ООН: Мирное урегулирование в Намибии

5
Success in Namibia
The second UNTAG contingent: September 1989 – April 1990
The images of the Namibian election flashing on television screens around the globe
seemed to provide a human face to the ‘new world order’ that promised so much at
the end of the Cold War. In blazing heat, long lines of tribesmen and women, in
their best clothes, or sporting the colours of their political parties, waited patiently
in the dust to cast their votes in the country’s first free and fair election. Thousands
of Namibians had worked, prayed, agitated and fought for this day. They had been
assisted by friendly countries and, importantly, by the United Nations, which was now
supervising the whole peace process. After five days of voting, emotions were released
on the evening of 11 November 1989 when the UN Special Representative, Martti
Ahtisaari, announced that the election had indeed been ‘free and fair’. Ahtisaari’s top
assistant, Cedric Thornberry, wrote in his diary that suddenly ‘everyone was in the front
office, laughing and crying . . . The Brits arrived, many of the South Africans, and some
of the Frontline. A wonderful, spontaneous, happy party.’1 But the images did not
dominate the world’s television screens. Events in Europe seemed even more dramatic,
for in Berlin the hated Wall was falling at just the same time. Nonetheless, the election
was an outstanding achievement and a giant step along the road to peace.
In years to come members of the Australian second contingent, as well as the civilian
Australian election monitors, would reflect that their labours had been crucial to the
success of the election. But the Australian engineers’ work went well beyond that
undertaken during the election, for they had already done much to prepare for it, and
after the election they would need to devote considerable effort towards preparing the
country for independence on 21 March 1990.
Well briefed on the situation, the second contingent’s troops who arrived during
September and early October 1989 knew that the elections would dominate their tour.
The first contingent had done outstanding work in establishing the force, but the
1
Thornberry, A Nation is Born, p. 326.
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New major peace operations
second contingent could approach the election tasks with new enthusiasm and energy.
The changeover therefore came at an appropriate time.
Planning the replacement of the first contingent had begun as soon as it had deployed
in March 1989, and the second contingent commander, Colonel John Crocker, had been
appointed almost immediately. He was an even more experienced engineer than his
predecessor. Born in June 1941, by the time he arrived in Namibia he was aged 48.
A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, he had completed a Bachelor of
Technology in Civil Engineering and had served with the 17th Construction Squadron
in South Vietnam in 1966–67. He then had a wide range of regimental postings, serving
in field squadrons and commanding the district engineer office in Mendi in Papua New
Guinea and the 3rd Field Engineer Regiment. He was Director of Engineers in 1983–
85, then Director of Organisation in Army Office. When Warren left Australia for
Namibia, Crocker returned as Director of Engineers and commander designate of the
second contingent.
The second contingent was significantly different from the first. The first contingent
had been built around the existing 17th Construction Squadron, and although many
soldiers needed to be posted in from around Australia, its structure was intact (except for
the additional 14th Field Troop from Brisbane). By contrast, the second contingent was
built from scratch, and by the time it was complete it included soldiers from seventyeight different Australian and New Zealand units and twelve different corps.2 Only the
15th Field Troop (from 18th Field Squadron in Townsville) came as a formed unit.
There were other differences, as the contingent included five soldiers from the
Army Reserve, an RAAF officer, Flight Lieutenant Craig Forster, who became the
resources staff officer in the headquarters, and fourteen New Zealand engineers (led
by Lieutenant Gerrard [Jed] Shirley), who were spread throughout the squadron. The
New Zealand Government had requested Australia to make positions available for its
men.3 Further, as noted in the previous chapter, on 28 August the UN secretariat asked
Australia to provide five military police to Untag as soon as possible.4 Australia agreed,
and incorporated a military police detachment, led by Sergeant Tim Dewar, into the
second contingent.5 Their duties included manning a military police post, security of
the Grootfontein logistic base, traffic control and investigation of incidents involving
Untag personnel.6 The second contingent therefore numbered 309 personnel, while
the first was 304.
There were difficult challenges in trying to form a cohesive entity out of these
disparate elements; but the contingent drew strength from being formed for a purpose.
Unexpectedly, its commanders had to battle the Army system to put the team together.
Although the 1st Construction Regiment had assisted the first contingent to prepare for
its deployment, by the time the second contingent was being formed the regiment was
deeply involved in Exercise Kangaroo 89, and could not assist. Further, units that were
2
3
4
5
6
Col J.A. Crocker, ‘Second Australian Contingent Untag post operational tour report’, 1 June 1990,
Defence: A6721, 90/4429 pt 1.
Cable CE755664, Canberra to New York, 1 August 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 3.
Cable UN47636, New York to Canberra, 28 August 1989, NAA, A1209, 1985/221 pt 3.
Signal Ops 1404, Armyops, Canberra to Defarm, Campbell, 15 September 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18907 pt 4.
Letter, Beazley to Evans, 19 September 1989, NAA, A1209, 1985/221 pt 3.
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Success in Namibia
committed to the exercise were reluctant to release troops. Apparently field exercises
were thought to be more important than operational deployments.
Fortunately, Crocker’s deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Ken Gillespie, was Senior Instructor at the School of Military Engineering, Casula, and, as Crocker recalled, the school
thus became the ‘sponsoring establishment, training and equipping’ his contingent,
‘whilst the requirement for a mounting HQ [ie a headquarters to control the deployment] was debated within Army Office’.7 Eleven years younger than Crocker, Gillespie
had started his military career as an apprentice bricklayer before attending the Officer
Cadet School at Portsea, graduating in mid-1970. He had served in various engineer
units and by 1989, as a major, was Senior Instructor at Casula when he was promoted
to lieutenant colonel to be SO1 (Operations) in the second contingent.
The squadron commander, Major Brendan Sowry, was also well qualified. Aged 32,
he was a Duntroon graduate with a degree in civil engineering and, in addition to
engineer appointments, he had spent a year as a UN observer in Untso serving on the
Golan Heights and in Beirut. For the previous eighteen months he had been commander
of the 22nd Construction Squadron in Perth, and many of his soldiers had been posted
to the new contingent. Further, he was accompanied by his Squadron Sergeant Major,
Warrant Officer Class 1 Rod Carr, who also had peacekeeping experience, having served
with the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.
Even bringing Crocker’s force together for a 14-day training period was difficult.
Between 19 August and 3 September, 240 members gathered at the 2nd Training
Group, Ingleburn (a few kilometres from Casula), but other members could not join
them because they were committed to Exercise Kangaroo 89. Therefore a further sixty
members conducted their training between 23 September and 1 October, by which
time some of the contingent was already in Namibia. Some soldiers spent up to three
months on Exercise Kangaroo 89 in northern Australia before beginning their six- or
seven-month tour with Untag.
The long handover from 7 September, when the first group of the second contingent
arrived, until 5 October, when the last group of the first contingent departed, was a
strain for both parties. The outgoing troops were anxious to be on their way and found it
difficult to remain interested in the tasks at hand. The incoming troops were eager to do
things their way, often seeing the situation differently from their predecessors. Crocker
and Gillespie in Windhoek believed that the first contingent had erred in allowing
members to live in private accommodation, and instead directed that all officers and
men live in the Pastoral Centre.8 Major Sowry, writing at the time, described his
handover in Grootfontein:
After the first week, Dave [Crago] and his key people went on two weeks holiday. This
gave us time to find our feet, to settle in and determine the condition of the unit, its equipment etc. The previous contingent had achieved a good deal in their time however they
let quite a few standard procedures slip, the result is that we have a great deal of catch-up
work to do to ensure everything is running smoothly. There had also been quite a few
7
8
Ibid.
Interviews, K.J. Gillespie, 9 March 2005; P.M. Boyd, 20 July 2005. Warren claims that soldiers were
not permitted to live in private accommodation and that he was not aware that they did so (interview,
R.D. Warren, 30 October 2005).
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New major peace operations
ugly Australians in the old group who didn’t endear themselves to the other contingents
and some of the locals, again we have been working to redress the situation. On his
return, Dave and I were able to resolve some of the problems and identify a few more.
The old team finally departed on 5 Oct and we all breathed a collective sigh of relief.9
PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS
As the second contingent settled into its tasks of preparing for the election it was clear
that the security environment was changing. By this time the SADF had been reduced
in numbers, the remaining troops had been confined to base, and the SWATF had
already been demobilised. Meanwhile former Swapo soldiers had returned to Namibia
as part of the returnee program. The Untag military force was not structured to deal
with internal unrest, and at times the South West Africa Police (Swapol) seemed
to lack interest or motivation. With the beginning of the election campaign there
was an increase in politically motivated violence, the most obvious example being the
assassination of the white Swapo lawyer, Anton Lubowski, on 12 September, just two
days before the Swapo president, Sam Nujoma, returned to Windhoek after two decades
of exile.
Along with violence within Namibia, there was an upsurge of fighting between the
Angolan government (Fapla) and rebel (Unita) troops across the border in Angola, with
the potential of spilling over into Namibia. This gave Swapol units an excuse to step
up their patrols in northern Ovamboland. On 18 September the Fapla were reported to
have killed two civilians, one a known Swapo activist, inside Namibia.10 Eleven days
later Fapla ambushed a Unita party, and a Swapol unit in Casspirs assisted Unita to
break contact. The commanding officer of the Malaysian battalion believed that Swapol
had fabricated the reports ‘to justify their numbers and deployments along the border’.
