изучения
ее текстов как бы «изнутри», в соответствии с выработанными ею самой критериями (6). Только после этого «взгляда изнутри» можно сопоставлять фрагменты
разных культур и делать какие-либо выводы относительно их однородности или
неоднородности. Дополнительное преимущество такой методики, утверждает
Гринцер, состоит в том, «что она хотя бы отчасти помогает преодолеть барьеры
уже сложившегося эстетического восприятия. Знакомство с внутренней логикой
„чужой“ литературы невольно приближает к ней даже далекого от нее читателя,
приобщает к ее ценностям» (7).
Литературоведческое вступление Гринцера приведено здесь не случайно,
так как оно уже с самых первых слов раскрывает проблему, которой посвящено
данное научное сообщение: проблему адекватной интерпретации иной культуры.
Игнорирование этой проблемы приводит к умножению наших ложных представлений об иной культуре, которым, увы, ничего не соответствует в действительности. В частности, часто индийская философская традиция может представляться
этаким экзотическим вариантом европейской традиции, и которая при лишении
ее всяких орнаментов предстает бледной копией европейской мысли. Но уже внимательное рассмотрение языков, на которых создавались философские трактаты
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обеих традиций, показывает неожиданные результаты, лишающие исследователя
энтузиазма сравнивать и сводить их друг к другу.
Известно, что перевод с санскрита философских текстов Рамануджи, часто
весьма затруднителен, если не невозможен, без обращения к уже известной из традиции интерпретации этих текстов.
Коротко говоря, перевод этого текста обретает смысл (причем не в герменевтическом, а грамматическом значении) только при опоре на религиозно-философскую традицию, знание которой становится для переводчика condicio sine qua
non. В отличие от обычной фразы на санскрите предложение из философского
текста Рамануджи нельзя перевести (грамматически верно), не зная, о чем в нем
говорится (примеры будут позже по тексту).
Разумеется, историк философии, занимающийся текстами на любом другом
языке, может возразить, что немецкий текст Канта, арабский текст Ибн Сины и т.д.
также весьма затруднительно переводить без предварительного знакомства с философскими учениями авторов этих текстов. Но, тем не менее, беру на себя смелость утверждать, что эти предложения можно перевести грамматически верно,
даже не подозревая о глубине мысли, в них содержащейся, т.е. составить с точки
зрения грамматики правильное предложение, пусть и неверное с точки зрения
содержащегося в нем философского смысла. Обращение же к санскритским текстам Рамануджи показывает, что большую часть его философских предложений
невозможно осмысленно перевести уже на уровне грамматики, не говоря уже
об уровне философском. И «повинна» в этом не философия Рамануджи, а язык,
на котором она описана, т.е. санскрит! Какие же именно грамматические особенности философского санскрита могут стать препятствием осмысленного перевода текстов Рамануджи?
Известно, что синтаксический строй санскрита обладает весьма специфическими чертами, затрудняющими понимание санскритского текста для русскоговорящего реципиента. Так, автор «Грамматического очерка санскрита» А.А. Зализняк приводит следующие черты, характеризующие санскрит (8).
1. Санскрит обладает такой синтаксической эквивалентностью, как возможностью передавать смысл либо «словосочетанием или сложным словом... При
этом при втором способе, в отличие от первого, смысловые связи между элементами не находят внешнего выражения (кроме порядка основ) и восстанавливаются по общему контексту, причем не всегда однозначно (особенно при большом
числе основ). Кроме того, у всех элементов, кроме последнего, остается невыраженным грамматическое число» (9).
2. Эквивалентом глагольного предложения (с личной формой) может выступать именное предложение, где сказуемое выражено просто причастием (10).
3. Активная конструкция часто подменяется пассивной (11).