The Australians thought that the Unita activity along the border was intended to
bolster the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance’s election prospects in Swapo’s traditional
heartland.11
Of course the Swapol counterinsurgency unit, Koevoet, was supposed to be demobilised, and on 30 September Crocker accompanied Prem Chand on a visit to Oshakati
to inspect progress. Crocker’s report to Canberra was blunt:
It appears that the demobilisation plan is in a shambles. UN [civilian police] commenced
the monitoring process supervised by reps from UN military monitors. Only half the
expected number of Koevoet members paraded. The senior Koevoet member present
indicated that the others were still drunk after the previous day’s pay parade and could
not be found. The Commander [Prem Chand] also refused to allow those members that
did attend to stand in the sun while the personal particulars required by the UN were
recorded for monitoring purposes. The Koevoet commander dismissed them for the
remainder of the day. We now await the outcome of this fiasco.12
9
10
11
12
Circular letter, c. 17 October 1989, B. Sowry papers.
Contingent Diary of Events, Crocker papers.
Cable WI0259, Windhoek to Canberra, 30 October 1989, AWM: Col (OA) files.
Signal SIC JFD Ops2374, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 1 October 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18932 pt 1.
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Success in Namibia
Next day there were clashes between Swapo and Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
supporters armed with sticks, stones, bows, arrows, spears and firearms, which resulted
in the death of one and serious injuries to eight. UN civilian police were jostled and
threatened with death by DTA supporters armed with knives and pistols. Malaysian
troops protected the UN police station, but Swapol did little to quell the rioting,
arguing that with the demobilisation of Koevoet they lacked the manpower to take
decisive action.13 One report claimed that former Koevoet members, dressed in DTA
colours, started the riot.14
Violence and intimidation continued, and Crocker reported on 15 October that the
demobilisation of Koevoet had ‘taken a 1,200-man force which was answerable for its
actions and has simply turned it loose on the local population’.15 In the two weekends
before the election eleven people were killed and fifty wounded in the town of Oshakati
alone.16 Nonetheless, the violence was actually less than had been expected. As the South
African foreign affairs representative in Namibia stated on 30 October, ‘Despite some
intimidation and loss of life, the process had so far stayed within generally acceptable
bounds.’17
The Australian engineers were not directly involved in dealing with the violence,
but they still had plentiful work in preparing for the election, their main task being to
locate and carry out maintenance works at the polling stations across northern Namibia.
Military support for the election was organised on a piece-by-piece basis, and initially
it was envisaged that the military would only provide communication and logistic
support. Later the military was asked to provide electoral monitors.18 On 18 September
Untag headquarters held a conference to discuss military support to the election,
and Prem Chand offered to provide up to 300 officers and senior NCOs as electoral
monitors. It was thought that Prem Chand would ask the Australians to contribute
forty personnel.
Two days later news came that a civilian had lost a foot while taking a short cut
through a minefield around an old SADF base near Mahanene. SADF engineers had
claimed that they had cleared 85 per cent of the minefield, but the Chief Engineer
Headquarters noted that even if this claim was correct there were at least 800 mines
in the field. Lieutenant Brent Maddock’s 15th Field Troop was despatched and made
the first entry by Australian troops into a live minefield since the Vietnam War. The
sappers destroyed five anti-personnel mines.19
On 2 October Crocker ordered a reconnaissance of the proposed polling stations
in Ovamboland, Kavango and the Caprivi Strip, and teams began deploying from
Grootfontein on 5 October. Lieutenant Noel Beutel’s 9th Construction Troop had the
task of locating 114 static polling stations in Ovamboland. On 17 October Crocker
reported to Untag headquarters that his troops had surveyed 133 polling stations,
13
14
15
16
Cable WI0229, Windhoek to Defence, Canberra, 4 October 1989, AWM; Col (OA) files.
Memo, Director DIO to Beazley, 5 October 1989, AWM: Col (OA) files.
Signal, HQ Austengrs, Untag, to HQADF, 15 October 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18922 pt 1.
Crocker evidence before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
Canberra, 10 December 1990, p. 64.
17 Cable PR28203, Pretoria to Canberra, 30 October 1989, AWM: Col (OA) files.
18 Report, Col M.K. Jeffrey, ‘A historical summary of Untag’, c. April 1990, Jeffrey papers.
19 Contingent Diary of Events, Crocker papers.
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New major peace operations
although they were unable to locate a further twenty-nine stations on the map or
on the ground. The static polling stations were generally in school buildings, which
could provide basic sleeping accommodation for the electoral monitors, although tents
would be required at twenty-six sites. Sanitary facilities needed to be constructed at
a minimum of 120 stations, and water would need to be delivered and stored at a
minimum of seventy stations.20
By this time the second contingent had completed its deployment. Lieutenant Ian
Bottrell’s 8th Construction Troop was at Rundu, working on accommodation for the
Italian air contingent.21 The 9th Construction and 15th Field Troops were at Ondangwa.
The 9th Troop was beginning concreting work for caravans to be used by UN civilian
police and for UN district staffs. The field troop had a demanding explosive ordnance
disposal program, as in the week ending 15 October there were three incidents in which
children had been killed.22 A section of the field troop was at Swakopmund constructing
security fencing for three military monitor observation posts, from where Untag would
monitor the SADF’s withdrawal to the South African enclave at nearby Walvis Bay
following the election. Captain Kurt Heidecker’s Plant Troop had teams deployed to
Oshivelo, Ohangwena and Ondangwa preparing sites for caravans. And Lieutenant
Doug Langrehr’s Resources Troop was constructing an operating theatre for the Swiss
medical unit and undertaking concreting tasks in the Grootfontein logistic base.
Throughout October the Australian headquarters staffs in both Windhoek and
Grootfontein had been planning for the engineer contribution to the election, to be
held between 7 and 11 November, and on 28 October Crocker issued his written order
for Operation Poll Gallop. This order noted that a total of 350 polling stations (207
static and 143 mobile) were to be established and that the Australians were to provide
engineer support to 121 static polling stations in the northern areas of Kaokoland,
Ovamboland and West Hereroland.23 In addition, they were to be prepared to support
the Finnish battalion’s engineer efforts in Kavango and the Caprivi Strip. Crocker
had become alarmed about the capacity of the UN logistic organisation to support
the assembly and dispersal of election monitors from Ondangwa, and he ordered his
engineers to be prepared to assist this part of the operation.
The first task, preparing the polling stations, was well underway, and included the
construction of toilets and ablutions at thirty stations in Kavango, 103 in Ovamboland
and four in Kaokoland, the provision of eight jerry cans of water at each of thirtyone stations in Kavango, ninety-one in Ovamboland and four in Kaokoland, and the
provision of tents at one station in Kavango and eleven in Ovamboland. A water point
was to be established near Nkurenkuru to support the Finnish battalion.
The second task was to prepare and maintain reception and training centres for the
electoral monitors in Windhoek, Rundu and Ongwediva.
The third task was to maintain facilities at the 121 polling stations throughout the
period of the election. To achieve this task, 17th Construction Squadron formed ten
20 Memo, Crocker to Untag Deputy Director of Administration, 17 October 1989, Crocker papers.
21 The task involved the construction of fifty rooms in five existing buildings, and took three and a half
months to complete.
22 Signal, HQ Austengrs, Untag, to HQADF, 15 October 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18922 pt 1.
23 OPORD 3/89, Operation Poll Gallop, 28 October 1989, Crocker papers. The United Nations, The
Blue Helmets, 3rd edn, p. 227, states that a total 358 polling stations were established.
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Success in Namibia
engineer maintenance teams, each of eight persons, ready to be deployed at short notice.
One team was deployed in Kaokoland, eight in Ovamboland and one in Hereroland
East.24 The maintenance teams were to visit each static polling station for which they
were responsible at least once every thirty-six hours.
The fourth task was to provide security for all Australian personnel, including the
civilian electoral monitors. 17th Construction Squadron was to provide a reinforced
troop (fifty soldiers) to be mounted in Buffel mine-proof vehicles and held as a mobile
reserve in Ondangwa. The ready-reaction teams were to conduct rehearsals for deployments to each of the fifteen sensitive locations in Ovamboland, and to practise actions
to be taken ‘in stabilising a hostile but not physically violent situation’ in which
Australians might be involved.25
As this latter task suggests, the Australian engineers saw it as their special responsibility to support the Australian civilian election monitors. To ensure that the elections
were ‘free and fair’ Untag planned to deploy election monitors at each of the polling
stations. These included almost 900 civilian Untag staff who were already in Namibia,
885 specialist personnel made available from twenty-seven countries, and 358 Untag
military staff in civilian clothes. In addition the 1,023 Untag police monitors were
assigned to electoral duties.26 The Australian Government only confirmed that it was
willing to provide electoral monitors on 11 October, and a mixed team of thirty volunteered, mostly from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).27
There were also thirty Australian military electoral monitors, headed by Lieutenant
Colonel Peter Boyd, the legal officer on Crocker’s staff. The team included seven other
officers, six warrant officers, eleven sergeants and five corporals. On 24 October Ahtisaari
met a representative of the Administrator-General’s office and agreed to the latter’s
demand that the military monitors be deployed at the polling stations in civilian clothes
and without weapons, as would be the case with the civilian and police monitors. Prem
Chand and the contingent commanders strenuously opposed this decision, and when
Crocker sought advice from Canberra he was advised that Australian military personnel
were not permitted to be employed in civilian clothes.28 Once it became clear that all the
other contingents except Canada had agreed, Crocker advised Canberra that if Australia
refused it might ‘negate the very high reputation gained by the Australian contingent
to date’.29 But even then the Australian Government was reluctant to approve the
24
25
26
27
Maj B. Sowry, ‘A concise history of 17 Construction Squadron Untag’, B. Sowry papers.