Известно также, что поздний классический санскрит преимущественно содержит именные предложения, пассивные конструкции, что позволяет отличать
синтаксический стиль II позднего санскрита от синтаксического стиля I ведийского
и раннего послеведийского санскрита. Если для синтаксического стиля I характерно наличие (проявленность) большинства грамматических значений и син138
Псху Р.В. Экспликация одного известного, но непопулярного факта
таксических связей, то в синтаксическом стиле II количество внешних грамматических показателей минимально. В крайних формах этого стиля (а именно к таким
можно отнести тексты Рамануджи) гигантские сложные слова (до нескольких
десятков основ) без числа и падежа фактически заменяют собой целые предложения и даже абзацы, грамматические показатели имеются лишь у незначительной
части входящих во фразу основ и при этом используется очень малое количество
глагольных форм (12), во многих фразах глаголы вообще отсутствуют. Синтаксический стиль I, замечает Зализняк, — это образцовый флективный язык (как
русский и латынь), в то время как синтаксический стиль II приближает санскрит
к инкорпорирующим языкам (13).
Другой особенностью синтаксиса санскрита, осложняющий процесс перевода
на другие языки, является то, что порядок слов в санскрите в принципе свободный.
Разумеется, в прозаической речи есть некоторые тенденции, к примеру, глагольное
сказуемое тяготеет к последнему месту в предложении, а группа подлежащего —
к первому и т.п., но это носит только характер тенденции, а не фиксированного
жесткого правила.
Если же мы обратимся к другим языковым философским традициям, то увидим, что синтаксис ни одной из них нельзя сравнить с синтаксисом позднего санскрита. В сносках к нижеследующим пунктам читатель сможет увидеть образцы
наиболее сложной философской прозы, написанной на разных языках (14).
1. Латинский язык (15).
2. Немецкий язык (16).
3. Арабский язык (17).
4. Санскрит (18).
Читатель, знакомый с грамматикой данных языков, увидит невозможность
отказа от грамматических показателей, в то время как приведенные примеры
санскритской прозы демонстрирует наличие одного-двух грамматических показателей (в частности, именительный падеж) в столь длинных предложениях, что
в свою очередь демонстрирует невозможность дословного перевода.
Исходя из этого можно сделать вывод о том, что санскритский прозаический
текст, относящийся к синтаксическому стилю II, обладает статичностью, обусловленной отсутствием грамматических показателей внутри предложения. Это значит,
что переводчик должен не только соучаствовать в формировании заданного смысла на своем языке (предварительно ознакомившись с автохтонной традицией
интерпретации переводимого текста), но и вносить в перевод динамику (в виде
грамматических показателей), которой нет в тексте оригинала изначально.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Работа подготовлена при поддержке гранта РГНФ № 11-03-00033.
(2) Ориентировочно жил в первой половине VII века н. э. Второй роман Баны «Кадамбари»
почитается индийской традицией в качестве самого чтимого и образцового санскритского романа.
(3) [2. С. 370].
(4) Там же.
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
140
Там же.
Там же.
[2. С. 370—371].
[3. С. 834—943]. К сожалению, руководство по изучению санскрита Миллера, Кнауэра,
а также руководство Бюлера, не говоря уже об учебнике Веры Александровны Кочергиной, не содержат обобщающей информации о синтаксисе санскрита.
[3. С. 927].
[3. С. 928].
Там же.
И это из богатейшей глагольной системы санскрита.
[3. С. 928—929].
Инкорпорирующие языки — это весьма интересное языковое явление. Особенностью
этого типа языков (индейские в Америке, палеоазиатские в Азии) является то, что предложение строится как сложное слово, т.е. неоформленные корни-слова агглютинируются в одно общее целое, которое будет и словом, и предложением. Части этого целого —
и элементы слова, и члены предложения. Целое — это слово-предложение, где начало —
подлежащее, конец — сказуемое, а в середину инкорпорируются (вставляются) дополнения со своими определениями и обстоятельствами. См. более подробно: [8. С. 341].
Древнегреческий не приведен здесь, так как его синтаксис близок русскому языку.
«Ex his duobus gradibus primis, quibus manuducimur ad speculandum Deum in uestigiis quasi
ad modum duarum alarum descendentium circa pedes, colligere possumus, quod omnes creaturae istius sensibilis mundi animum contemplantis et sapientis ducunt in Deum aeternum,
pro eo, quod illius Primi Principii potentissimi, sapientissimi et optima, illius aeternae Originis,
Lucis et plenitudinis, illius, inquam, Artis efficientis, exemplantis et ordinantis sunt umbrae,
resonantiae et picturae, sunt uestigia, simulacra et spectatula nobis ad contuendum Deum
proposita et singa diuinitus data; quae, inquam, sunt exemplaria uel potius exemplata, proposita mentibus adhuc rudibus et sensibilibus, ut per sensibilia, quae uident, transferantur ad intelligibilia, quae non uident, tanquam per signa ad signata».
«На основании этих двух первых ступеней, ведущих нас к узрению Бога в следах,
этих двух крыльев, ниспадающих к стопам серафимов, мы можем сделать вывод, что все
творения этого воспринимаемого чувствами мира ведут мудрую и преданную созерцанию
душу к вечному Богу. По отношению к Богу, являющемуся всемогущим, мудрейшим
и наиблагим Первоистоком всего сущего, по отношению к Его вечному происхождению,
свету и полноте, по отношению, как я полагаю, к Его действующему искусству, творящему по образцу и упорядоченно, все творения являются как бы тенями, эхом и картинами. Они представляют собой следы, подобия и зримые образы, открытые нам для
постижения Бога и данные в качестве божественных знаков, которые, как я полагаю,
являются образцами или, скорее, копиями, служащими для того, чтобы еще грубые и чувственные души через видимые, воспринимаемые чувствами вещи перешли к вещам
интеллигибельным, то есть через знаки перешли к ими обозначаемому» [1. С. 86].
«Um aber in dieser Bearbeitung nicht bloß von der gemeinen sittlichen Beurteilung (die hier
sehr achtungswürdig ist) zur philosophischen, wie sonst geschehen ist, sondern von einer populären Philosophie, die nicht weiter geht, als sie durch Tappen vermittelst der Beispiele
kommen kann, bis zur Metaphysik (die sich durch nichts Empirisches weiter zurückhalten
läßt und, indem sie den ganzen Inbegriff der Vernunfterkenntnis dieser Art ausmessen muß,
allenfalls bis zu Ideen geht, wo selbst die Beispiele uns verlassen) durch die natürlichen Stufen
fortzuschreiten, müssen wir das praktische Vernunftvermögen von seinen allgemeinen Bestimmungsregeln an bis dahin, wo aus ihm der Begriff der Pflicht entspringt, verfolgen und
deutlich darstellen».
Псху Р.В. Экспликация одного известного, но непопулярного факта
«Однако, чтобы в этой работе подняться по естественным ступеням не просто от обыденной нравственной оценки (которая здесь достойна большого уважения) к философской,
как это произошло раньше, но от популярной философии, не заходящей дальше, чем
насколько она ощупью может добраться посредством примеров, к метафизике (которую
уже более не сдерживает ничто эмпирическое и которая, имея своей задачей измерить
всю совокупность этого рода разумного познания, во всяком случае доходит до идей,
где нас покидают даже и примеры), мы должны проследить и четко представить практическую способность разума, начиная с ее общих правил определения и кончая тем моментом, где из нее возникает понятие долга» [4. С. 116].
(17)
«И сказал Он: свойство этого — в видении сердца твоего, а разум твой для того,
чтобы ты свидетельствовал в душе своей каждого царя и царствие, каждое небо и землю,
сушу и море, ночь и день, пророка и ангела, знание и мистическое знание, слова и имена;
все то, что включено в это, и то, что посреди этого, говорит «Нет ничего подобного
Ему», и ты видишь, что эта речь «Нет ничего подобного Ему» — предел знания и край
мистического знания». Перевод с арабского Р.В. Псху [5].
(18)
«ekyavAkyavirodhAdetadparamArthikaguNbrahmaprAptiviXayamityabhyupagantavyamiti cet»
«[Возражение оппонента]: Поскольку это противоречит пассажу о тождестве Брахмана
и души, то полагаем, что в данном случае объект достижения — Брахман, обладающий
качествами, и не являющийся высшей целью» [6. С. 224].
«atredaь sarvaśāstrahзdayam — jīvātmānaю svayamasaьkucitāparīcchinnanirmalaj$ānasvarūpāю santaю karmarūpāvidyāveщсitāstattatkarmānurūpaj$ānasaьkocamāpannāю,
brahmādistambaparyantavividhavicitradeheщu praviщсāstattaddehocitalabbhaj$ānaprasarāstattaddehātmābhimāninastaducitakarmāхī kurvāхāstadanuguхasukhadu:khopabhogarūpasaьsārapravāhaь pratipadyante».