Annex A to OPORD 3/89, Operation Poll Gallop, 28 October 1989, Crocker papers.
The Blue Helmets, p. 227.
Cable UN47996, New York to Canberra, 11 October 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 4, and
cable CH561810, Canberra to New York, 31 October 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 5. There
were 26 monitors from the AEC, two from DFAT, one from the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet and a fingerprint expert from the Australian Federal Police. Outside Untag, but in support
of UN efforts in Namibia, Australia contributed to the Commonwealth observer group, including
the chairman, Alf Parson (cable WI0245, Windhoek to Canberra, 12 October 1989, NAA: A9737,
92/11348 pt 6).
28 Cable WI0255, Windhoek to Canberra, 25 October 1989, and Signal SIC JFD, HQADF to New
York, 26 October 1989, both in Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 4. Crocker’s legal officer, Lt Col Boyd,
had given him the same advice (letter, Boyd to Brig W.D. Rolfe, Director-General Legal Service –
Army, 21 November 1989, Boyd papers).
29 Signal, SIC IAA Ops2686, HQ Austengrs Untag, to HQADF, 30 October 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18932 pt 1. Memo, CDF to Minister, 31 October 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 5.
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wearing of civilian clothes unless the United Nations and South Africa confirmed that
the military personnel would continue to be covered by the status of forces agreement.30
The United Nations did not confirm this until 7 November, the first day of the elections.
The Australians then carried out their tasks in civilian clothes.31
Belatedly, on 10 November the Australian Army’s Director General of Legal Services,
Brigadier Bill Rolfe, who had not been consulted earlier, advised that the troops might be
lawfully required to wear civilian clothes; but he thought the longer-term implications
were serious. He advised: ‘A proposal that members of a UN force “disguise” themselves
as civilians to perform their UN functions points inevitably to a failure of the UN force
in its role.’32 An Australian warrant officer refused to deploy as an electoral monitor,
claiming that to do so in civilian clothes would expose him to danger.33 There was no
difficulty finding another warrant officer to replace him. Interestingly, the Canadian
Government withdrew its military observers when they were required to wear civilian
clothes.34
OPERATION POLL GALLOP
In the evening of 27 October the Australian electoral monitors, headed by Nick Tall
from the AEC, arrived at Windhoek where they were met by Crocker and Major
Adrian Overell, of the headquarters staff. They had departed Australia brimming with
excitement. At that time the AEC had not been closely involved in overseas elections,
and for many this was their first visit overseas.35 Their first night was spent in a school
on the outskirts of the city in the black township of Katatura, which also doubled as
an assembly point for the hundreds of other international monitors. But difficulties
soon became apparent; the buses scheduled to arrive at 5 o’clock the next morning did
not appear. Nor, it seemed, was breakfast considered an essential part of the electoral
process. Luckily, a local family, caretakers at the school, generously offered bread, jam
and tea, to give the group sustenance for the day ahead. As one monitor later wrote:
‘This was the first of our many experiences with Untag – the “United Nations Terrible
Arrangements Group”.’36
The buses that arrived at 11 am took the majority of Australians north to Ongwediva
(between Ondangwa and Oshakati in Ovamboland), where they spent several days being
instructed on their duties and the possible dangers associated with the election. Michael
Maley, the Australian AEC official seconded to Untag headquarters, had written the
30 Cable CE798106, ADF to New York, 2 November 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 5.
31 Cable WI0265, Windhoek to Canberra, 2 November 1989, NAA, A9737, 92/11348 pt 6. Contingent
Diary of Events, Crocker papers.
32 Memo, DGLS-A to ACPERS-A and DGOPS-A, 10 November 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 6;
letter, Rolfe to Boyd, 14 December 1989, Boyd papers.
33 Interview, P.M. Boyd, 20 July 2005; letter, Boyd to Rolfe, 13 October 1989, Boyd papers.
34 Report, O.A.K. MacDonald (Military Coordinator, elections operation), ‘Report on the role of
the military component of Untag in the Namibian elections – November 1989’, UN: S0529/
244/3.
35 For the AEC’s experience to this time see Michael Maley, ‘Exporting expertise in democratic administration’, in Sawer, Elections: Full, Free and Fair, p. 176.
36 Dawson, ‘Into Africa’.
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Success in Namibia
training manuals.37 Most of the Australians were to be employed in Ovamboland,
which had more than 36 per cent of Namibia’s 700,000 registered voters. Immediately
there were administrative problems. The local sewerage system became blocked, and the
engineers constructed field toilets. By 30 October Crocker was reporting to Canberra that
the organisation at Ongwediva ‘left much to be desired’. In addition to the emergency
plumbing his engineers had also needed to provide meals for their compatriots.38
On 1 November the second-in-command of the squadron, Captain Steve Day, arrived
at Ondangwa to command the squadron’s tactical headquarters, which was responsible
for providing support to the election.39 The Australians now received information
that the coordination arrangements at the election monitors’ forward reception area in
Ondangwa was poor, so next day the contingent’s Regimental Sergeant Major, Warrant
Officer Class 1 John Raddatz, took control of a specialist team that Crocker had formed to
assist with the management of the monitors’ dispersal area if it proved to be necessary.40
Crocker and staff from Windhoek established a forward headquarters in Ondangwa
on 3 November, leaving Gillespie in command in Windhoek. The five-member electoral
monitoring teams (numbering 800 in all) were supposed to be deployed to all the
polling stations throughout Ovamboland during that day, but it was soon obvious
that the movement arrangements were in disarray.41 One group of monitors trudged
to the Ondangwa airport early in the morning to be ferried to remote polling booths
by helicopter. Instead, most of them spent the entire day standing on the tarmac in
awful heat, annoyed and bemused by Untag’s inefficiency. Meanwhile the Australian
military monitors, who had completed training in Windhoek and Grootfontein, arrived
at Ondangwa in a Spanish C-130 aircraft that had flown so low it had struck a tree.42
(After the election all the Australian Army monitors returned to Grootfontein and
Windhoek by road, not being willing to risk ‘a ride with Spanish Air’.43 )
On 4 November Crocker despatched the engineer maintenance teams to their areas,
and they were able to escort the monitors to their locations, as the engineers were the
one group who knew where the polling stations were located. Next day Raddatz and his
Australian and Canadian staff worked hard to keep control and to despatch the monitor
teams. The squadron diary noted that the monitors on the whole (not referring to the
Australians) were ‘uncooperative and lazy’, and that Raddatz and Captain David Saul
(a staff officer from the Chief Engineer Headquarters) ‘were stretched to the limits of
their patience’. During the day Australian civilian monitors arrived at the Australian
base at Ondangwa seeking rations as none had been provided by the United Nations.
Captain Day issued them with Australian 24-hour ration packs. Captain Brian Florence,
37 Maley evidence before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra,
10 December 1990, p. 17.
38 Signal SIC IAA Ops2686, HQ Aust Engrs Untag to HQADF, 30 October 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18932 p 1.
39 Capt Day was the son of Col (later Maj Gen) Peter Day, who had been appointed commander of the
first Australian Untag contingent in 1978.
40 17th Construction Squadron Commander’s Diary, B. Sowry papers.
41 For the monitors’ training and deployment program see draft memo, Omayad to Medili, nd, Crocker
papers.
42 17th Construction Squadron Commander’s Diary, B. Sowry papers.
43 Letter, Boyd to Rolfe, 21 November 1989, Boyd papers. ‘Spanish Air’ refers to the Spanish air force.
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New major peace operations
the squadron operations officer, took four soldiers to the Ongwediva training centre to
assist with the despatch of the civilian monitors. As Day wrote in the squadron diary,
the ‘civil organisers’ were ‘not worth their salt and a lot of heartache resulted’. By last
light on 5 November only fifty-nine of the 124 teams had been deployed.44
Next morning reports came in that some of the monitor teams had deployed without rations, water, tents and even ballot boxes, and Crocker despatched the engineer
maintenance teams on resupply missions, even though the Australians had never been
given the resupply mission. By the night of 6 November all the teams had deployed
in readiness for the election, which began the following morning. Writing soon after,
Major Sowry left a vivid description of the preparations:
The bun fight really started when all the election monitors were concentrated in Ongwediva and Ondangwa. There were nearly 1000 civilian, military and police personnel
from almost every country imaginable. The task was to form them into teams of 7 or
8, issue them with vehicles and equipment, marry them up to their AG [Administrator
General] Dept counterpart, then despatch them into the Ooloo.45 A daunting task when
you consider the number of nationalities and diverse backgrounds involved. The UN
really wasn’t prepared for the task, its structure is not suited to the implementation
of plans (if they actually had one) as they have few coal-face managers. Fortunately we
had anticipated the problem and essentially took on the task of getting the teams away,
albeit at short notice. There were many comical scenes over the few days, with diplomacy being thrown to the wind, most of the monitors seemed more intent on taking
photographs of themselves, catching up with old or new friends and wandering away at
critical times, rather than listening to announcements and adhering to directions. There
was almost a carnival atmosphere in the air; our RSM did his best to dispel this, despite
the ever-present language barriers. Whilst this was going on my teams were doing a final
tour of the polling stations, familiarising themselves with their routes and making last
minute preparations. After three frustrating days we eventually got the polling teams
away, the last arriving in location just prior to the opening of the polls. The secretaries
from New York, Paris and Vienna who had come to Namibia expecting air-conditioned
motels, flushing toilets and valet parking discovered that they had a tent, a thunderbox
[field toilet] and a Nigerian driver.46
Gillespie reported to Canberra in a similar vein. There was no doubt, he said, that the
election would not have been able to proceed as planned without the positive attitude
and hard work of members of the Australian, British, Canadian and Polish contingents.