«Здесь суть всех учений: дживатманы сами по себе имеют форму чистого, неограниченного знания, но приобрели ограниченное знание в соответствии со своей кармой,
покрытые неведением в виде кармы. Они приняли многочисленные и разнообразные
проявления, начиная с Брахмы и кончая пучком травы. И они, как сказано, находятся
в потоке сансары. Испытывая страдания и счастье в соответствии со своими поступками;
они мнят себя как проявленное, обладая тем знанием, которое они получили в соответствии со своими проявлениями» [6. C. 216].
«svacchandānuvartisvarūpasthitipravзttibhedāśeщaśeщataikaratirūpanityaniravadyaniratiśayaj$ānakriyaiśvaryādyanantakalyāхaguхagaхaśeщaśeщāщanagaruуapramukhanānāvidhā
nantaparijanaparicārikāparicaritacaraхayugala!»
«У Твоих ног разнообразные бесконечные слуги и служанки, самые главные из которых — это Гаруда, Шеша, Вишвакшена, обладающие множеством бесконечных благих
качеств, таких как вечные, непревзойденные и безграничные власть, активность, знание,
чья сущность, пребывание и деятельность состоят в безраздельной радости абсолютной
зависимости служения [Тебе]».
«paramayogivāпmanasāparicchedyasvarūpasvabhāvasvābhimatavividhavicitrānantabhogyabhogopakaraхabhogasthānasamзddhānantāścaryānantamahāvibhavānantapari
māхanityaniravadyaniratiśayavaikuхсhanātha».
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«Ты являешься повелителем Вайкунтхи, вечной, непревзойденной, безграничной,
бесконечно большой, бесконечно сияющей, бесконечно дивной, обладающей местами
и способами разнообразных и прекрасных наслаждений, желанных Тебе, [соответствующих] Твоему нраву и сущности, которая не может быть познана даже умом (manas)
высших йогинов. Твоей игрой [является] появление, сила и исчезновение всего мира,
наполненного местами и средствами множества удовольствий, в котором есть бесконечно разнообразные и дивные вкушающие наслаждение и сами наслаждения, а также
представленного в виде времени, пуруши и пракрити, единственная природа [которых]
быть Твоим дополнением, а деятельность и пребывание которых соответствуют Твоей
сущности, следующей за Твоей волей!» [7. С. 131].
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Бонавентура Путеводитель души к Богу / Перевод В.А. Задворного. — М., 1993.
[2] Гринцер П.А. «Кадамбари» Баны и поэтика санскритского романа // Бана. Кадамбари.
Перевод, статья, примечания, словарь имен, названий и терминов. — М., 1995.
[3] Зализняк А.А. Грамматический строй санскрита / Кочергина В.А. Санскритско-русский
словарь. — М., 1996.
[4] Кант И. Основоположения к метафизике нравов (русский текст подготовлен А.К. Судаковым на базе перевода Л.Д. Б. Хвостова) // Кант И. Сочинения на русском и немецком
языках. Т. 3. — М., 1997.
[5] ан-Ниффари, Китаб ал-мавакиф // Шарх мавакиф ан-Ниффари ли ‘Афиф ад-Дин атТилимсани. — Каир, 1997.
[6] Рамануджа, Ведартхасамграха // Псху Р.В. «Ведартхасамграха» Рамануджи и становление вишишта-адвайта-веданты. — М., 2007.
[7] Рамануджа. Шаранагатигадья // Псху Р.В. Религиозно-философское учение Ямуначарьи. — М., 2012.
[8] Реформатский А.А. Введение в языкознание. — М., 1955.