UN civilian police were ‘disorganised, irresponsible and unreliable’. The AG’s staff had
deviated from the deployment plan agreed the previous evening. Gillespie thought
that several UN team leaders lacked ‘commonsense often bordering on plain stupidity’.
Some team leaders had deployed without their teams, some had deployed without
their AG’s counterparts, and individuals had arrived in the assembly areas without
personal equipment and rations. He concluded that subordinate civilian and military
44 17th Construction Squadron Commander’s Diary, B. Sowry papers.
45 Australian slang for distant, unknown countryside.
46 Circular letter, 25 November 1989, B. Sowry papers.
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Success in Namibia
commanders were working hard to keep the chaos from the attention of Ahtisaari and
Prem Chand.47
Peta Dawson, a Canberra-based AEC official, recalled that her team of monitors
took three days of ‘frustrating argument’ with Untag and the AG’s staff, ‘and a lot of
crashing around in the bush to finally decide that we had found the place where we were
going to poll’. They were trying to find the Onanghulo polling station, but there were
two other stations with similar names – Onangolo and Onandhulo – and each was some
200 kilometres apart. Neither Untag nor the AG’s staff were sure which was which
anyway. So, as Dawson wrote, they reached their position at 7 pm on 6 November. ‘In
the headlights from the vehicles we unloaded our convoy, set up camp and prepared
the concrete schoolhouse to receive voters the next morning. I finally crawled into my
sleeping bag at about 3 am only to be awoken an hour later by the subdued murmurings
of a gathering crowd.’48
The first day of polling was chaotic. Somehow, despite publicity to the contrary, the
people were under the impression that they had only one day to vote, and many stations
had crowds of more than a thousand voters milling around. The crowds were generally
well behaved and most were wearing coats and ties and pretty dresses in temperatures
above 40 degrees Celsius. Nearly 60 per cent of the population voted in the first two
days. An Australian election monitor noticed that at one polling booth an obviously ill
elderly lady was carried in on a mattress to cast her vote. She died soon after she was
carried out of the building.49
Although the elections were supposed to be run by the AG’s staff, they were far
less experienced than the Australian and other national electoral monitors who were
very familiar with the electoral process. So while the monitors were only supposed to
observe, they ended up advising the polling station staff, who were very receptive to
this advice. The Australian army monitors in civilian clothes were generally the vehicle
and radio operators at the polling stations, and became the camp coordinators. As one
recalled, ‘ . . . a lot of effort was required to convince the civilian monitors, some of
whom had flown in expecting a flash motel, that life was possible without room service.
Most people enjoyed the new surroundings including the field latrines, even when the
goats would eat the toilet paper and the edges of the screen.’50
The Australian army monitors had been directed to deploy without weapons, but
one later revealed that he had hidden his weapon in his vehicle. He thought that the
presence of the army monitors helped provide security, as those who might have wanted
to cause harm could not be sure whether the army monitors actually had weapons with
them.51 Lieutenant Colonel Boyd, at a polling station at Oshakati, agreed that the
presence of army monitors in civilian clothes had a calming effect. The election officials
knew that as the army monitors were carrying walkie-talkie radios they were able to call
for help from the Australian response force. On the first morning a man with a shotgun
47 Signal SIC JFD Ops2742, HQ Aust Engrs Untag to HQADF, 6 November 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18932 pt 2.
48 Dawson, ‘Outnumbered and overwhelmed in Ovamboland’.
49 ‘Experiences of an Australian election monitor’, Australian Contingent Family Newsletter, issue 2, November 1989, NAA, A6721, 89/18907 part 5.
50 Ibid.
51 Interview, R.J. Dooley, 24 April 2005.
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New major peace operations
appeared outside the Oshakati polling station intimidating voters. The Swapol and
UN civilian police ‘expressed no desire’ to speak to the man, so Boyd went to the front
gate. As Boyd wrote later, ‘I tried reasoning with him for a few minutes but he then lost
patience and pointed the shotgun at me and started yelling. Nothing happened apart
from a few heart flutters by me and eventually I was able to persuade him to leave. I
learnt very quickly on the first morning that Swapol and UN [civilian police] were
unreliable and a waste of time.’52
The Australian engineers were crucial to the smooth running of the election. The
Swapol and UN civilian police proved ineffective in controlling the large crowds, and
although the crowds were generally peaceful, when there was unrest at several polling
stations the presence of the maintenance teams and, at times, the ready reaction team
was a stabilising influence. On 9 November, following an incident between supporters
of rival political parties, a large hostile crowd confronted an engineer maintenance team,
led by Corporal John Hodge (whose main job was responsibility for the Plant Troop’s
Scammell heavy transporter fleet), outside the Ohangwena civil police station. Hodge
deployed his team to provide protection for themselves and those within the station
while he called for support. There was no response from Swapol, and the crowd did not
disperse until the arrival of two sections of the Australian response force (three Casspirs,
one Wolf and two Buffels) accompanied by Major Sowry in his vehicle.53
The engineers had already dealt with other incidents. On 7 November a field troop
detachment was called to an explosion east of Okankolo, to be met by a group of stoic
Ovambo tribesmen surrounded by wailing women. Three still, small bundles lay under
tree branches. Two brothers, aged nine and ten, had been playing with a ‘toy’ they
had found. It was anti-armour projectile. A two-year-old girl standing nearby had also
been killed, while another toddler escaped with his life. The sappers disposed of other
ordnance in the area. ‘It must have been the site of an old battle,’ Lieutenant Maddock
told an Australian journalist. ‘War never really goes away, does it?’54 Two days later a
civilian vehicle was destroyed by an anti-tank mine at Onembenge, the two occupants
luckily escaping serious injury. Australian sappers investigated and thought that the
mine had been laid on the morning of the incident.
Throughout the five-day election period the maintenance teams tried to visit each
station once every twenty-four hours, carrying out repairs to facilities, resupplying
them with water and also bringing ballot papers, boxes and dye for marking the fingers
of each voter. Sowry wrote later that his teams ‘were well received wherever they
went’:
Most people were appreciative of their efforts although some . . . were too ignorant to
even realise what was being done for them. We took special care of the thirty Australians
who had been sent across by the Australian Electoral Office to help; they were very
professional, knew exactly what was required but very frustrated by some of their team
members and the UN. They left Namibia singing our praises, declaring that they would
let the public know of our efforts.55
52
53
54
55
Letter, Boyd to Rolfe, 21 November 1989, Boyd papers.
For this and other actions Cpl J.R. Hodge was awarded the Conspicuous Service Medal.
Cameron Forbes, ‘In Namibia, the war never really goes away’, Age, 9 November 1989.
Circular letter, 25 November 1989, B. Sowry papers.
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Success in Namibia
He was right about the impact on the Australian monitors. Geoff Marles, an AEC
official from New South Wales, observed that ‘whoever you spoke to was generally
full of praise for’ the Australian soldiers. ‘A Swedish officer told a group of us that in
his opinion the Australians were the most efficient military detachment in Namibia,
better even than the East Germans. This was well-earned and high praise indeed from
their peers.’56 Marles and some colleagues later confessed that ‘the sight of that green
and gold kangaroo emblem was always fantastic to see’ as, along with sustenance, the
Australians provided some welcome camaraderie.57 These visits ensured that the polls
could stay open, despite the harsh climate and often primitive conditions.58
The provision of Australian armed escorts for the vehicles returning the ballot boxes
to Oshakati after threats of interference was also significant. They provided protection
and a deterrent against forces wanting to disrupt the election.
By the time the polls closed on 11 November 96.40 per cent of all registered
voters had cast their votes, and that evening Ahtisaari declared that the elections had
been ‘free and fair’.59 Then the counting started at Ongwediva Teachers’ College and,
as one of the Australian monitors, Ross MacKay, a 42-year-old Brisbane-based AEC
Assistant Director of Operations, recalled, they had intended working throughout the
day until the job was completed.60 By late evening, just as the end was in sight, all the
lights suddenly went out. A wave of apprehension swept the counting hall in case this
heralded an attack. But the electricity had simply failed. Local television crews, there
to film proceedings, powered up their portable flood lights and the count continued,
even though the batteries soon dwindled and the lights fell to barely the strength of a
candle.61 A generator, operated by Australian sappers, then supplied power.
Australians in Windhoek also contributed to the success. In addition to Michael
Maley’s work in planning the election, three Australian officials, Nick Tall, Colin Ball
and the Australian Federal Police fingerprint expert, Sergeant Jim Herold, had helped
verify the ‘tendered ballots’ made by voters who were away from their electorates or had
difficulty proving their identity.62
Much of the success in the key Ovamboland area had been due to Australian engineers, who were then required to assist with the relocation of the monitors back to
Ongwediva and Ondangwa. Crocker had shown foresight in planning for a range of
eventualities. By moving forward to Ondangwa he was on the spot and able to direct his
men to step in when the UN civilian organisation – which had not previously mounted
such an operation – failed. Gillespie thought, however, that Crocker did not win many
friends in the UN civilian administration for his efforts (although this did not prevent
the same UN civilian administrators from recruiting him for a senior appointment
56 Marles, ‘Great blokes and good Diggers’.
57 Geoff Marles, Dave Gallard and Ian Johnston, ‘SCA – the last frontier’, Australian Contingent Family
Newsletter, issue 2, November 1989, NAA, A6721, 89/18907 pt 5.
58 ‘Experiences of an Australian election monitor’, Australian Contingent Family Newsletter, issue 2, November 1989, NAA, A6721, 89/18907 pt 5.
59 Kanwal, ‘Free, fair and peaceful’, p. 7.
60 For a description of the counting see Stark, ‘The scrutiny’.
61 Interview, R.M. MacKay, 5 April 2005.
62 Tall, ‘Tendered ballots’; Kate Levings, ‘Tradition born in Cyprus broadens role of policing’, Platypus,
no 64, October 1999, p. 30.
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New major peace operations
in a later UN mission in the former Yugoslavia).63 And Sowry was slightly miffed
at the contingent commander deploying to ‘his area’, even if Crocker was justified in
doing so.64
The Australian engineers knew that they had performed well, and morale soared.
On 13 November Gillespie reported to Canberra:
While it might sound as though the Australian contingent is blowing its own trumpet, a
wide cross section of the electoral staff and Untag HQ have admitted that the elections
would not have proceeded in the north of the country without the Australian component’s support. Mr [Hocine] Medili, the Untag Deputy Director of Administration,
thanked the contingent personally in Ondangwa last night stating that ‘the UN and
Namibia owed the Australian contingent a great debt’, and he advised that he would
ensure that Mr Ahtisaari understood fully the part the Australian members had played in
the election success. Another compliment paid to the Australian component’s professionalism was that Untag operations and Untag electoral staff requested verification from
the Australian component of most incidents reported in the north of the country. This
was because our information was accurate and timely and the Australian component’s
communications net was one of the few to operate successfully throughout the period.65
The Australian civilian monitors were also proud of their work. In many cases they
brought professionalism to the electoral process that was not otherwise available. After
the election they enjoyed some leave at various places in Namibia before departing on
20 November. Interviewed after their return to Australia, Trevor Willson, who had led
the AEC contingent in Ovamboland, said that one of their strongest impressions was
the effectiveness of the Australian Army, which ‘played a crucial role . . . and won the
admiration, not just of the Aussie civilians, but of the civilian groups from all over the
world’. The AEC monitors organised Christmas hampers to be forwarded to the troops
to thank them for their efforts.66
Crocker, Boyd and several other observers believed that had it not been for the work of
the Australians the election process in Ovamboland would have collapsed. The election
would not have begun on time, and the thousands of voters arriving at unprepared
polling station would have caused much unrest. Further, without the security provided
by the Australians, Ahtisaari would not have been able to declare that the election was
‘fair and free’ until much later. Of course it would have been declared eventually because,
as Michael Maley and Ken Gillespie have pointed out, the imperative for declaring the
election to be successful (on the part of both the South Africans and the United Nations)
was so strong that it would have declared even if the problems had been very much
greater.67
The Australian engineers were not the only military element to support the election.
The Canadian contingent commander Colonel Jeffrey wrote later that ‘in reality’ the
complete communications network was operated by the military. ‘Plans to have both
63 Interview, K.J. Gillespie, 9 March 2005.
64 Interview, B.J.B. Sowry, 24 April 2005.
65 Signal SIC JFD Ops2891, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 13 November 1989, AWM: Col (OA)
files.
66 AEC News Service press release, c. 28 November 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/9096 pt 5.
67 Interviews, M.C. Maley, 24 March 2005; K.J. Gillespie, 9 March 2005.
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Success in Namibia
UN Radio and the AG run communications in the final analysis failed to materialise
and the [British] Signals unit was again called upon at short notice to save the day.
Virtually all units provided logistic support of some sort.’68
Counting of votes was completed three days after the close of polling. Swapo won
forty-one seats, DTA twenty-one and minor parties ten. As the writer John Turner put it:
Although the political settlement permitted Swapo to win and control the new
government of independent Namibia, it was only after a free and fair election of the
sort it would never have agreed in the heyday of the Cold War. Swapo was ultimately
cornered by its lack of success as an insurgent organisation into accepting the results of
a democratic election to determine the fate of Namibia.69
The next step was to form the Constituent Assembly, with the task of approving the
country’s new constitution. The Assembly met for the first time on 21 November.
AFTER THE ELECTION
Meanwhile, after a short rest, the Australian engineers turned their attention to other
engineering tasks, one of which involved taking over barracks and accommodation
from the SADF as its units departed for South Africa. The engineers were also kept busy
with the repair and maintenance of UN facilities throughout the country.
According to the contingent’s post-operational tour report, it completed 204 separate
works tasks.70 One of these was to continue the upgrading of the airfield at Opuwo,
which had been begun by the first contingent. A detachment from Plant Troop departed
for Opuwo on 5 December, and the work was completed by 1 January. The task involved
resurfacing and shaping the runway, improving general drainage on the edge of the main
runway, and the installation of six double-barrel culverts.71
Despite the heavy workload of programmed tasks and unforeseen repair and maintenance work, time was found for twelve separate non-Untag tasks in support of the
local community. One of these involved upgrading the 900-metre supply channel that
provided water for the Andara Catholic Mission’s hydroelectric plant, on the Okavango
River in the western Caprivi Strip. The task, under the direction of Lieutenant Nick
Rowntree, included blasting rock obstructions and clearing the channel either by hand
or with plant equipment. The second task was the construction of classrooms at the
Anglican school in a black neighbourhood in Tsumeb, using funds provided by the
Australian Liaison Office, not the United Nations.72
The field troop expended its main combat engineer effort on minefield and battlefield
clearance operations. Untag headquarters did not give the Australians permission to
begin work on minefields in a concerted manner until late in their tour, and the major
task, Operation Make Safe, took place between 18 February and 19 March, when the
field troop conducted the reconnaissance, repair of perimeter fencing and signposting
68 Report, Col M.K. Jeffrey, ‘A historical summary of Untag’, c. April 1990, Jeffrey papers.
69 Turner, Continent Ablaze, p. 34.
70 Appendix 2 to Annex A to Col J.A. Crocker, ‘Second Australian Contingent Untag post-operational
tour report’, 1 June 1990, Defence: A6721, 90/4429 pt 1.
71 A section from the 9th Construction Troop constructed the culverts.
72 For the list of community tasks see Appendix 3 to Annex A to Col J.A. Crocker, ‘Second Australian
Contingent Untag post-operational tour report’, 1 June 1990, Defence: A6721, 90/4429 pt 1.
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New major peace operations
of ten SADF protective anti-personnel minefields in Ovamboland. Before its units
departed the SADF had fenced and rolled the minefields, but each one still contained
many anti-personnel mines, and in some fields it was estimated that up to 4,000 mines
were still in place. Local inhabitants had removed portions of the perimeter fences, thus
allowing animals and people access, and death and injury had resulted.
After almost a year of requests, the SADF finally provided minefield records in early
March.73 The Australians hoped to use SADF flail tanks, driven by SADF personnel
but under Australian direction. The SADF agreed to loan tanks and crews, but the new
Namibian Government understandably refused to allow the SADF back into Namibia,
and the best the Australians could do in the time was to erect new fences, construct
warning signs, educate the local population on the dangers of entering fenced areas,
and destroy mines that had been exposed by the weather. Australian sappers entered
live minefields on seven occasions, four times in Operation Make Safe.74 In addition to
minefield operations, between 10 June 1989 and 28 February 1990 the two contingents
undertook forty-two explosive ordnance disposal tasks, resulting in the destruction of
4,224 items of ordnance.75
WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS
Working and living conditions were very similar to those of the first contingent. Both
contingents experienced frustrations with the UN administration. This was demonstrated in Operation Poll Gallop, and will be discussed shortly in the planning for the
withdrawal. The second contingent experienced the changing political environment
following the successful election, the subsequent withdrawal of the SADF units and
the disbandment of SWATF and Koevoet, and witnessed politically motivated violence
well into 1990.
One example of the situations faced by the Australians occurred on 16 November,
when two whites, a male priest and a female doctor, approached the Ondangwa base
seeking refuge from about twenty-five blacks who were pursuing them in six unmarked
vehicles known locally as bakkies. Murders had occurred in the area two nights earlier.
The Australians provided refuge and, as the blacks were hostile and smelled of alcohol,
9th Construction Troop soldiers manned the defences while their commander notified
Swapol and UN civilian police. The situation remained tense for some time as the
blacks, who claimed to be ex-Koevoet members, threatened violence. Apparently the
two whites had observed and started photographing the blacks chasing children around
a kraal in their vehicles. By 11.15 pm the situation was stabilised when Swapol officers
escorted the whites away from the base.76
Another example of violence occurred on 6 December, when members of the Kenyan
battalion shot dead a Swapol officer near Okahandja. The Kenyans claimed that one of
their patrols was fired upon and one soldier was wounded in the leg. They returned fire,
73 Signal SIC JFD Ops3708, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 5 March 1990, Defence: A6721,
89/18907 pt 8.