НАШИ АВТОРЫ
Гревцова Елена Степановна — кандидат философских наук, доцент кафедры
социальной философии факультета гуманитарных и социальных наук Российского университета дружбы народов. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Десницкая Евгения Алексеевна — кандидат философских наук, ассистент, ка-
федра философии и культурологии Востока философского факультета СанктПетербургского государственного университета. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Жданов Владимир Владимирович — кандидат философских наук, доцент ка-
федры истории философии факультета гуманитарных и социальных наук
Российского университета дружбы народов. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Защитина Галина Викторовна — кандидат филологических наук, кафедра анг-
лийского языка заочного факультета, Московского государственного лингвистического университета. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Защитин Александр Валерьевич — кандидат филологических наук, старший
научный сотрудник ИВР РАН. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Канаева Наталия Алексеевна — кандидат философских наук, доцент кафедры
истории философии факультета философии Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики». E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Ковыршина Наталья Борисовна — кандидат филологических наук, доцент ка-
федры иностранных языков филологического факультета Российского университета дружбы народов. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Кулагин Игорь В. — аспирант Государственного академического университета
гуманитарных наук. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Лапицкая Ольга Юрьевна — аспирант, кафедра истории философии факультета
гуманитарных и социальных наук РУДН. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
143
Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2014, № 1
Мазепова Елена Викторовна — кандидат филологических наук, доцент, докто-
рант, кафедра Ближнего Востока Института филологии Киевского национального университета имени Тараса Шевченко. E-mail: philolog@univ.kiev.ua
Муссауи Екатерина Викторовна — кандидат исторических наук, доцент кафед-
ры иностранных языков философии факультета гуманитарных и социальных
наук Российского университета дружбы народов. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Нижников Сергей Анатольевич — доктор философских наук, профессор ка-
федры истории философии факультета гуманитарных и социальных наук Российского университета дружбы народов. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Пахомов Сергей Владимирович — кандидат философских наук, доцент, ка-
федра философии и культурологии Востока философского факультета СанктПетербургского государственного университета. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Псху Рузана Владимировна — кандидат философских наук, доцент, кафедра
истории философии факультета гуманитарных и социальных наук РУДН.
E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Рашковский Евгений Борисович — доктор исторических наук, профессор,
комплексный научно-исследовательский отдел, Всероссийская государственная библиотека иностранной литературы им. М.И. Рудомино. E-mail:
hphilosophy@mail.ru
Смирнов Андрей Вадимович — доктор философских наук, член-корреспондент
РАН, зав. сектором философии исламского мира Института философии РАН.
E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Скороходова Татьяна Григорьевна — доктор философских наук, кандидат ис-
торических наук, профессор кафедры теории и практики социальной работы
Пензенского государственного университета. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Степанянц Мариэтта Тиграновна — доктор философских наук, профессор,
главный научный сотрудник сектора восточных философий Института философии РАН. E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
Титлин Лев Игоревич — кадидат философских наук, младший научный со-
трудник сектора восточных философий Института философии РАН. E-mail:
hphilosophy@mail.ru
Юркевич Александр Генадьевич — кандидат исторических наук, доцент отде-
ления востоковедения факультета философии Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики». E-mail: hphilosophy@mail.ru
ВЕСТНИК
Российского университета
дружбы народов
Научный журнал
Серия
ФИЛОСОФИЯ
2014, № 1
Зав. редакцией Т.О. Сергеева
Редактор К.В. Зенкин
Компьютерная верстка: Е.П. Довголевская
Адрес редакции:
Российский университет дружбы народов
ул. Орджоникидзе, 3, Москва, Россия, 115419
Тел.: 955-07-16
Адрес редакционной коллегии
серии «Философия»:
ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 10/2, Москва, Россия, 117198
Тел.: (495) 952-52-26 e-mail: kirabaev@gmail.com
Подписано в печать 05.03.2014. Формат 60×84/8.
Бумага офсетная. Печать офсетная. Гарнитура «Times New Roman».
Усл. печ. л. 17,21. Тираж 500 экз. Заказ № 9
Типография ИПК РУДН
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BULLETIN
of Peoples’ Friendship
University of Russia
Scientific journal
Series
PHILOSOPHY
2014, N 1
Managing editor T.O. Sergeeva
Editor K.V. Zenkin
Computer design E.P. Dovgolevskaya
Address of the editorial board:
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Ordzhonikidze str., 3, Moscow, Russia,115419
Ph. +7 (495) 955-07-16
Address of the editorial board
series «Philosophy»:
Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, Moscow, Russia, 117198
Ph. +7 (495) 952-52-26
e-mail: kirabaev@gmail.com
Printing run 500 copies
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Ordzhonikidze str., 3, Moscow, Russia, 115419
Ph. +7 (495) 952-04-41
ДЛЯ ЗАМЕТОК