74 Col J.A. Crocker, ‘Second Australian Contingent Untag post-operational tour report’, 1 June 1990,
Defence: A6721, 90/4429 pt 1.
75 Memo, Capt B.K. Florence, to Chief Engineer Headquarters, 12 March 1990, Crocker papers.
76 17th Construction Squadron Commander’s Diary, B. Sowry papers.
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Success in Namibia
killing one and capturing another. Only then did they find that their opposition was
Swapol. The Swapol version was that both parties had been clearly identified before
any shooting took place. The Australian contingent reported to Canberra that scientific
investigation showed that the first shot, which wounded the Kenyan, might well have
been fired by another Kenyan.77 The Kenyan contingent commander (and Deputy Force
Commander), Brigadier General Opande, refused to allow Untag military police to
investigate and insisted that a Kenyan board of enquiry would be the only investigatory
body. As Gillespie noted at the time, Opande’s ‘actions have received a lot of criticism
from the local press and has done much to lower the morale of HQ Untag staff. The
Force Comd [Prem Chand] also appears to have lost the respect of many for not insisting
on an impartial investigation into the incident.’ There were some indications that the
Kenyans might have killed the constable well after it was established that he was a
police officer.78
As with the first contingent, commanders worked hard to maintain morale, especially
following the ‘let-down’ after the election. In September the Australian Government
relaxed its prohibition against troops visiting South Africa, and they were therefore able
to take leave in that country at their own expense. But that opportunity also presented
dangers. The SADF offered week-long, all-expenses-paid holidays, with escorted flights
around South Africa, apparently in an effort to win support for the apartheid regime.
Some squadron officers took up the offer. But when Crocker found out he was angry.
Had it known, the Australian Government would also have been angry, as evidenced by
its response when one Australian rugby union passed on an invitation to some players to
visit South Africa in August that year. There were political implications in ‘impartial’
UN military members being seen to be accepting favours from the South African
Government, and Crocker believed that Sowry had gone behind his back in approving
the visits, including one by himself and his quartermaster. Sowry was motivated by a
desire to raise his soldiers’ morale by giving them as many opportunities as possible to
take some worthwhile leave, and while he might have disappointed Crocker, his officers
and soldiers retained a high regard for him.79
Taking opportunities to participate in sport also raised morale. On 9 December the
Australians won an inter-contingent triathlon (shooting, swimming and a five-kilometre
run), organised by the Poles, who had already optimistically engraved their name on
the winners’ trophy.80 Earlier the Australians had defeated Merlyn Force at soccer and
the South African Air Force at cricket.
Morale was helped by visits from Australia. The Shadow Minister for Veterans’
Affairs, Tim Fischer, visited towards the end of December and spent Christmas Day
77 Signal SIC JFD 111329Z Dec 89, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 11 December 1989, Defence:
A6721, 89/18932 pt 2.
78 Contingent Diary of Events, Crocker papers. Also, Signal SIC JFD Ops3142, HQ Aust Engrs
Untag to HQADF, 18 December 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/18932, pt 2. When the UN Civpol
report implied that the Kenyans had acted in an ‘unprofessional manner’, Opande described this
as ‘a lie which I must object to’ (fax Untag/DFC/11–4, Opande to Fanning, 7 December 1989,
UN:SO529/593/3, Operational Incidents Untag/FC/G/1319). For the Kenyan version see memo
15/Int/3, B.W. Kithinui (CO Kenbatt) to Chand, 11 December 1989, UN:SO529/593/3, Operational
Incidents Untag/FC/G/1319.
79 Interview, S.J. Day, 3 March 2005.
80 Ibid.
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New major peace operations
with the troops in Grootfontein. Sowry recalled that when Fischer returned to Australia
he telephoned the families of some troops he had met in Namibia – an action that was
greatly appreciated. The Senate President, Senator Kerry Sibraa, visited the contingent
in early January, and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Laurie O’Donnell,
visited towards the end of January.
On 26 January, a few days after O’Donnell departed, the contingent held a parade
at Grootfontein to mark Australia Day. Lieutenant General Prem Chand reviewed the
parade and presented Untag medals to selected soldiers. It was a clear indication that
the end of the tour was approaching.
Generally, discipline was good, with only five soldiers being charged with relatively
minor offences such as using UN vehicles without permission.81 But there was one
particularly unpleasant incident. On 29 December a white local woman complained
to the Australian military police, alleging she had been raped by one of the squadron
soldiers in the barracks at Grootfontein. The soldier was identified and held in custody
in the guardroom. Next day, the woman provided a statement to the military police that
she had no complaint to make and wished the matter to go no further. The following
evening the woman arrived at the squadron’s New Year’s Eve party with a soldier from
the first Australian contingent. He had flown from Australia to see the woman. The
Squadron Sergeant Major, Rod Carr, asked the couple to leave, and when they were
reluctant to do so the Australian military police escorted them off the base.82 On
2 January the local Grootfontein Swapol advised the military police that they had
received a complaint from the same woman that she had been raped, and asked to
interview the Australian soldier whom she had accused several days earlier. The military
police denied the request and undertook their own investigation. The issue was whether
intercourse had been with mutual consent. Ultimately the charge of rape could not
be sustained, as when Swapol officers interviewed the woman they believed that ‘the
complainant lacked credibility’.83
Health concerns were similar to those of the first contingent, although the second
contingent had no confirmed cases of malaria and only two cases of low-grade sexually
transmitted disease. In this latter regard, a South African journalist recalled visiting
Popa Falls in the Caprivi Strip where she met up with some Australian soldiers at a resort
run by a ‘gruff woman . . . and her nubile daughter who made half-hearted attempts to
fend off the attentions of the increasingly unruly soldiers’. The journalist observed that
‘after the generator cut out at 10 pm the shambling and grunting of hippos feeding on
the river bank mingled with human staggers and giggles as the daughter dispensed her
favours to a procession of the Australian diggers’.84
Road accidents remained the greatest danger, and two bad accidents took place on
13 March between Ruacana and Ondangwa. In the first case a Wolf mine-protected
vehicle driven by an Australian swerved and tipped over to avoid a civilian vehicle and
81 Letter, Boyd to Lt Col K. Northwood, 20 February 1990, Boyd papers.
82 17th Construction Squadron Commander’s Diary, B. Sowry papers; and signal SIC WAA/EVA/Z2L
Pers3254, HQ Aust Engrs Untag to HQADF, 7 January 1990, Defence: A6721, 89/18907 pt 7.
83 Interview, P.M. Boyd, 20 July 2005; personal diary, quoted in email, Boyd to author, 10 September
2005.
84 Diana Streak, ‘Sadistic season’, Canberra Times, 8 January 2007, Times 2, p. 3; also interview, D.F.
Streak, 12 January 2007.
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Success in Namibia
two Australian soldiers received broken limbs requiring surgery. The South West Africa
Police were unwilling to assist in the investigation and would not provide details of the
owner of the civilian vehicle, which failed to stop after the accident.85 In the second
case a Land Cruiser driven by an Australian struck a civilian woman, who died from
the injuries sustained. A total of nineteen Untag personnel lost their lives in Namibia,
most through vehicle accidents, but fortunately none were Australians.86
WITHDRAWAL
The contingent’s withdrawal was a major logistic operation, and planning for it began
towards the end of November, when the success of the election made it clear that there
was a very good chance of Namibia gaining independence before the planned date of
1 April.87 From the beginning, Crocker assessed that Untag would require engineer
support through to the end of the mission: there would be a continuing requirement
to maintain Untag facilities; as the SADF moved out of its bases these would need
refurbishment; and the wet season would create unforseen tasks.88
On 8 December Behrooz Sadry, UN Director of Field Operations from New York,
met Lieutenant General Prem Chand, Abdou Ciss, Untag Director of Administration,
and key Untag staff to plan the withdrawal.89 To the great shock of most present, Prem
Chand announced that the three infantry battalions would remain in the country until
31 March, but that most of the engineer and logistic personnel would be withdrawn
between 15 February and 1 March. The Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General
Opande from Kenya and the Chief of Staff, Colonel H. Shariff from Malaysia, both
contingent commanders from two countries contributing infantry battalions, strongly
supported the decision, which was not surprising as they had been the authors of the
plan.90 Crocker thought that withdrawal plan was being driven by Opande’s ‘desire to
have all [of the] “white” contingents out as early as possible before independence, a view
reinforced by his intention to have the Kenyan contingent the last out and “hand over”
Namibia to the new government’.91
The plan was vigorously opposed by the Untag chief of logistics (a Polish officer), the chief liaison officer (the Canadian Colonel Jeffrey) and Crocker. As the latter
commented, Prem Chand did not appear to recognise the implication of leaving the
infantry battalions without logistic or engineer support for up to two months, as the
engineers would need to cease all engineer tasks by 1 January to begin preparing for their
85 Report, Untag/AP/1118, ‘HQ Board of Inquiry No 26’, 10 April 1990, UN: SO308/3/13.
86 The Blue Helmets, p. 711.
87 Signal SIC JFD 291609Z Nov 89, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 29 November 1989, AWM;
Col (OA) files.
88 Memo, Crocker to Sadry, 1 December 1989, UN: S0529/622/13, Untag/ENG/3752.
89 Memo, ‘Confirmatory notes on the meeting between Mr Sadry and the Force Commander on the
withdrawal of the military component of Untag held on 081500B Dec 89’, 12 December 1989, UN:
S0529/692/5, Engineer Tasks – Requests Untag/COS/G/3441.
90 Signal SIC EYL 111327Z Dec 89, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 11 December 1989, AWM:
Col (OA) files.
91 Cable CE819916, HQADF to New York, 28 December 1989, AWM: Col (AO) files and NAA,
A9737, 92/11348 pt 6.
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withdrawal.92 Sadry seemed to be unhappy with this plan but did not openly question
it. Crocker reported to Canberra that Hocine Medili, who was due to succeed Ciss
in January, was opposed to Prem Chand’s decision and had ‘stated on more than one
occasion that the smooth withdrawal of Untag’ would ‘rely heavily on Australian component support’. Medili believed that the Australians were the ‘only contingent with
the professionalism and flexibility to help plan and control the extraction’. But Crocker
did not believe that Medili would be able to persuade New York to countermand Prem
Chand’s decision.93
A few days later, Crocker advised that the Untag withdrawal plan had ‘been widely
condemned by principal staff officers as being unworkable and likely to create havoc’,
but he added that Opande and Shariff ‘have refused to accept [the] advice of principal
staff officers and they, along with the Force Commander, have become intransigent on
the matter’.94 Nick Warner added his comment that ‘administrative and organisational
competence have not been amongst Untag’s strengths, and planning for the withdrawal
of this large UN force has been poorly handled’.95
Meanwhile, the Headquarters of the Australian Defence Force in Canberra informed
the Australian Mission in New York of these developments.96 A fortnight later Canberra
advised New York that Crocker thought that the withdrawal plan was ‘militarily
unsound and politically biased’.97 The Australian Defence staff in Washington replied
that it had urged UN Headquarters to develop ‘a sensible withdrawal plan’ that
allowed elements of engineer and logistic units to remain in Namibia until the final
withdrawal.98
The UN staff in New York now briefed the troop-contributing nations and emphasised that the plans were only tentative as the date for Namibian independence might
be achieved before 1 April. Parties of up to fifty Australian engineers and Polish
logistic troops would be among the last to leave. The Australian Mission reported to
Canberra that it did not consider the withdrawal plan ‘to be politically biased or militarily unsound’. It noted that the military aspect had ‘been arrived at by consultations
between UN Headquarters military and other staff and contingent commanders in the
field, taking into account the range of political, economic and military factors operating’.
As the Untag operation was ‘a political as well as military exercise . . . it would not be
92 Crocker later wrote: ‘The Force Commander’s grasp of logistic support, and perhaps reality, was so
poor that he believed his infantry battalions could operate in a desert environment without their major
equipments and any form of logistic resupply for two months’ (Col J.A. Crocker, ‘Second Australian
Contingent Untag post operational tour report’, 1 June 1990, Defence: A6721, 90/4429 pt 1).
93 Signal SIC EYL 111327Z Dec 89, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 11 December 1989, AWM:
Col (OA) files.
94 Signal SIC EYL Ops3144, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 14 December 1989, Defence: A6721,
89/18907 pt 6.
95 Cable WI0318, Windhoek to Defence, Canberra, 14 December 1989, Defence: A6721, 89/16815
pt 1.
96 Cable CE815472, HQADF to New York, 14 December 1989, NAA, A9737, 92/11348 pt 6.
97 Cable CE819916, HQADF to New York, 28 December 1989, AWM: Col (OA) files and NAA,
A9737, 92/11348 pt 6.
98 Signal SIC JFD WAC 1706, Washington to HQADF, 29 December 1989, AWM: Col (OA) files and
Defence: A6721, 89/16815 pt 1.
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inappropriate should the UN decide that an African contingent be the last to leave
Namibia’.99 Crocker would have questioned the thoroughness of the consultation. Nonetheless, the UN Secretariat was worried, because on 4 January the UN
Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, asked Prem
Chand to indicate that he was satisfied with the logistic support available to the end of
the mission, ‘bearing in mind that logistically, the military component is responsible
for supporting all components of Untag’.100
Crocker responded by presenting Prem Chand with a 12-page analysis of the engineer
support required for the Untag withdrawal in which he recommended that a hundred
troops and some heavy equipment remain until April.101 Neither Prem Chand nor
his senior staff were persuaded; but now the Untag civilian administrators began
insisting that engineer and logistic support would be required until the end of the
mission, and Prem Chand eventually relented.102 He agreed that a hundred Australian
troops would depart on 6 February with a second group of a hundred departing on
about 22 February, depending on when the heavy equipment would leave Walvis Bay.
A further hundred troops would remain in Namibia until after the departure of the
battalions, and probably two to four weeks after independence.103 Although Crocker
would have preferred the main body to leave two weeks later, he was pleased with the
compromise; but he remained ‘unhappy with the lack of foresight by Untag military
staff in retaining engineer personnel and equipment for nation building tasks, especially
now that the SRSG [Ahtisaari] is calling out for such tasks to be carried out’.104 Prem
Chand was adamant that nation building was a matter for the Administrator General or
the new Namibian Government, not Untag.105 Later the plan was modified so that 135
personnel would depart between 20 and 23 February and sixty-five in the first week of
April.106
While Crocker negotiated about the withdrawal dates, his engineers continued
their tasks. Construction work lasted well into February, and the field troop conducted
Operation Make Safe through until 19 March. Crocker’s senior staff were busy with
withdrawal plans. The outlying detachments needed to be withdrawn to Grootfontein.
Then the equipment needed to be cleaned and decontaminated (to meet Australian
quarantine regulations), packed and loaded on to trains for the journey to Walvis
Bay. The withdrawal program was supported by the arrival from Australia on 12
January of a team of twelve specialists, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Burnham.
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
Cable UN48968, New York, to HQADF, 3 January 1990, NAA, A1838, 626/11/128 pt 1.
Cable, Goulding to Prem Chand, 4 January 1990, AWM: Col (OA) files.
Memo, Crocker to Prem Chand, 7 January 1990, AWM: Col (OA) files.
Signal SIC JFD Ops 3361, HQ Aust Engrs Untag, to HQADF, 15 January 1990, NAA A6721,
89/18907 pt 2; memo, Ciss (Director of Administration) to Prem Chand, 8 January 1990, and code
cable Untag/FC/548, Prem Chand to Goulding, 11 January 1990, both in UN: S529/583/2.
Cable WI0334, Windhoek to Canberra, 17 January 1990, NAA, A1838, 626/11/128 pt 1.
Contingent Diary of Events, Crocker papers.
Handwritten note by Prem Chand on memo, Crocker to Thornberry, 18 February 1990, UN:
S0529/583/2.
Cable UN49089, New York to HQADF, Canberra, 25 January 1990, NAA, A1838, 626/11/128 pt
1. See also memo, Crocker to Prem Chand, 30 January 1990, Crocker papers and UN: S0529/583/2.
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This team included a psychologist, to conduct end-of-tour debriefings, and a finance
officer. But it was mainly concerned with providing expert advice on preparing and
packing dangerous cargoes, including ammunition, corrosives, flammables, radioactive
stores, non-flammable gases, poisonous liquids and pesticides. They also helped the
engineers preserve the vehicles and equipment for the sea voyage.107 The team returned
to Australia on 28 February.
On 6 February, the day that brickwork commenced at the Tsumeb Anglican school,
101 members of the contingent departed by a chartered Qantas flight from Windhoek.
The work at Tsumeb was completed on 17 February and handed over on 23 February. On
22 February the chartered vessel MV Kwang Tung departed from Walvis Bay, with the
contingent’s equipment and eight soldiers. Four days later 134 personnel departed from
Windhoek. The remainder included a reduced headquarters staff and two detachments,
one at Grootfontein, commanded by Captain Douglas Fox, and the other at Ondangwa,
commanded by Captain Brian Florence. Two four-man maintenance teams were located
at each of Grootfontein and Ondangwa, and one was at Rundu (under Lieutenant
Bottrell). The explosive ordnance disposal team of thirteen (under Staff Sergeant John
Delai) was based at Ondangwa.108
Events in Namibia were now moving quickly towards independence. By early February the date for the declaration of independence had been advanced to 21 March; and as
the Untag mandate would cease two days later, the final withdrawal dates were brought
forward. The Australian Liaison Office in Windhoek closed shortly before independence,
and thereafter the Australian Ambassador in Lusaka, Zambia, looked after Australia’s
interests in the new nation. During the withdrawal planning Crocker had recommended
that the Australian Army assist the new nation with explosive ordnance disposal teams
and with training the new Namibian Army and police in ordnance disposal and mine
warfare operations, but this was not accepted by Canberra.109 Namibia was seen as being
well outside Australia’s area of interest. The British had no such reservations and began
deploying training teams immediately.
Despite the efforts of the Australians, none of the contingent was invited to the
independence ceremony in the Windhoek sports stadium on the southern outskirts of
the city on the night of 20 March. Australia was represented by its Ambassador to
the United Nations, Dr Peter Wilenski. Many national leaders were present, including
F.W. de Klerk of South Africa, Fidel Castro of Cuba and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine
Liberation Organisation. As he knew some of the security staff, amid the pandemonium
of disorganisation, rain and mud Crocker was able to sneak in to witness Pérez de Cuéllar
107 Report, ‘ASC Untag – Report on deployment of specialist team to Namibia’, 9 March 1990, NAA:
A621, 89/18932 pt 3. The team consisted of Lt Col G.T. Burnham, Maj P.J. Murphy, Capts M.T.
Vogt and B.T. Rickerby, WO1 L.J. Riley, WO2s B.D. Tracey, R.J. Bailey, M.J. Greenway and P. Van
Dan Brock, and Sgts P.W. Giesler, R. Keays and P.A. Neugebauer. The previous September Burnham,
then a major, had visited Namibia to investigate the adequacy of logistic support to the Australian
contingent (Maj G.T. Burnham, ‘Report of a visit to ASC Untag Namibia’, October 1989, AWM:
Col(OA) files).
108 Memo, OPORD 1/90 Operation Ubique, 10 February 1990, Crocker papers. Also Defence: A6721,
89/18907 pt 8.
109 Signal SIC JFD Ops3685, HQ Aust Engrs, Untag to HQADF, 28 February 1990, and memo, FASIP
to ACDEV, 1 March 1990, NAA: A67221, 89/18907 pt 8.
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Success in Namibia
administering the oath of office to President Sam Nujoma, soon after midnight.110
Nujoma did not even mention Untag in his speech.111
On 23 March the Australians from the headquarters were ordered to attend, as
spectators, a farewell parade for Lieutenant General Prem Chand at Suiderhof. The
guard was formed from the three infantry battalions. The last demolition task was
undertaken at Ondangwa on 25 March. On 26 March, twenty-five Australians departed.
Meanwhile the remaining Australians were busy handing over Untag facilities to
the local authorities. Finally, at 12.45 pm on 9 April, Crocker and thirty-nine other
Australians departed on a chartered Air Zimbabwe aircraft. The Kenyan battalion
remained under a bilateral agreement with the new Namibian government.
CONCLUSION
Untag’s success tended to mask the reality that it came close to being a military failure.
The Canadian contingent commander, Colonel Jeffrey, claimed that the ‘lack of planning
was criminal’, and affected the organisation and deployment of his contingent.112 The
same could be said of the Australian contingents. Further, Jeffrey was highly critical of
Prem Chand’s leadership, averring that he ‘was often indecisive and when faced with
difficult problems, retreated to the seclusion of his office. He displayed little or no trust
in his staff, refusing to accept advice and attempting to provide all detailed direction
himself.’ The lack of leadership affected the whole mission and the ‘effectiveness of the
various units depended on the ability and initiative of the respective commanders and
their willingness to act in spite of the Force Commander’s direction’.113 Prem Chand
never accepted that once the main military tasks were complete he had sufficient capacity
to support the civilian component of the mission. The Australians realised this when
they switched to civilian-oriented tasks towards the end of their tour. It was to their
credit that they were able to operate effectively in this difficult military environment.
Ultimately, though, the mission succeeded primarily because the South Africans were
determined that it should succeed. They withdrew their forces as required and provided
crucial logistic support to Untag.
The Australians who served in Namibia gained tremendous satisfaction from their
contribution to a successful UN mission – one that brought peace to the country, the
return of many citizens, and independence to the new nation. Years later many were
still watching the progress of the country with interest and affection, noting that while
problems remained, it had continued as a peaceful democracy that was bringing a
measure of prosperity to its previously long-suffering citizens.
More broadly, those who served in Nambia felt that they had played their part
in one of the major events in world history. Untag had grown out of the changes
wrought by the end of the Cold War. While the Australians had been in Namibia
110 Interview, J.A. Crocker, 17 December 2004.
111 Thornberry, A Nation is Born, p. 371. A copy of the speech is in Nujoma, Where Others Wavered,
pp. 445–7. Subsequently Nujoma has praised the work of Untag (interview, 8 April 2005), and the
National Museum of Namibia in Windhoek has a substantial Untag exhibition.
112 Report, Col M.K. Jeffrey, ‘An Evaluation of Untag’, c. April 1990, Jeffrey papers.
113 Ibid.
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the Berlin Wall had come down. They had witnessed the influence on the troops from
Eastern Bloc countries for, as well as the large logistic contingent from Poland, the
military observers and UN civilian police included members from Czechoslovakia, East
Germany and Hungary. The East German police were left wondering whether they
would have a country to return to, but the Australians were interested to see the rapid
development of camaraderie between the East and West Germans. Lieutenant Colonel
Gillespie was on leave in Cape Town on 18 February 1990 when Nelson Mandela was
released from prison. A month later, Mandela was in Windhoek for the independence
celebrations. Yet, in the midst of these great events, some Australians were frustrated by
their isolation from news. On 9 November, the day the Berlin Wall was breached, the
Australians were working hard supporting the election in northern Namibia. Captain
Steve Day did not find out that the Wall had come down until a few weeks later.
For their efforts the Australians received praise from various quarters. Writing to
Crocker on 23 February, Prem Chand said that the Australian contingent had carried
out its duties ‘with singular and sustained dedication . . . It has been a privilege and a
pleasure having the Australian sappers with us in the team, and we shall be missing
them much.’114 Pérez de Cuéllar referred to the ‘remarkable contribution made by the
Australian military and electoral personnel’, and noted that their ‘dedication and professionalism had been widely and deservedly praised’.115 In addition to the contribution
to the election and the obvious engineer support, Gillespie thought that one of the
Australian contingent’s achievements was ‘to keep the mission honest’. The Australians
were the one contingent that could be relied upon to provide accurate information to
Untag headquarters.116 In a confidential report, Brigadier General Opande described
Crocker as ‘an inspiring leader and a systematic planner – a very able senior officer
whose interests and determination is to produce results in his line of duty’. Prem Chand
endorsed these remarks and recommended Crocker for duty in future UN missions.117
On 2 March 1990, 200 servicemen from the three services paraded at Holsworthy
Barracks in Sydney to honour those who had served in eleven UN and other peacekeeping
operations. The largest group was from Untag, and during the parade the Minister for
Defence, Beazley, said that Untag’s performance had ‘drawn nothing but praise from
other nationalities and UN contingents’.118 But only a fraction of the 600 soldiers who
had served in Namibia were on parade; more than sixty were still in Namibia and the
first contingent’s members had been dispersed. Some soldiers never learned until years
later that on the parade both contingents had received a formal commendation from
the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General O’Donnell.119
Many troops believed that they received little recognition for their efforts when they
returned home. In Australia’s infantry-oriented army, the sappers felt that other officers
and soldiers were not interested in their experiences. It was more than a decade before
114
115
116
117
Letter, Prem Chand to Crocker, 23 February 1990, Crocker papers.
Letter, Pérez de Cuéllar to Evans, 21 March 1990, NAA, M3128, 39.
Interview, K.J. Gillespie, 9 March 2005.
Confidential Report – Officers: Crocker, John, UN: S0529/703/3. See also letter, C.E. McDonald,
Australian Ambassador, Cape Town, to Gration, 11 April 1990, Defence: CDF DO file 1988–94.
118 ‘Peacekeepers’ role honoured’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 15 March 1990.
119 The commendation, signed on 2 March 1990, was held in trust by the 17th Construction Squadron
but was later destroyed in a fire at Holsworthy. Fortunately copies had been made.
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Success in Namibia
those who served in Namibia were awarded the Australian Active Service Medal.120
Initially they had just been awarded the Australian Service Medal.
These disappointments do not detract from the worth of Australia’s contribution to
Untag. It was the largest deployment of Australian troops overseas since Vietnam. The
environment was always potentially hostile and dangerous, and at times it was actually
dangerous. Work was demanding in a harsh climate. It was also often boring. In all of
this the Australian soldiers were highly professional in their conduct and their approach
to the task. The Australian Defence Force learned many lessons about working in a
foreign environment, and particularly with the United Nations, as it faced a further
decade of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.121 As Gillespie put it, ‘Namibia
was the start of the re-education of our army after Vietnam.’122 Further, Untag marked
the beginning of the Australian Electoral Commission’s extensive overseas operations.
More broadly, the Untag commitment was the beginning of the government’s
acceptance that, as a good international citizen, Australia could play a significant
role in helping to bring peace to trouble spots around the world. Unfortunately, the
conditions that brought success in Namibia would not always be replicated elsewhere.
The optimism of the ‘new world order’ would not last many years beyond the Namibian
mission.
120 Commonwealth Gazette, S303, 26 July 2001.
121 In 1993 Lt Col Crago, who had commanded the 17th Construction Squadron in the first contingent,
was appointed the first commander of the ADF Peacekeeping Centre. In 1995 the Australian Army
published Training Information Bulletin No 63: United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag) in
Namibia, Headquarters Training Command, Georges Heights, 1995. Crocker and Warren were later to
work in senior UN mission appointments. Gillespie was to command Australian forces in East Timor
and the Middle East. Day was to command a combat engineer regiment in East Timor. Pippard helped
plan the Bougainville peace monitoring operation. Beutel commanded the Australian component in
Untso.
122 Interview, K.J. Gillespie, 9 March 2005.
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